Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Thursday, September 6, 2012

Endogenous Market Structures and Welfare

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Federico Etro (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca Foscari) addresses Endogenous Market Structures and Welfare.

ABSTRACT: I characterize microfounded endogenous market structures with Bertrand and Cournot competition and perform welfare analysis generalizing the Mankiw-Whinston condition for excess entry. The impact of market leaders on welfare is reconsidered, with a number of policy implications about strategic investments, vertical contracts, bundling, mergers and more. The neutrality of consumer surplus holds only when utility is homothetic. Under quantity competition, aggressive (accommodating) leaders increase consumer surplus if the elasticity of utility is decreasing (increasing) in consumption. This provides general rules to evaluate mergers and abuse of dominance issues in antitrust policy.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/09/endogenous-market-structures-and-welfare.html

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