August 6, 2012
Competition under Consumer Loss Aversion
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Heiko Karle, Universite Libre de Bruxelles and Martin Peitz, University of Mannheim explain Competition under Consumer Loss Aversion.
ABSTRACT: We address the effect of contextual consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in imperfect competition. Consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the moment of purchase. However, some consumers are initially uninformed about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match—value and price distribution, while others are perfectly informed all the time. We show that, in duopoly, a larger share of informed consumers leads to a less competitive outcome if the asymmetry between firms is sufficiently large and that narrowing the set of products which consumers consider leads to a more competitive outcome.
August 6, 2012 | Permalink
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