Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, February 6, 2012

Organizational structure, strategic delegation and innovation in oligopolistic industries

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Evangelos Mitrokostas (University of Portsmouth) Emmanuel Petrakis (University of Crete) address Organizational structure, strategic delegation and innovation in oligopolistic industries.

ABSTRACT: We endogenize firms’ organizational structures in a homogenous goods duopoly where firms invest in cost reducing R&D and compete in quantities, and examine their impact on R&D efforts, market performance and social welfare. Each firm’s owner can either delegate to a manager both market competition and R&D investment decisions (Full Delegation strategy) or delegate the market competition decision alone (Partial Delegation strategy). We show that when the initial marginal cost is relatively high, Universal Full Delegation emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, an asymmetric equilibrium with one owner choosing a Full Delegation strategy and the other a Partial Delegation strategy arises. Welfare is always higher in the asymmetric equilibrium configuration, thus, market and societal incentives are not always aligned. Finally, Universal Partial Delegation can arise in equilibrium only if goods are poor substitutes! or if competition is in prices.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/02/organizational-structure-strategic-delegation-and-innovation-in-oligopolistic-industries.html

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