Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, March 19, 2012

Promoting Competition by Coordinating Prices: When Rivals Share Intellectual Property

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Nancy Gallinim (UBC) has an interesting article on Promoting Competition by Coordinating Prices: When Rivals Share Intellectual Property.

ABSTRACT: The paper examines technology agreements and the standards process from which they emerge when members supply inputs to the alliance while simultaneously competing with it. Under this overlapping ownership structure, pool members are horizontally related. I show that strategic complementarity between the downstream products owned by a member and those arising from the collaboration is sufficient for a pool to be pro-competitive. Although patent pools are more efficient than uncoordinated pricing, consumers are better off if an outside firm rather than a pool member owns the non-pool competing product. Antitrust rules facilitating efficient IP agreements under overlapping ownership and their implications for the direction of technological change are derived.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/03/promoting-competition-by-coordinating-prices-when-rivals-share-intellectual-property-.html

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