Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Saturday, February 12, 2011

European Competition Journal : Volume 6 . Number 3 . December 2010

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

EUROPEAN COMPETITION JOURNAL

Volume 6 . Number 3 . December 2010

 

We are very pleased to let you know that the 3rd issue of the 2010 volume of European Competition Journal has just been published. Please see below for the table of contents, information about online access and details on how to subscribe.

 

CONTENTS

 

The Use by Irish Courts of EU Jurisprudence to Resolve Conflicts between National Competition Law and Regulation: Panda Waste

Philip Andrews and Paul K Gorecki

 

Rediscovering the Spirit of Competition: On the Normative Value of the Competitive Process

Oles Andriychuk

 

Open Standards: Public Policy Aspects and Competition Law Requirements

Marcus Glader

 

Left Behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Object under Article 101(1)

Alison Jones

 

Fishy Business: Multijurisdictional Treatment of a Horizontal Merger in Salmon Farming

Peter Møllgaard

 

The Ordoliberal Notion of Market Power: An Institutionalist Reassessment

Massimiliano Vatiero

 

Current Developments In Member States

Edited by Mark Clough and Donald Slater

 

ONLINE ACCESS

To access this issue online, read the abstracts and purchase individual papers please click here.

February 12, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Great Doctrinal Debate: Under What Circumstances is Section 5 Superior to Section 2?

Friday, February 11, 2011

Understanding UPP

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Roy J. Epstein, BC - Econ and  Daniel L. Rubinfeld, University of California at Berkeley - School of Law, NYU Law School have written on Understanding UPP.

ABSTRACT: Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro have proposed a measure of Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) as offering a presumption of anticompetitive unilteral effects in a merger. We explaini that the underlying framework (which relies on Bertrand competition) is in fact a special case of a more general merger simulation methodology. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the framework as a policy tool.

February 11, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Seeking out and building monopolies, Rothschild strategies in non ferrous metals international markets (1830-1940)

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Miguel A. López-Morell (Universidad de Murcia) and Jos M. O'Kean (Departamento de Economía, Universidad Pablo de Olavide & IE Business School) have undertaken some historical work in their piece Seeking out and building monopolies, Rothschild strategies in non ferrous metals international markets (1830-1940).

ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to analyse the strategies employed by the Rothschilds until 1940 to limit competition in the non ferrous international market. We will study how they opted for rigid demand products of highly concentrated supply which were favourable to market control (mercury, nickel, lead and copper and sulphur) by assuming administrative monopolies (mercury from Spanish Almadn Mines) or through control of the leading businesses of the respective markets (Le Nickel, Pearroya and Rio Tinto). We will also analyse how the family was able to gain worldwide monopolies, or if not, how they promoted collusive oligopolies with the competition in any number of forms in their quest to maintain profitability and to flee from any competition.

February 11, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Global Competition Law Conference: Competition Law and the State

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Global Competition Law Conference:
Competition Law and the State
18 & 19 March 2011, Hong Kong


Register here

 

Conference Schedule

Friday 18 March 2011

08:30 Registration
09.00 Welcome and Introduction
Professor Dame Hazel Genn DBE QC (Dean, UCL Faculty of Laws)
Professor Johannes Chan (Dean, The University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law)
Dr Ioannis Lianos (UCL, Co-Director, Global Competition Law and Economics Series)
Professor Daniel Sokol (University of Florida, Co-Director, Global Competition Law and Economics Series)
09:15 Official Address:
Mr Gregory So (Under Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region)
09:30 KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Government in Markets

Keynote Speaker:
John Fingleton (Chairman, UK Office of Fair Trading)

Chair:
Judge Frederic Jenny (Cour de Cassation and Chairman, OECD Competition Committee)

Respondents:

  • Allan Fels (Dean, Australian and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG))
  • William Kovacic (Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission)
  • Eduardo Pérez Motta (President, Federal Competition Committee, Mexico)

Followed by discussion

10:45 COFFEE BREAK
11:00 SESSION 1:
Controlling anticompetitive action by the State: ex ante approaches (competition advocacy, competitive neutrality, competition law assessment of projected legislation)


Chair: William Kovacic (Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission)
Panelists:
  • Michal Gal (Professor of Law, University of Haifa)
  • Michiyo Hamada (Commissioner, Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC))
  • Gert-Jan.Koopman (Deputy Director General (State Aids) European Commission - OECD)
  • Simon Milnes (Infrastructure, Competition and Consumer Division, the Australian Treasury)
  • Eduardo Pérez Motta (President, Federal Competition Committee, Mexico)
  • Shiying Xu (Institute of Competition Law, East China University of Political Science and Law)
13:00 The Baker & McKenzie Speakers' Lunch
Light Lunch for other attendees
14:00 SESSION 2:
Competition law and state regulation: Setting the stage and focus on state-owned companies


Chair: Gert-Jan.Koopman (Deputy Director General (State Aids) European Commission - OECD)
Panelists:
  • Gregory Leonard (Senior Vice-President, NERA)
  • Yena Lim Hua Yen (Chief executive, Competition Commission of Singapore)
  • Tony Prosser (Professor of Law, University of Bristol, Law School)
  • Huang Yong (Professor of Law, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) School of Law, Beijing)
  • Representative (Baker & McKenzie LLP)
15:45 COFFEE BREAK
16:00

SESSION 3:
Controlling anticompetitive action by the State: ex post approaches (state aids, state action doctrine, state sponsored cartels and anticompetitive practices)

Chair: Dhanendra Kumar (Chairman, Competition Commission of India)
Panelists:

  • Joseph P Bauer (Professor of Law, The University of Notre Dame Law School)
  • Thomas Cheng (Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law)
  • Damien Geradin (University of Tilburg & Covington & Burling LLP)
  • Gavin Robert (Partner, Linklaters LLP)
  • Willard Tom (General Counsel, US Federal Trade Commission )
17:30 COFFEE BREAK
17:45

SESSION 4: Authorities Roundtable
Exemptions from the application of competition law / the challenge of applying competition law to foreign state activities: comparative and international perspectives


Chair: Allan Fels (Dean, Australian and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG))
Panelists:

  • Gert-Jan.Koopman (Deputy Director General (State Aids) European Commission - OECD)
  • Dhanedra Kumar (Chairman, Competition Commission of India)
  • Zhu Zhong Liang (Anti-Monopoly Bureau, MOFCOM)
  • Yena Lim Hua Yen, (Chief Executive, Competition Commission of Singapore)
19:30 Close of Day one

Saturday 19 March - Competition law and the challenge of the evolving definition and structure of State activities

09:30 Registration and refreshments
10:00 SESSION 5:
Competition law, regulation and the challenge of private interests: Self-regulation by professional associations and legitimate lobbying


Chair: Eduardo Pérez Motta (President, Federal Competition Committee, Mexico)
Panelists:
  • Assimakis Komninos (Commissioner, Hellenic Competition Commission)
  • Paul Lugard (TBC) (former Head of Antitrust, Philips; Vice-Chair, Competition Commission BIAC; Lecturer Tilburg University)
  • D. Daniel Sokol, (Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida)
  • Mark Williams (Professor of Law, The Hong Kong Polytechnic)
11:30 Coffee Break
11:45 SESSION 6
The interaction between competition law and regulatory alternatives (case studies: broadcasting, energy, digital media)


Chair: Gert-Jan Koopman (Deputy Director General (State Aids), European Commission)
Panelists:
  • Nick Economides (Professor of Law, Stern Business School, NYU)
  • Geoff Edwards (Charles River Associates)
  • Leigh Hancher (University of Tilburg & Allen & Overy LLP)
  • Ioannis Lianos (UCL Faculty of Laws)
  • Franz Jürgen Säcker (Professor of Law, Freien Universität Berlin)
  • Mark Whitener (Senior Counsel, General Electric)
13:15 LUNCH
14:15 SESSION 7:
The interaction between competition law and regulatory alternatives II (case studies: healthcase, environmental regulation, financial services and crisis regulation)


Chair: Yena Lim Hua Yen, (Chief Executive, Competition Commission of Singapore)
Panelists:
  • Alberto Heimler (Professor of Economics, Advanced School of Public Administration, Government of the Italian Republic)
  • Judge Frederic Jenny (Cour de Cassation and Chairman, OECD Competition Committee)
  • Ioannis Kokkoris (University of Reading Law School )
  • William Kovacic (Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission)
16:15 Break
16:30

DISCUSSION:
Extensions - The evolving role of the State and the impact of competition law in a globalized world: institutional solutions for dealing with tragic choices


Chair:
Emeritus Professor Valentine Korah (UCL Faculty of Laws)

Moderator:
Judge Frederic Jenny (Cour de Cassation and Chairman, OECD Competition Committee)

Open discussion to the floor

17:30 Concluding remarks:
Thomas Cheng (HKU), Ioannis Lianos (UCL) & Daniel Sokol (Florida)
17:45 End of conference

February 11, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Fabrizio Germano (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE) and Martin Meier (Institut fur Hohere Studien, Vienna) have an interesting paper on Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media.

ABSTRACT: Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality and content of media under different ownership structures. Assuming advertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by all outlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentration of ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number of owners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relies on consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the same media companies. We argue that externalities resulting from self-censorship could be empirically large.

February 11, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, February 10, 2011

Exclusive contracts in health insurance

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ilya Rahkovsky (Michigan State) has posted Exclusive contracts in health insurance.

ABSTRACT: Competition between insurance companies for employees of a firm often increases the prices and reduces the availability of high-quality health plans offered to employees. An insurance company can reduce competition by signing an exclusive contract, which guarantees that the company is the only insurance provider. The study assesses whether exclusive contracts can alleviate the negative consequences of competition. Using the nation-wide survey of employers, I find that exclusive insurers charged 39-42 less for a unit of insurance quality than non-exclusive insurers. Furthermore, I find that the pattern of insurance quality dispersion is consistent with the exclusive insurers offering more high quality plans.

February 10, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Credit Quantity and Credit Quality: Bank Competition and Capital Accumulation

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Nicola Cetorelli (Federal Reserve Bank of NY) and Pietro Peretto (Duke - Econ) discuss Credit Quantity and Credit Quality: Bank Competition and Capital Accumulation.

ABSTRACT: In this paper we show that bank competition has an intrinsically ambiguous impact on capital accumulation. We further show that it is also responsible for the emergence of development traps in economies that otherwise would be characterized by unique equilibria. These results explain the conicting evidence emerging from the recent empirical studies of the e¤ects of bank competition on economic growth. We obtain them developing a dynamic, general equilibrium model of capital accumulation where banks operate in a Cournot oligopoly. More banks lead to a higher quantity of credit available to entrepreneurs, but also to diminished incentives to o¤er relationship services which contribute to improve the likelihood of success of entrepreneursprojects. This tension between credit quantity and credit quality is what leads to the ambiguous e¤ect on capital accumulation, We also show that conditioning on one key parameter resolves the theoretical ambiguity: in economies where intrinsic market uncertainty is high (low), less (more) competition leads to higher capital accumulation.

February 10, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Banking Sector Performance in Some Latin American Countries: Market Power versus Efficiency

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Georgios E. Chortareas (University of Athens), Claudia Girardone (University of Essex), and Jesus Gustavo Garza-Garcia (Bank of Mexico) address Banking Sector Performance in Some Latin American Countries: Market Power versus Efficiency.

ABSTRACT: The wave of consolidation and the rapid increase in market concentration that took place in most Latin American countries has generated concerns about the rise in banks' market power and its potential effects on consumers. This paper advances the existing literature by testing the market power (Structure-Conduct-Performance and Relative Market Power) and efficient structure (X- and scale efficiency) hypotheses for a sample of over 2,500 bank observations in nine Latin American countries over 1997-2005. We use the Data Envelopment Analysis technique to obtain reliable efficiency measures. We produce evidence supporting the efficient structure hypotheses. Finally, capital ratios and bank size seem to be among the most important factors in explaining profits for these Latin American banks.

February 10, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Antitrust Mini Track at ABA International Section Spring Meeting in Washington, DC, April 5-8, 2011

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

DON’T MISS OUT ON THE ANTITRUST LAW MINI-TRACK AT THE 2011 SPRING MEETING OF THE ABA INTERNATIONAL LAW SECTION!  April 5-9, 2011, Washington, DC.  Early registration discounts expire February 28, 2011.

Antitrust Law Mini-Track Programs Include http://tinyurl.com/4bzqcs5 :
What’s New in Merger Review and Its Impact on Merger Activity
Size Matters: When Do Powerful Firms Attract Antitrust and Regulatory Scrutiny and Sanctions?
SHOWCASE PROGRAM: Joint Venture Amongst Competitors: Substantive Analysis in Multiple Jurisdictions
Ethics and Confidential Communications: Akzo Nobel and Its Global Ramifications
When Saying No is Not an Option - A Primer for Non-U.S. Companies About Managing Complex Litigation in the United States and Strategies for Minimizing Costs and Exposure

General Meeting Information http://tinyurl.com/4lbsna7:
Join more than 1,200 international practitioners from around the world for 4 days of socializing and networking!
The Spring Meeting offers MORE THAN 60 WORLD-CLASS programs and OVER 300 world-class experts on a range of international law subjects!

8 program tracks to be offered:
Corporate/Transactional, Dispute Resolution/Litigation, International Finance, International Trade/Customs, Public International Law/Rule of Law I & II, Regulatory and Young Lawyers

6 Mini-Tracks: Antitrust Law, Environmental Law, Ethics, Intellectual Property Law, “How To” Series, and Private Equity, Public/Private Partnerships and Developing Countries

TO REGISTER AND FOR MORE INFORMATION VISIT:
www.abanet.org/intlaw/spring11 OR CALL +1-202-662-1660

What’s New in Merger Review and Its Impact on Merger Activity

Moderators:
Bruno L. Peixoto, Lanna Peixoto Advogados, São Paulo, Brazil
Hanna Anttilainen, Herbert Smith LLP, Brussels, Belgium

Speakers:
Elizabeth Avery, Gilbert + Tobin, Sydney, Australia
Michael H. Byowitz, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, New York
Christine Castellano, Corn Products International, Inc., Westchester, Illinois
Mark Katz, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP, Toronto, Ontario, Canada


Size Matters: When Do Powerful Firms Attract Antitrust and Regulatory Scrutiny and Sanctions?

Moderator:
Damian Didden, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, New York

Speakers:
Laurent Garzaniti, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Brussels, Belgium
Gene Burrus, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington
Michael Han, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Beijing, People’s Republic of China
William Kovacic, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC
Sandy Walker, Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP, Toronto, Ontario, Canada


SHOWCASE PROGRAM: Joint Venture Amongst Competitors: Substantive Analysis in Multiple Jurisdictions

Moderator:
Alfredo M. O’Farrell, Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Speakers:
David A. Schwartz, Wachtell, Lipton, Rose & Katz, New York, New York
María Cecília Andrade, Mattos, Muriel & Kestener, Advogados, São Paulo, Brazil
Philippe Chappatte, Slaughter and May, London, United Kingdom
Tamara Dini, Bowman Gilfillan, Cape Town, South Africa
Susan Ning, King & Wood, Beijing, People’s Republic of China


Ethics and Confidential Communications: Akzo Nobel and Its Global Ramifications

Moderator:
Susan Hackett, Association of Corporate Counsel, Washington, DC

Speakers:
Tim Howe, Sanofi Pasteur S.A., Lyon, France
Mahmud Jamal, Osler, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Youngjin Jung, Kim and Chang, Seoul, South Korea (Invited)
Kenneth O’Rourke, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California


When Saying No is Not an Option - A Primer for Non-U.S. Companies About Managing Complex Litigation in the United States and Strategies for Minimizing Costs and Exposure


Moderators -
Elaine Metlin, Dickstein Shapiro LLP, Washington, DC
David Stewart, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC (Invited)

Speakers:
Alexander Blumrosen, Bernard-Hertz Béjot, Paris, France
Kenneth Rashbaum, Rashbaum Associates, LLC, New York, New York
The Honorable Barbara Rothstein, U.S. District Judge, Western District of Washington and Director, Federal Judicial Center, Seattle, Washington (Invited)
Andrea Tecce, Navigant Consulting Inc., Washington, DC (Invited)


February 10, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of GP Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Chris Pike (Co-operation & Competition Panel) offers An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of GP Competition.

ABSTRACT: We analyse the relationship between the quality of a GP practice in England and the degree of competition that it faces (as indicated by the number of nearby rival GP practices). We find that those GP practices that are located close to other rival GP practices provide a higher quality of care than that provided by GP practices that lack competitors. This higher level of quality is observed firstly in an indicator of clinical quality (referrals to secondary care for conditions that are treatable within primary care), and secondly in an indicator of patient observed quality (patient satisfaction scores obtained from the national GP patient survey). The association between increased competition and higher quality is found for GP practices located within 500 metres of each other. However it would appear that the magnitude and geographic scope of the relationship are constrained by restrictions upon patient choice. As a resu! lt the findings presented here may only reflect a fraction of the potential benefits to patients from increased choice and competition.

February 10, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, February 9, 2011

Some Thoughts on the Role of Intellectual Property in Innovation Market Cases and Refusals to License

Product Market Regulation and Competition in China

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Paul Conway (OECD), Richard Herd (OECD), Thomas Chalaux (OECD), Ping He (National Bureau of Statistics, China), and Jianxun Yu (National Bureau of Statistics, China) explain Product Market Regulation and Competition in China.

ABSTRACT: The extent of competition in product markets is an important determinant of economic growth in both developed and developing countries. This paper uses the 2008 vintage of the OECD indicators of product market regulation to assess the extent to which China’s regulatory environment is supportive of competition in markets for goods and services. The results indicate that, although competition is increasingly robust across most markets, the overall level of product market regulation is still restrictive in international comparison. These impediments to competition are likely to constrain economic growth as the Chinese economy continues to develop and becomes more sophisticated. The paper goes on to review various aspects of China’s regulatory framework and suggests a number of policy initiatives that would improve the extent to which competitive market forces are able to operate. Breaking the traditional links between s! tate-owned enterprises and government agencies is an ongoing challenge. Reducing administrative burdens, increasing private sector involvement in network sectors and lowering barriers to foreign direct investment in services would also increase competition and enhance productivity growth going forward. Some of the reforms introduced by the Chinese government over the past two years go in this direction and should therefore help foster growth. This paper relates to the 2010 OECD Economic Review of China (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/china).

February 9, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Using Rival Effects to Identify Synergies and Improve Merger Typologies

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Joseph A. Clougherty and Tomaso Duso (WZB) discuss Using Rival Effects to Identify Synergies and Improve Merger Typologies.

ABSTRACT: The strategic management literature has found it difficult to differentiate between collusive and efficiency-based synergies in horizontal merger activity. We propose a schematic to classify mergers that yields more information on merger types and merger effects, and that can, moreover, distinguish between mergers characterized largely by collusion-based synergies and mergers characterized largely by efficiency-based synergies. Crucial to the proposed measurement procedure is that it encompasses the impact of merger events not only on merging firms – as is custom – but also on non-merging competitor firms (the rivals). Employing the event-study methodology with stock-market data on samples of large horizontal mergers drawn from the US and UK (an Anglo-Saxon sub-sample) and from the European continent, we demonstrate how the proposed schematic can better clarify the nature of merger activity.

February 9, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Discounts For Qualified Buyers Only

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

David McAdams, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business discusses Discounts For Qualified Buyers Only.

ABSTRACT: The standard monopoly pricing problem is re-considered when the buyer can disclose his type (e.g. age, income, experience) at some cost. In the optimal sales mechanism with costly disclosure, the seller posts a price list, including a "sticker price" available to any buyer and a schedule of discounts available to those who disclose certain types. Unambiguous welfare implications of such a pricing policy are available in the limiting case when the buyer's type is fully informative: (i) The buyer is better o and the monopolist worse o when disclosure is more costly. (ii) When discounts are suciently rare, social welfare is strictly less than if the seller could not oer discounts.

February 9, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Caron Beaton Wells (Melbourne - Law) and Ariel Ezrachi (Oxford - Law) are editors of Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement.

BOOK ABSTRACT: This book is inspired by the international movement towards the criminalisation of cartel conduct over the last decade. Led by US enforcers, criminalisation has been supported by a growing number of regulators and governments. It derives its support from the simple yet forceful proposition that criminal sanctions, particularly jail time, are the most effective deterrent to such activity. However, criminalisation is much more complex than that basic proposition suggests. There is complexity both in terms of the various forces that are driving and shaping the movement (economic, political and social) and in the effects on the various actors involved in it (government, enforcement agencies, the business community, judiciary, legal profession and general public). Featuring contributions from authors who have been at the forefront of the debate around the world, this substantial 19-chapter volume captures the richness of the criminalisation phenomenon and considers its implications for building an effective criminal cartel regime, particularly outside of the US. It adopts a range of approaches, including general theoretical perspectives (from criminal theory, economics, political science, regulation and criminology) and case-studies of the experience with the design and enforcement of existing or contemplated criminal cartel regimes in various jurisdictions (including in Australia, Canada, EU, Germany, Ireland and the UK). The book also explores the international dimensions of criminalisation - its specific practical consequences (such as increased potential for extradition) as well as its more general implications for trends of harmonisation or convergence in competition law and enforcement.

Contributors include: Donald I Baker, Caron Beaton-Wells, John D Cooke, Ariel Ezrachi, Brent Fisse, Casey W Halladay, Christopher Harding, Julian Joshua, Jirí Kindl, William E Kovacic, D Martin Low QC, Patrick Massey, Michael O'Kane, Christine Parker, Ingeborg Simonsson, Andreas Stephan, Maurice E Stucke, Florian Wagner-von Papp, Peter Whelan, Stephen Wilks, and Rebecca Williams.

Image


February 9, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Call for Papers: Patents, Standards, and Innovation

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

CALL FOR PAPERS
    
               PATENTS, STANDARDS, AND INNOVATION
    
    
     The National Bureau of Economic Research's Innovation
     Policy and the Economy Working Group is seeking paper
     proposals for a conference on Patents, Standards and
     Innovation. The goal of this conference is to promote
     original empirical and theoretical research on intellectual
     property issues in technologies or sectors in which de
     facto, voluntary, legal or technical standards play an
     important role.
    
    
     TOPICS:
    
     Potential topics include, but are not limited to, patent
     thickets, compatibility standards, cross-licensing, patent
     pools, collective rights management, trade-related aspects
     of technical standardization, and open technology
     platforms. The conference will be co-sponsored by the U.S.
     Patent and Trademark Office.
    
    
     PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE:
    
     Interested authors are encouraged to submit a two-page
     research proposal that includes an abstract of the intended
     paper, an outline of the methodologies to be used, and a
     brief statement about the current state of the research
     project. Proposals should be submitted by March 3, 2011,
     via the NBER web site, at:
    
     http://www.nber.org/confsubmit/backend/cfp?id=IPKEpre
    
     Authors will be notified of acceptance by March 15, 2011. A
     pre-conference is scheduled for May 7, 2011 in Cambridge,
     MA, and the formal conference will be held in late 2011 or
     early 2012. Authors of accepted papers will be reimbursed
     for regular transportation expenses (one author for the
     pre-conference and up to two authors for conference), and
     receive an honorarium of $7,500 per paper for timely
     submission of the draft and final manuscript. The NBER
     Innovation Policy and the Economy Working Group is
     supported by a generous grant from the Ewing Marion
     Kauffman Foundation.


     IJIO SPECIAL ISSUE:

     The International Journal of Industrial Organization (IJIO)
     will publish a special issue on the topic following the
     conference, to be edited by Marc Rysman and the conference
     co-organizers: Ajay Agrawal, Stuart Graham, and Timothy
     Simcoe. The special issue is open to papers presented at
     the conference, as well as papers not presented at the
     conference. Papers for the special issue will be submitted
     via the IJIO's online website and will go through the
     regular IJIO review process. The deadline for special issue
     submissions will be announced at a later date.


     FURTHER INFORMATION:

     Please direct any questions to:
    
     CONTACT:       Timothy Simcoe
     Email:         [email protected]

February 9, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

On the Existence of Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium Prices Under Logit Demand

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

W. Ross Morrow and Steven J. Skerlos have written On the Existence of Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium Prices Under Logit Demand.

ABSTRACT: This article presents a proof of the existence of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices with multi-product firms and under the Logit model of demand that does not rely on restrictive assumptions on product characteristics, firm homogeneity or symmetry, product costs, or linearity of the utility function. The proof is based on conditions for the indirect utility function, fixed-point equations derived from the first-order conditions, and a direct analysis of the second-order conditions resulting in the uniqueness of profit-maximizing prices. Several subsequent results also demonstrate that price equilibrium under the Logit model of demand cannot adequately describe multi-product pricing.

February 9, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, February 8, 2011

The New EU Regime for Horizontal Cooperation Agreements amongst Competitors The New Rules and How They Will Apply

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The New EU Regime for Horizontal Cooperation Agreements amongst Competitors The New Rules and How They Will Apply

Tuesday, 1 March 2011, The Stanhope Hotel, Brussels

 

 

 

The revised rules for the assessment of horizontal co-operation agreements between competitors have now been adopted by the European Commission.

This conference gathers together industry and legal experts as well as leading figures from the Commission and leading national competition authorities to explore in detail the nuances of the new regime and what they mean for business.

Chaired by Fiona Carlin, Partner, Baker & McKenzie

Distinguished speakers include:

  • Donncadh Woods
    Deputy Head of Unit for Antitrust and Mergers
    Policy and Scrutiny
  • Henning Leupold
    DG Competition,
    European Commission
  • Jonas Koponen
    Partner, Linklaters LLP
  • Thomas Graf
    Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
  • Bill Batchelor
    Partner, Baker & McKenzie
  • Andrea Lofaro
    Partner, RBB Economics
  • Emily Roche
    Senior Counsel - Competition
    Rio Tinto
  • Fabian Theurer
    German and European Antitrust Law, Desk Officer, Bundeskartellamt
  • Anna Emanuelson
    DG Competition,
    European Commission
  • James Killick
    Partner, White & Case LLP
  • Gil Ohana
    Senior Director, Antitrust and Competition,
    Cisco Systems
  • Jean-Yves Art
    Director, Competition Law, Microsoft
  • Aleksandra Boutin
    DG Competition, European Commission
  • Matthew Bennett
    Director of Economics,
    Office of Fair Trading
  • Frank Wijckmans
    Partner, Contrast Law

Topics include:

  • Setting the scene
  • R&D Agreements and Innovation
  • Joint Production and Specialisation
  • A Revised Approach to Standardisation Agreements
  • Other developments of Interest: Joint commercialisation and standard terms
  • The Economists' Perspective
  • Information Exchange and the Object/Effect Distinction

Conference Fees:

Standard:



£700

In-house Counsel and
Government Agencies:


£600


All prices are subject to 21% TVA.

Forthcoming GCR Conferences:

  • Competition Law, Consumer Goods and Retail 2011
    11 May 2011, The King's Fund, London

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Cancellations received in writing on and before 31 January 2011 will receive a refund less 10%. Cancellations received on and between 1 February 2011 and 15 February 2011 will receive a refund less 50%. Cancellations received on and after 16 February 2011 will not receive a refund. Substitute delegates are welcome at any time. Cancellations must be received in writing.

February 8, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Columbia's Tim Wu to Join the FTC in the Office of Policy Planning

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

According to a report in the WSJ, Tim Wu (Columbia Law) will join the FTC's Office of Policy Planning to "help the agency to develop policies that affect the Internet and the market for mobile communications and services."

February 8, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)