Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

EU Competition Law and the Information and Communication Technology Network Industries

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Andrej Fatur has a new book on EU Competition Law and the Information and Communication Technology Network Industries.

ABSTRACT: Competition policies have long been based on a scholarly tradition focused on static models and static analysis of industrial organisation. However, recent developments in industrial organisation literature have led to significant advances, moving beyond traditional static models and a preoccupation with price competition, to consider the organisation of industries in a dynamic context. This is especially important in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) network industries where competition centres on network effects, innovation and intellectual property rights, and where the key driver of consumer benefit is technological progress. Consequently, when an antitrust intervention is contemplated, a number of considerations that arise out of the specific nature of the ICT sector have to be taken into account to ensure improved consumer welfare. This book considers the adequacy of existing EU competition policy in the area of the ICT industries in the light of the findings of modern economic theory. Particular attention is given to the implications of these dynamic markets for the competitive assessment and treatment of the most common competitive harms in this area, such as non-price predatory practices, tying and bundling, co-operative standard setting, platform joint ventures and co-operative R&D.

Antirust Professors on the Move and Visiting for 2012-13

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

I am looking to compile a list of antitrust faculty who have accepted entry level or lateral offers and will be moving this summer to a new institution. Also let me know if there are any profs doing a visit next year.

Remarks as Prepared for Delivery By Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division Sharis A. Pozen at the Brookings Institution

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Remarks as Prepared for Delivery By Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division Sharis A. Pozen at the Brookings Institution are now up.

Competition Policy in Infrastructure Specific Sectors in the Estonian Case: Entwining of Natural Monopoly and Universal Service

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Diana Eerma, University of Tartu - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration and Juri Sepp, University of Tartu have written on Competition Policy in Infrastructure Specific Sectors in the Estonian Case: Entwining of Natural Monopoly and Universal Service.

ABSTRACT: There is a growing consensus that the successful development of infrastructure specific sectors depends a lot on the adaption of appropriate public policies and the effective implementation of these policies. The way how regulation is implemented plays an important role in infrastructure development and use. In the article the means of regulating economic policy in Estonia are systematized and evaluated looking at practices regarding both natural monopoly and universal service.

The Oligopoly Problem in EU Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol Nicolas Petit (Liege) discusses The Oligopoly Problem in EU Competition Law. ABSTRACT: This paper offers a complete overview of the oligopoly problem in competition law and economics, with a specific focus on European Union (EU) law. A related purpose of the paper is to challenge the dominant view that merger control is the ultimate preventive remedy against tacit collusion. On close analysis, the merger-only enforcement paradigm against tacit collusion generates a systemic risk of type II errors. Part of this enforcement gap may, however, be alleviated through a more muscular enforcement of the rules on coordinated conduct (i.e. Article 101 TFEU) and on unilateral conduct (i.e. Article 102 TFEU). In this later respect, the paper formulates a possible theory of harm that would entitle agencies and courts to apply Article 102 TFEU to specific types of conduct by oligopolists.

The concept of abuse of collective dominance may in particular be applied to the artificial tactics which oligopolists adopt to protect an observed collusive equilibrium from the natural, disruptive effect caused by an external shock (entry, natural disaster, change in tax rate, etc.). In this sense, the paper is different from other scholarly proposals that recommend applying rules on unilateral conduct to excessive oligopoly prices and/or facilitating practices.

Price Discrimination and Fairness Concerns

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Florian Englmaier, University of Wurzburg - Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, Linda Gratz, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich - Munich Graduate School of Economics (MGSE) and Markus Reisinger, WHU - Otto Beisheim Graduate School of Management have written on Price Discrimination and Fairness Concerns.

ABSTRACT: We analyze the profitability of third degree price discrimination under consideration of consumers' fairness concerns within an experiment and explain the results within a theoretical framework. We find that with an increase in the price differential negative reciprocal reactions by disadvantaged consumers become stronger compared to positive reciprocal reactions by advantaged consumers. Consequently, the profit maximizing price differential lies below the one predicted to be optimal by standard theory. Further, profitability increases when consumers who are regarded as poorer are charged lower prices compared to when the wealth of the different consumer groups is unknown.