Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Antitrust in Innovative Industries: the Optimal Legal Standards

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Giovanni Immordino (Salerno) and Michele Polo )Bocconi) theorize on Antitrust in Innovative Industries: the Optimal Legal Standards.

ABSTRACT: We study the interaction between a firm that invests in research and, if successful, undertakes a practice to exploit the innovation, and an enforcer that sets legal standards, fines and accuracy. In innovative industries deterrence on actions interacts with deterrence on research. A per-se legality rule prevails when the practice increases expected welfare, moving to a discriminating rule combined with type-I accuracy for higher probabilities of social harm. Moreover, discriminating rules should be adopted more frequently in traditional industries than in innovative environments; patent and antitrust policies are substitutes; additional room for per-se (illegality) rules emerges when fines are bounded.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/06/antitrust-in-innovative-industries-the-optimal-legal-standards.html

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