May 23, 2012
Applications Barrier to Entry and Exclusive Vertical Contracts in Platform Markets
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
James E. Prieger, Pepperdine University - School of Public Policy and Wei‐Min Hu, Pepperdine have written on Applications Barrier to Entry and Exclusive Vertical Contracts in Platform Markets.
ABSTRACT: Our study extends the empirical literature on whether vertical restraints are anticompetitive. We focus on exclusive contracting in platform markets, which feature indirect network effects and thus are susceptible to an applications barrier to entry. Exclusive contracts in vertical relationships between the platform provider and software supplier can heighten entry barriers. We test these theories in the home video game market. We find that indirect network effects from software on hardware demand are present, and that exclusivity takes market share from rivals, but only when most games are nonexclusive. The marginal exclusive game contributes virtually nothing to console demand. Thus, allowing exclusive vertical contracts in platform markets need not lead to domination by one system protected by a hedge of complementary software. Our investigation suggests that bargaining power enjoyed by the best software providers and the skewed distribution of game revenue prevents the foreclosure of rivals through exclusive contracting.
May 23, 2012 | Permalink
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