Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Saturday, July 28, 2012

Unilateral Effects in Technology Markets: Oracle, H&R Block, and What It All Means

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Scott Sher and Andrea Agathoklis Murino (Wilson Sonsini) have a new article out on Unilateral Effects in Technology Markets: Oracle, H&R Block, and What It All Means.

July 28, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, July 27, 2012

Concrete Shoes for Competition - The Effect of the German Cement Cartel on Market Price

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Kai Huschelrath, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Kathrin Mueller, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) and Tobias Veith, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) describe Concrete Shoes for Competition - The Effect of the German Cement Cartel on Market Price.

ABSTRACT: We use publicly available price data from the German cement industry to estimate the cartel-induced price increase. We apply two different comparator-based approaches – the ‘before-and-after’ approach and the ‘difference-in-differences’ approach – and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel period on the overcharge estimate. We find that the cement cartel led to price overcharges in a range from 20.3 to 26.5 percent depending on model approach and model assumptions.

July 27, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Correcting the OECD's Erroneous Assessment of Telecommunications Competition in Mexico

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol Jerry Hausman (MIT) & Agustin Ros (NERA) are Correcting the OECD's Erroneous Assessment of Telecommunications Competition in Mexico.

ABSTRACT: America Movil has asked us to review and comment on the study that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published in January 2012 entitled, "Estimation of Loss in Consumer Surplus Resulting from Excessive Pricing of Telecommunication Services in Mexico" ("OECD Study"). The OECD Study concludes that high pricing of Mexico's telecommunications services caused a loss in consumer surplus estimated at $129.2 billion (USD) from 2005 to 2009, or 1.8 percent of Mexico's annual GDP. The OECD attributes this loss to lack of competition in Mexico's telecommunications sector. The OECD then used this calculated consumer-surplus loss to justify the release of another consulting report (written at Cofetel's request) recommending extensive changes to telecommunications regulations in Mexico.

There has been no loss of consumer surplus in Mexico. Rather, Mexican consumers have benefitted from consumer welfare gains. The OECD's conclusions to the contrary are incorrect and implausible. When we correct the OECD's errors and unreasonable assumptions, we find that Mexico's mobile and fixed-line prices are low and consumers are receiving billions of dollars of benefits. The mobile and fixed-line sectors perform much better than a comparable sample of its peers. The OECD's conclusion that Mexican consumers have suffered welfare losses from a lack of telecommunications competition has no basis in reality.

In Part I of this report, we explain how the OECD's refusal to provide its data to us violates the accepted practice in academic research and regulatory proceedings around the world. Such conduct would preclude publication of the OECD's results in reputable academic journals. That the OECD made its results public without even the possibility of an independent professional review borders on the unethical. In Part II, we explain how the OECD's calculation of $129.2 billion (USD) in lost consumer surplus results from mistakes, the improper use of data and seriously flawed economic analysis. The OECD's calculation relies on incorrect assumptions and commits elementary mistakes in econometric methodology. In particular, the OECD used an unrepresentative sample of rich countries to claim-falsely-that Mexican consumers are overpaying for telecommunications services. Additionally, the OECD misused price data and ignored actual market prices to create the illusion of an increase in prices and harm to consumers in Mexico that did not in fact occur. Mobile prices used in the study were not the lowest prices available to consumers in Mexico and the price changes referenced in the OECD study were not real price changes; but rather a product of the OECD's flawed pricing methodology. The OECD's flawed approach to calculating prices leads to results that are contrary to reality. The fact is that Mexican consumers are benefiting from low prices - among the lowest in Latin America - and have experienced significant gains in consumer surplus. In Part III, we select a sample of "peer" countries that are similar to Mexico in terms of GDP per capita. We review the mobile and fixed-line sectors in Mexico and find that, by proper international comparisons, Mexico's prices are low. We show that prices have declined considerably causing significant increases in purchases and benefits to consumers. The empirical evidence further refutes the OECD's conclusion that Mexico has suffered from a lack of competition in its telecommunications sectors.

In Part IV, we demonstrate that not only has there been no consumer loss in Mexico but there have, in fact, been significant gains in consumer surplus, much more than expected when compared to peer countries. We use publicly available data to estimate econometric demand and price models for Mexico's mobile and fixed-line sectors (based on a sample of peer countries). We then use these models to assess the actual performance of the Mexican telecommunications markets. Based on this analysis we find that telecommunications prices in Mexico are low. Specifically, we find that Mexico's actual mobile and fixed-line prices are below the predicted prices. In other words, Mexican consumers are paying lower prices than what one would expect based on comparisons of comparable countries. Also, and contrary to the OECD's calculation of consumer loss, we calculate that in 2011 Mexican consumers have received at least $4 to $5 billion (USD) in consumer surplus from these lower mobile prices and in 2010 they received over $1 billion (USD) in consumer surplus

July 27, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tying Having No Impact on Competition as Abuse of Market Dominance: A Comparative Analysis of Korean and American Tying Laws

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Nam Woo Kim, Yonsei Institute of Legal Studies discusses Tying Having No Impact on Competition as Abuse of Market Dominance: A Comparative Analysis of Korean and American Tying Laws.

ABSTRACT: A recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on tying, Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc. (2012), moved tying doctrine in the direction to reduce error costs by bringing an overly prohibitory liability rule, which was established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde (1984), reflecting economic learning. The Ninth Circuit, affirming the district court, held that plaintiffs’ claims of ‘higher prices’ and ‘reducing choice’ were not enough to establish anticompetitive harm and thus there should be no tying liability without substantial tied market foreclosure or exclusion.

In contrast, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) of Korea, a counterpart of the Sherman Act, prohibits exploitative abuse of monopolists. ‘Substantial’ injury to consumers through higher prices and reduced choices even without an impact on competition might still be able to trigger the MRFTA. As a result, certain types of tying, which are not subject to the Sherman Act violation, could still conflict with the MRFTA.

This article, juxtaposing two jurisdictions, suggests in the conclusion that it be a better competition policy to tolerate monopolists’ tying having no impact on competition in order to protect competitive process. Monopoly is generally blamed for charging higher prices or reducing outputs but monopoly profits can be regarded as rewards for an entrepreneur who achieved success in markets through competition. It is also rational conduct in the economic sense for a monopolist to charge monopoly price, which maximizes its profits. Therefore, condemning monopolists’ tying having no injury to competition, should be held back because it could hurt competitive process in the long term.

July 27, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, July 26, 2012

Healthcare Reform and Antitrust Enforcement: Provide Consolidation Encouraged, Scrutinized

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jane Willis, Melissa Davenport, & Ryan McManus (Ropes & Gray) analyze Healthcare Reform and Antitrust Enforcement: Provide Consolidation Encouraged, Scrutinized.

ABSTRACT: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") withstood constitutional challenge in June 2012 and will define the shape of the U.S. healthcare system for years to come. Provisions within the ACA address the dual policy goals of controlling healthcare costs and ensuring high quality care, and often do so through incentivizing providers to work together and share the responsibility for delivering high-quality care (and the risk for failing to do so). Through provisions encouraging the creation of accountable care organizations ("ACOs") and other measures that reward providers who demonstrate quality and efficiency, providers are encouraged to achieve scale and ensure a continuum of care. However, this activity may confront a number of potential existing roadblocks, not the least of which is antitrust concern about market power and related price-fixing issues. This article will address this tension, and discuss how organizations looking to consolidate may proceed.

July 26, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy, Petroleum, and Politics at the Federal Trade Commission

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Bilal Sayyed, George Mason University School of Law and Timothy J. Muris, George Mason University School of Law have posted The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy, Petroleum, and Politics at the Federal Trade Commission. Download it now!

ABSTRACT: The Federal Trade Commission has investigated the structure and competitiveness of the petroleum industry many times over the past 100 years. Some of the Commission’s most intensive investigations were initiated in response to Congressional inquiries, most notably the enormously expensive and ultimately fruitless attempt to dismember the industry vertically in the 1970s. Since that case ended in 1981, the FTC has attempted to limit the influence of “political antitrust” on the petroleum industry despite intense political interest in the price of gasoline. Although the agency has conducted several substantial investigations of the industry without finding evidence of illegal conduct, and appears to apply strict standards in its review of petroleum industry mergers (suggesting the continued influence of political considerations), on balance, the FTC has succeeded in limiting the influence of politics on its antitrust enforcement decisions.

We seek both to acknowledge and to begin to explain the FTC’s recent success, drawing primarily from incidents over the last fifteen years. We focus on three areas of intense political interest in which the FTC has avoided implementing what we think are extreme and unnecessary suggestions from congressional and local enforcement officials: (1) merger enforcement; (2) scrutiny of certain business practices, such as zone pricing; and (3) retail prices. The FTC has largely succeeded in recent years in avoiding Congressional control over its petroleum industry agenda through five steps: (1) continuity across administrations in the standards used to challenge mergers and identify problematic conduct; (2) a commitment to transparency; (3) engaging its critics and a willingness to subject itself to self-criticism through the use of retrospective reviews of its enforcement decisions; (4) a robust research agenda conducted by the FTC’s Bureau of Economics; and (5) an affirmative, pro-competition program, illustrated by the FTC Office of Policy Planning’s comments on state proposals that would limit or restrict competition in the petroleum industry.

July 26, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Liberalizing the Gas Industry: Take‐Or‐Pay Contracts, Retail Competition and Wholesale Trade

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michele Polo, Bocconi University - Department of Economics and Carlo Scarpa, University of Brescia , Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan have written on Liberalizing the Gas Industry: Take‐Or‐Pay Contracts, Retail Competition and Wholesale Trade.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines retail competition in a liberalized gas market. Vertically integrated firms run both wholesale activities (buying gas from the producers under take-or-pay obligations) and retail activities (selling gas to final customers). The market is decentralized and the firms decide which customers to serve, competing then in prices. We show that TOP clauses limit the incentives to face-to-face competition and determine segmentation and monopoly pricing even when entry of new competitors occurs. The development of wholesale trade, instead, may induce generalized entry and retail competition. This equilibrium outcome is obtained if a compulsory wholesale market is introduced, even when firms are vertically integrated, or under vertical separation of wholesale and retail activites when firms can use only linear bilateral contracts.

July 26, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Exclusivity in High-Tech Industries: Evidence from the French Case

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Patrice Bougette, University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis - Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (GREDEG CNRS), LAMETA CNRS, Frederic M Marty, Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG), Julien Pillot, Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG) and Patrice Reis, Law, Economics, and Management Research Group discuss Exclusivity in High-Tech Industries: Evidence from the French Case.

ABSTRACT: The iPhone exclusivity deal illustrates the complex issue of exclusive arrangements in high-tech industries. Previous law cases on broadcasting right restrictions also highlighted the risk of anticompetitive foreclosure through such contractual clauses. This paper questions the French competition authorities’ decisions in the light of economic analysis. If such exclusive agreements foster incentives to invest and innovate, they may also be considered as exclusionary practices.

July 26, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The European Commission's Closer Look on the Pharmaceutical Sector - New Development on the Interface between IP and Antitrust Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Simon Baier, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies examines The European Commission's Closer Look on the Pharmaceutical Sector - New Development on the Interface between IP and Antitrust Law.

ABSTRACT: A recent investigation of the EU's pharmaceutical market carried out by the European Commission has been shedding new light on the question of abuse of a dominant position pursuant to Article 102 TFEU by holding, acquisition or exploitation of IP rights. This so-called 'sector inquiry' identified practices and strategies which 'originator companies' exert on a large scale in order to target competitors, and found that such behavior results in significantly higher costs for buyers and competitors, in delay in the entry of generic medicine as well as in the access to innovative medicine, and in obstruction of innovation. This article investigates recent antitrust proceedings by the Commission and the decision practice of the European Courts - within and beyond the pharmaceutical sector - and argues that the practices revealed by the sector inquiry can be predominantly assumed to lack objective justification, lead to foreclosure of competitors and therefore constitute infringements of Article 102 TFEU. Towards the end, the article shows that the Commission's proactive policy in IP-related antitrust matters and its sensitivity to issues of abusive acquisition of intellectual property and abuse of public procedures by misleading representations establish a new quality in the application of European antitrust law, and serve as a guidance how to draw the line between IP protection, lawful business strategies and anti-competitive behavior under EU law.

July 26, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

Metcash, Market Power and Counterfactuals - The Standard of Proof in Australian and New Zealand Competition Laws

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Cento Veljanovski, Case Associates, Institute of Economic Affairs, Centre for Regulation and Market Analysis (CRMA) discusses Metcash, Market Power and Counterfactuals - The Standard of Proof in Australian and New Zealand Competition Laws.

ABSTRACT: The standard of proof required in merger cases has become the centre of considerable controversies and confusion following the Australian Federal Court’s decision in Metcash. This paper reviews the use of counterfactuals and the inherent contradictions in adopting the real chance standard of proof. It also critically examines the different approaches of the judgments in Metcash, and the more formal approach by the New Zealand High Court in the Warehouse decision. This is assessed using probability theory. The discussion points to the adoption of the balance of probabilities as the requisite standard of proof, and a watering down of the counterfactual in preference to a more direct approach to merger assessments. The discussion also critically assesses the use of counterfactuals in monopolisation and anticompetitive practices cases under Australian and New Zealand competition laws.

July 25, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Comparative Antitrust Federalism: Review of Cengiz, Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Herb Hovenkamp (Iowa) offers a review of Comparative Antitrust Federalism: Review of Cengiz, Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US.

ABSTRACT: This brief essay reviews Firat Cengiz’s book “Federalism in the EU and the US” (2012), which compares the role of federalism in the competition law of the European Union and the United States. Both of these systems are “federal,” of course, because both have individual nation-states (Europe) or states (US) with their own individual competition provisions, but also an overarching competition law that applies to the entire group. This requires a certain amount of cooperation with respect to both territorial reach and substantive coverage.

July 25, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Payment Card Interchange Fees: Assessing the Effectiveness of Antitrust Investigations and Regulation in Europe

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Santiago Carbo-Valverde, Universidad de Granada and Jose Manuel Linares-Zegarra, University of St. Andrews - School of Management describe Payment Card Interchange Fees: Assessing the Effectiveness of Antitrust Investigations and Regulation in Europe.

ABSTRACT: This article provides empirical evidence on the impact of different interventions by public authorities on interchange fees (IFs) and cross-border multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) on both adoption and usage of payment cards in the EU-27. Controlling for social and financial characteristics across countries, we find no statistically significant effects on payment card adoption. However, we find mixed results on payment card usage after specific regulatory events: IFs regulation and investigations seem to have increased the number of transactions per card, mandatory reductions in IFs seem to have a negative impact on the value of transactions per card, and antitrust and regulatory scrutiny related to MIFs is found to increase the number of transactions per card but to reduce the value of transactions per POS. Additionally, the results show that specific regulatory and antitrust investigations related to both IFs and MIFs have statistically significant effects on card transactions as a proportion of all transactions made in a specific country.

July 25, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Call For Papers and Proposals Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth Research Roundtable and edited book on Technology Standards and Innovation

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Call For Papers and Proposals
Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and
Economic Growth Research Roundtable and edited book on Technology Standards and
Innovation


Max Schanzenbach, Director
Daniel F. Spulber, Research
Director

Thursday, February 7, 2013 - Friday February 8, 2013, Chicago,
IL

The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth is issuing a
call for original research papers and proposals to be presented at a Research
Roundtable Conference on Technology Standards and Innovation. The conference
will be held at the Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago, IL on
Thursday, February 7, 2013 and Friday February 8, 2013.

OVERVIEW: The
papers will be published in an edited volume and cannot be submitted elsewhere
for publication. There will be time after the conference to prepare completed
drafts of the papers before publication. The conference will obtain a publisher
after the book is completed.

At this stage, research proposals and
preliminary versions of papers are sufficient. If a proposal is accepted for the
conference and volume, the authors will receive an honorarium of $8,000 for the
completed paper. Additional details will be provided upon submission. We are
seeking both empirical and theoretical work in economics.

The conference
and edited volume are being organized by Daniel F. Spulber (Northwestern
University).

The goal of this conference is to provide a forum where
economists and legal scholars can gather together with Northwestern's own
distinguished faculty to present and discuss high-quality research relevant to
intellectual property (IP) protection, innovation, and
entrepreneurship.

This conference will be an important component of the
Searle Center's expanded innovation focus. Conference participants will explore
the connections between IP, invention, and innovation through empirical and
theoretical economic and legal analysis. The Searle Center has received support
from Qualcomm and other companies and institutions.

THEME AND TOPICS: The
theme of the conference is on market-based approaches to standard setting. The
conference will explore the economic benefits and costs of intellectual property
(IP) protections in the context of standards. The conference will focus on the
positive economics of incentives for invention and incentives for innovation and
commercialization rather than the more standard normative economics calling for
regulation of technology transfer contracts. The conference will focus on
generating new and original scholarship in the following areas.
- Benefits
and costs of technology standards in a market equilibrium setting
- Market
coordination of technology adoption by inventors, innovators, investors,
consumers
- Coordination by market participants through Standard Setting
Organizations (SSOs)
- Implications of technology standards for invention
incentives
- Implications of technology standards for innovation
(commercialization of technology)
- Implications of technology standards for
investment in application and development of technology
- Technology
standards and antitrust policy
- Technology standards, licensing, and
patents

PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE: Proposals and papers for the
conference should be submitted to Susie Caruso at the following email address:
[email protected]

REVIEW
PROCEDURE AND TIMELINE: Conference Papers Submission Deadline: Proposals for the
conference and edited volume should be submitted to Susie Caruso at the
following email address: [email protected] by
August 30, 2012.

Notification Deadline: Authors will be notified of
decisions by September 10, 2012.

FURTHER INFORMATION: The Searle Center
on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law
was established in 2006 to research how government regulation and interpretation
of laws and regulations by the courts affect business and economic growth.
Information on the Searle Center's activities may be found at: http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter

July 25, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

MLex Interview with Almunia on Google

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

MLex has an exclusive interview with Almunia on a settlement with Google.

July 25, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Brazilian National Champions and Antitrust Policy: Interaction and Challenges

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Lucas Mendes, Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) discusses Brazilian National Champions and Antitrust Policy: Interaction and Challenges.

ABSTRACT: This paper aims to discuss the interface between antitrust and National Champions industrial policy. Therefore it seeks to contribute in the field of study involving the relationship between antitrust policy and the Theory of Industrial Organization. The theme of National Champions imposes a series of challenges to Brazilian antitrust authorities on how to proceed in a merger encouraged by the policy of fostering this kind of company. Currently, the topic is becoming more important due to a combination of political and economic factors that allowed the emergence of several Brazilian National Champions companies. From an inductive perspective of analysis and based on case studies, reports, analysis of legislation, jurisprudence, doctrine and comparative law, this paper concludes that there is not necessarily a conflict between antitrust and the industrial policy of promoting National Champions. In this sense, there is a broad field for complementarities between these two policies that can contribute to the design and enforce both these public policies.

July 25, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Antitrust Reverse Termination Fees--2012 Mid-Year Update

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Dale Collins (Shearman & Sterling) has updated his antitrust reverse termination fee study. See here.

July 24, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Between the ACA and Antitrust Enforcers: A Rock and a Hard Place or an Opportunity?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Toby G. Singer & David Pearl (Jones Day) ask Between the ACA and Antitrust Enforcers: A Rock and a Hard Place or an Opportunity?

ABSTRACT: With the Supreme Court having resolved the constitutionality of the individual mandate component of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, interested parties are now turning their attention to trying to divine how the ACA, mandate and all, will work in practice, as it gets fully phased in over the next several years. One refrain we have been hearing is that the ACA will push health care organizations to consolidate and that this push is in direct conflict with the DOJ and FTC's resurgent efforts to vigorously enforce the antitrust laws in the health care industry. As antitrust attorneys, we have several reactions to this statement: (1) we need to unpack what is meant by consolidation because (2) different types of consolidation have different antitrust implications that (3) health care organizations considering a merger need to understand.

Since the passage of the ACA, experts have disagreed over the impact it will have on competition in the health care industry. In a recent example, in May of this year, Congress held a hearing entitled, "Health Care Consolidation and Competition after PPACA" to address just this issue. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee and witnesses associated with the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation argued, among other things, that various provisions of the ACA will create incentives for health care organizations, both providers and insurers, to consolidate their operations, leading to a decrease in competition and harm to consumers. In opposition, Professor Thomas Greaney of Saint Louis University College of Law argued that the trend in increased market concentration in health care stretches back decades before the advent of the ACA and that the ACA itself, whether it will lead to consolidation or not, promotes competition in a number of ways, including through its creation of health care exchanges and fostering of new delivery systems.

This debate has understandably raised concerns among industry participants about whether they are about to find themselves between Scylla and Charybdis, urged by one part of the federal government to merge while another part of it lies in wait, ready to pounce at any hint of an increased market share. Whatever the ultimate merits of the differing views on the impact of the ACA on incentives to consolidate, we feel it important to be precise about the meaning of consolidation, as some of the previous debate has failed to do.

July 24, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

William Page (Florida) has authored Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis.

ABSTRACT: Antitrust remedies -- criminal and civil, public and private, penalties and injunctions -- are supposed to “eliminate the effects of the illegal conduct” and “restore competition.” In pursuing these goals, courts and enforcers are guided by the standard of economic efficiency and by certain assumptions about the relative capabilities of markets and regulators. A substantial literature now examines the optimal use of antitrust remedies in specific contexts or for specific offenses to achieve economic efficiency. In this essay, I draw on these studies to develop an integrated, albeit schematic, account of how courts and agencies might optimally deploy the various remedies to deter or enjoin collusive and exclusionary practices.

July 24, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Crane Responds to Baker and Shapiro on Continuity in Antitrust

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Dan Crane (Michigan) has responded to the critique by Baker & Shapiro of Crane's writing on the continuity of merger enforcement between Bush and Obama administrations.

July 24, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Fordham Competition Law Institute 39th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Dates for the 39th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy: 
Thursday, September 20 & Friday,  September 21, 2012
.

The conference will be held at McNally Amphitheater, Fordham Law School, located at 140 West 62nd Street, New York, NY.

Each year, a full two-day program focuses on a wide range of issues related to antitrust policy and enforcement. Leaders in the field, representing competition authorities, the judiciary, private practice and the academia, regularly contribute to the success of the conference as speakers and discussants.

The conference attracts close to 400 participants, including competition authorities from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin/South America and North America, as well as practitioners and academics.


------------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY

8:30
Breakfast & Registration

9:00
Introduction
Barry E. Hawk
Director, Fordham Competition Law Institute, New York

Antitrust Policy and the FTC
Jonathan D.  Leibowitz
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Washington

EU Competition Policy
Joaquin Almunia
Commissioner for Competition, EU Commission, Brussels

Panel Discussion
A. Paul Victor --- Presider, Winston & Strawn, New York
Ray V. Hartwell III, Hunton & Williams, Washington
Ulrich Schnelle, Haver & Mailander, Stuttgart

    
11:00
Specialized Antitrust Courts

Hon. Douglas H. Ginsburg
Chief Judge, U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, Washington
  
Hon. Peter Roth,
Justice of the High Court of England and Wales
Chairman of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal

Panel Discussion
Hon. Frederic Jenny, Presider, Cour de cassation, Paris
Frank  Montag, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Brussels
Daniel S. Savrin, Bingham McCutchen, Boston

1:00
Lunch

2:30
Market Definition in Antitrust
Louis Kaplow
Harvard Law School, Cambridge

Kai-uwe Kuhn
Chief Economist, DG Competition, EU Commission, Brussels

Gregory Werden
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Washington
  
Panel Discussion
Ilene K. Gotts --- Presider, Wachtell Lipton, Rosen & Katz,  New York
Bruno Lasserre, President, Autorite de la concurrence, Paris
Ramsey Shehadeh, NERA, New York
Gerwin Van Gerven, Linklaters, Brussels
 
6:00
Reception

------------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY

8:30
Breakfast & Registration
 
9:00
Innovation and Competition
Alexander Italianer
Director-General for Competition, EU Commission, Brussels

Panel Discussion
Ronan P. Harty --- Presider, Davis Polk & Wardwell, New York  
Michael Reynolds, Allen & Overy, Brussels
Philippe Rincazaux, Orrick Rambaud Martel, Paris

Antitrust  Developments in India and Mexico
S.N. Dhingra
Competition Commission of India, New Delhi

Eduardo Perez Motta
President, Comision Federal de Competencia, Mexico City

Panel Discussion
Michael D. Blechman --- Presider, Kaye Scholer, New York
Luis Omar Guerrero Rodriguez, Barrera Siqueiros Torres Landa, Mexico City
Pradeep S. Mehta, President, CUTS International, New Delhi

12:30
Lunch

2:00 
Antitrust Policy in the Information Age
Joseph Wayland
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington

Antitrust and Information Products
Mark Patterson
Fordham Law School, New York

Non-Exclusionary Abuses under EU Competition Law
Renato Nazzini
Labruna Mazziotti Segni, Southampton University, Southampton, Milan

Two-sided markets and predation/abuse 
Marc Rysman, Boston University, Boston

Panel Discussion
Herbert Hovenkamp --- Presider, Iowa Law School, Iowa City
Kai-uwe Kuhn, Chief Economist, DG Competition, EU Commission, Brussels

6:00
Closing
 

July 24, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)