Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Monday, May 28, 2012

VERTICAL THEORY OF HARM IN A HORIZONTAL MERGER: THE FRIESLAND FOODS/CAMPINA CASE

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst (Department of Economics, Erasmus School of Economics and Tinbergen Institute) and Vitaly Pruzhansky analyze VERTICAL THEORY OF HARM IN A HORIZONTAL MERGER: THE FRIESLAND FOODS/CAMPINA CASE.

ABSTRACT: In December 2008, the European Commission (EC) cleared the proposed merger between the two largest dairy cooperatives in the Netherlands. The transaction raised several interesting economic issues that were hotly debated during the EC investigation. In this article, we review the EC's proposed theory of harm relating to the impact of the merger on the market for raw milk in the Netherlands and the ability of the parties' competitors to source raw milk (a critical input) post-merger. We show that the EC's theory is unlikely to be supported by economic theory and facts of the market.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/05/vertical-theory-of-harm-in-a-horizontal-merger-the-friesland-foodscampina-case.html

| Permalink

TrackBack URL for this entry:

http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341bfae553ef0168eb39a270970c

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference VERTICAL THEORY OF HARM IN A HORIZONTAL MERGER: THE FRIESLAND FOODS/CAMPINA CASE:

Comments

Post a comment