December 10, 2012
The Role of Coordination Bias in Platform Competition
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Hanna Halaburda (Strategy Unit, Harvard Business School) and Yaron Yehezkel (Faculty of Management, Tel-Aviv University) explore The Role of Coordination Bias in Platform Competition.
ABSTRACT: This paper considers platform competition in a two-sided market that includes buyers and sellers. One of the platforms benefits from a favorable coordination bias in the market, in that the two sides are more likely to join the advantaged platform. We find that the degree of the coordination bias affects the platform's decision regarding the business model (i.e., whether to subsidize buyers or sellers), the access fees and the size of the platform. A slight increase in the coordination bias may induce the advantaged platform to switch from subsidizing sellers to subsidizing buyers, or induce the disadvantaged platform to switch from subsidizing buyers to subsidizing sellers. Moreover, in the former case the advantaged platform switches from oversupplying to undersupplying sellers, while in the latter case the disadvantaged platform switches from undersupplying to oversupplying sellers.
December 10, 2012 | Permalink
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