Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, April 16, 2012

The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Andreas Mantovani (Department of Economics, University of Bologna) and Jan Vandekerckhove (Department of Economics, Maastricht University) describe The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets.

ABSTRACT: In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the degree of competitive pressure in the market, either both pairs decide to merge (with or without bundling), or only one pair merges and bundles, while rivals remain independent. The latter case can very harmful for consumers as it brings surge in prices. We also consider the case in which one pair moves first. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where first movers merge but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/04/the-strategic-interplay-between-bundling-and-merging-in-complementary-markets-.html

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