June 27, 2012
Antitrust in Innovative Industries: the Optimal Legal Standards
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Giovanni Immordino (Salerno) and Michele Polo )Bocconi) theorize on Antitrust in Innovative Industries: the Optimal Legal Standards.
ABSTRACT: We study the interaction between a firm that invests in research and, if successful, undertakes a practice to exploit the innovation, and an enforcer that sets legal standards, fines and accuracy. In innovative industries deterrence on actions interacts with deterrence on research. A per-se legality rule prevails when the practice increases expected welfare, moving to a discriminating rule combined with type-I accuracy for higher probabilities of social harm. Moreover, discriminating rules should be adopted more frequently in traditional industries than in innovative environments; patent and antitrust policies are substitutes; additional room for per-se (illegality) rules emerges when fines are bounded.
June 27, 2012 | Permalink
TrackBack URL for this entry:
Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Antitrust in Innovative Industries: the Optimal Legal Standards: