The Goals of Antitrust - October 26, 2012 George Washington University School of Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

 

Updated: October 18, 2012

 

The Goals of Antitrust

October 26, 2012

George Washington University School of Law

 

8:20-8:50: Continental Breakfast

8:50-9:00 Opening Remarks

9:00-10:30 First Session

• Jonathan Baker

Pursuing Antitrust’s Goals in a Political Context 

• Joshua Wright, George Mason University School of Law & Douglas Ginsburg, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, NYU School of Law

The Goals of Antitrust: Why Welfare Trumps Choice 

• Robert Lande, University of Baltimore School of Law

A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Antitrust Statutes: The Efficiency v. Wealth Transfer Debate

10:45-12:15 Second Session

• Roger Blair, the University of Florida Department of Economics & Daniel Sokol, University of Florida Levin College of Law

Welfare Standards in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement 

• Dale Collins, Shearman & Sterling

The Revealed Choice of Antitrust Norms 

• Maurice Stucke, University of Tennessee College of Law

Should Antitrust Promote Happiness? 

12:15-1:30 Lunch

• Keynote Speaker: William Kovacic, George Washington University School of Law

The Lifecycle of Goals in Systems of Competition Law

1:30-3:00: Third Session

• Harry First, NYU School of Law & Spencer Waller, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law

Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit 

• John Kirkwood, Seattle University School of Law

Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct: The Goal With the Widest Support 

• Alan Meese, William & Mary Law School

Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser and Total Welfare: Removing the Blinders Imposed by the Partial Equilibrium Tradeoff Model

 3:15-4:45: Fourth Session

• Einer Elhauge, Harvard Law School

Ironically, Total Welfare Is Advanced Better by a Consumer Welfare Test 

• Barak Orbach, University of Arizona College of Law

Goals for Antitrust 

• Steven Salop, Georgetown University Law Center

Merger Settlement and Enforcement Strategy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare