August 22, 2012
Endogenous Market Structures and Welfare
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Federico Etro, Ca Foscari University of Venice explains Endogenous Market Structures and Welfare.
ABSTRACT: I characterize microfounded endogenous market structures with Bertrand and Cournot competition and perform welfare analysis generalizing the Mankiw-Whinston condition for excess entry. The impact of market leaders on welfare is reconsidered, with a number of policy implications about strategic investments, vertical contracts, bundling, mergers and . The neutrality of consumer surplus holds only when utility is homothetic. Under quantity competition, aggressive (accommodating) leaders increase consumer surplus if the elasticity of utility is decreasing (increasing) in consumption. This provides general rules to evaluate mergers and abuse of dominance issues in antitrust policy.
August 22, 2012 | Permalink
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