Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Thursday, January 12, 2012

Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Kai Andree (University of Potsdam) has written on Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition.

ABSTRACT: This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/01/collusion-in-spatially-separated-markets-with-quantity-competition-.html

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