Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Saturday, January 15, 2011

Newest Issue of Competition Policy Newsletter is Out

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

DG Competition has posted the newest issue of its Competition Policy Newsletter.

Antitrust
Mergers
State Aid

January 15, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, January 14, 2011

Do direct R&D subsidies lead to the monopolization of R&D in the economy?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Dirk Czarnitzki and Bernd Ebersberger (ZEW) ask Do direct R&D subsidies lead to the monopolization of R&D in the economy?

ABSTRACT: This paper explores the impact of R&D subsidies on the concentration of R&D in an economy. First, governments are often criticized of subsidizing predominantly larger firms and thus contribute to persistence of leadership in markets and higher barriers to entry, and, hence, reduced competition eventually. Second, theoretical literature, such as endogenous growth literature, has also shown that governmental intervention in the market for R&D affects the distribution of R&D which finally affects product market concentration. We test the relationship between R&D subsidies and R&D concentration employing treatment effects models on data of German and Finnish manufacturing firms. The data and estimations allow calculating concentration indices for the population of firms for both the actual situation where some selected companies receive R&D subsidies and the counterfactual situation describing the absence of subsidies. We find that R&D subsidies do not lead to higher concentration of R&D. On the contrary, we even find that R&D concentration is significantly reduced because of subsidies. This result may be attributed to the fact that technology policy maintains special funding schemes for small and medium-sized companies. The fact that the larger companies benefit from a higher likelihood of a subsidy receipt is offset by the phenomenon that smaller firms may be completely deterred from any R&D activity if they would not receive governmental support.

January 14, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The end of the Bertrand Paradox?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) and Nicolas Drouhin (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) ask if we have seen The end of the Bertrand Paradox?

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes price competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two-stage game implying a convex short term cost function in the second stage of the game. We show that the collusive outcome is the only predictable issue of the whole game i.e. the unique non Pareto-dominated pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Technically, this paper bridges the capacity constraint literature on price competition with the one of convex cost function, solving the Bertrand Paradox in the line of Edgeworth's research program.

January 14, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University Berlin and WZB), Klaus Guglery (Vienna University of Economics and Business), and Florian Szücs (University of Vienna) provide An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform.

ABSTRACT: Based on a database of 326 merger cases scrutinized by the European Commission between 1990 and 2007, we evaluate the economic impact of the change in European merger legislation in 2004. We first propose a general framework to assess merger policy effectiveness, which is based on standard oligopoly theory and makes use of stockmarket reactions as an external assessment of the merger and the merger control decision. We then focus on four different dimensions of effectiveness: 1) legal certainty; 2) frequency and determinants of type I and type II errors; 3) rent-reversion achieved by different merger policy tools; and 4) deterrence of anti- competitive mergers. To infer the economic impact of the merger policy reform, we compare the results of our four tests before and after its introduction. Our results suggest that the policy reform seems to have been only a modest improvement of European merger policy.

January 14, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, January 13, 2011

Behavioural Economics and Competition, London, England, 25 January 2011

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Behavioural Economics and Competition

London, England
25 January 2011
Hosted By: NERA Economic Consulting

Do consumers make rational decisions? Can the way in which choices are presented nudge our conduct and influence outcomes? Why are we so attracted to "free" offers? Why do so many bargaining games split the surplus 50:50?

In recent years regulators, executives, business advisers, and economic policy makers have shown increasing interest in behavioural economics and related areas.  These new branches of economics, rooted at the intersection of economics and psychology, challenge traditional neo-classical microeconomics, and, often on the basis of experimental methods, call in question the assumption of "rational economic agent."

Popular discussion, influenced by the work of Thaler, Sunstein, Ariely, and others, has also focused on whether "choice architecture" can be used by governments to "nudge" people into making "better" lifestyle choices. Conversely, businesses are looking into ways to exploit failures of information or rationality to induce us to buy chocolate whilst standing in the checkout queue or borrow more than we mean to.

In this seminar, of interest to competition lawyers, in-house counsel, executives, corporate strategy advisers, and policy makers, NERA Director Dr. Mark Williams will explain what behavioural economics is and how it differs from neo-classical thinking. He will then discuss the practical relevance of behaviouralism in predictive economics (e.g., merger analysis or business strategy) and ex post explanatory economics (e.g., abuse-of-dominance cases or commercial litigation), as well as some implications for competition and competition policy analysis.

This free seminar will be chaired by Associate Director Paul Hofer. To register your attendance or to obtain the slides after the event, please contact Mary Davies at mary.davies@nera.com or +44 20 7659 8804.

January 13, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

A methodology for the evaluation of competition policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Kai Hüschelrath and Nina Leheyda (WZB) provide A methodology for the evaluation of competition policy.

ABSTRACT: The paper develops a methodology for the evaluation of competition policy. Based on the existing literature and experiences with policy evaluations in other areas of economic activity, the three-step / nine-building-blocks methodology provides guidance for evaluation projects and also assists in the identification of avenues for further academic research.

January 13, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Fighting hard core cartels

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Kai Hüschelrath and Jürgen Weigand (ZEW) describe Fighting hard core cartels.

ABSTRACT: The paper provides a comprehensive survey of the economics behind the fight against hard core cartels. Differentiating between four subsequent stages - characterisation, welfare effects, enforcement and evaluation - the paper pays particular attention to cartel detection methods, the derivation of corporate fines, the quantification of private damages and possibilities to judge on the successfulness of cartel enforcement activities by competition authorities around the world.

January 13, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

2025: Reverse-Payment Settlements Unleashed

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michael A. Carrier (Rutgers Univ. School of Law-Camden) predicts 2025: Reverse-Payment Settlements Unleashed.

ABSTRACT: The year is 2025. For the past two decades, brand-name drug companies have settled infringement lawsuits with generic firms by paying them to drop their patent challenges. Early in the 21st century, courts had explained that this was the natural state of affairs. By 2025, this is true many times over.

This outcome traces back to 2005, when the Schering and Tamoxifen appellate courts upheld reverse-payment agreements. In the five years before that, drug firms had been more careful. In 2000, the FTC announced that it would challenge such settlements. And the first appellate case to address the issue, Cardizem, found one such agreement to be per se illegal. As a result, parties settled cases, but without payments from brands to generics, and with licenses allowing early generic entry.

After 2006, the pendulum swung quickly in the other direction. To be sure, there were baby steps towards vigorous scrutiny. Between 2006 and 2010, Congress had considered legislation that would have made reverse payments illegal. The Federal Trade Commission had brought several high-profile challenges. And the Second Circuit, recognizing concerns with its Tamoxifen ruling, even requested that plaintiffs file for en banc review in the Cipro case.

None of these developments, however, slowed the careening snowball of per se legality. In this short article, I will offer three predictions for drug patent settlements in the next 15 years:

1.     The Eastern District of Pennsylvania court will deny summary judgment in the Cephalon case.

2.     The Supreme Court will grant certiorari, and affirm, in the 2nd Circuit Cipro case.

3.     Congress will pass reverse-payments legislation.

Going even further out on a limb, the first two predictions will occur in 2011 and the third will happen in 2017.

January 13, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

M&A Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: Emerging Patterns

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Yee Wah Chin, Ingram Yuzek Gainen Carroll & Bertolotti, LLP has posted M&A Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: Emerging Patterns.

ABSTRACT: China’s Anti-Monopoly Law became effective on August 1, 2008, following its enactment on August 30, 2007 after 13 years of drafting. Since then, businesses and lawyers with interests in China have closely followed every development. While there have been draft and final regulations issued by the enforcement agencies on most aspects of the AML, and complaints citing the AML have been filed in the courts and with the agencies alleging monopolistic conduct, the most closely watched developments have been on the M&A front. All but one of the announced government enforcement actions to date have involved transactions. It is clear that China’s merger control regime is becoming the third major antitrust hurdle for large, cross-border transactions, along with the U.S. and the EU. This article summarizes the AML, reviews provisions relating to mergers and acquisitions, and discusses patterns emerging in China’s application of the AML in the M&A area.

There appear to be emerging patterns of industrial policy and nationalism trumping competition policy, greater procedural flexibility in the merger control regime than apparent at first glance, and analytic approaches that may have been abandoned elsewhere. Nonetheless, the increasingly detailed published MOFCOM decisions reflect a policy of increasing transparency and applying economic analysis in merger control, to be in the antitrust mainstream.

January 13, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, January 12, 2011

A Framework for Analyzing Competition in the Banking Sector: An Application to the Case of Jordan

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Asli Demirguc-Kunt, World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) provide A Framework for Analyzing Competition in the Banking Sector: An Application to the Case of Jordan.

ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a framework to analyze competition in the banking sector using Jordan as an example. In particular, the paper pursues a multi-pronged approach to analyze competition including (i) an examination of the extent to which the market is contestable (that is, has low barriers to bank entry and exit), (b) an evaluation of the behavior of bank spreads, and (iii) an assessment of non-structural and direct measures of bank competition such as the H-statistic and the Lerner Index. This approach provides a more comprehensive framework to examine competition in the banking sector, compared with the commonly used alternative of looking only at bank concentration figures. In the case of Jordan, the analysis indicates that although concentration has declined, competition in the country is low and has decreased over time.

January 12, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

A Man of Flowers: A Reflection on Plant Patents, the Right to Food and Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Geertrui Van Overwalle, Leuven University, Tilburg University has written on A Man of Flowers: A Reflection on Plant Patents, the Right to Food and Competition Law.

ABSTRACT: The present paper explores the multi-layered relationship between plant patents, the right to food and competition law. The present contribution takes the view that the growing tendency to appropriate agricultural crops through intellectual property (IP) – thereby making a pivotal shift from plant breeder’s rights to patents – has possibly led to hampering effects on the access to food by poor and disadvantaged groups, particularly in low-income countries. Human rights, in particular the right to food, might act as a welcome instrument to restore the balance between the private demand for a fair reward and the public interest in sustainable food supply. However, when making a human rights approach more exacting, and when translating the right to food into IP mechanisms facilitating access to food, competition law might come into play, adding a layer of complexity and uncertainty to this delicate balancing act.

January 12, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Predation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot framework

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Kai Hüschelrath and Jürgen Weigand (ZEW) describe Predation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot framework.

ABSTRACT: The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.

January 12, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Call for Papers - Industrial organization: Theory, Empirics and Experiments, University of Salento in Otranto (Lecce), JUNE 23-24, 2011

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Workshop “INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY, EMPIRICS AND EXPERIMENTS”, 2nd
edition, organized by the University of Salento in Otranto (Lecce), JUNE 23-24, 2011
CALL FOR PAPERS
We welcome submissions of papers in the following areas and any other field of Industrial Organization: Oligopoly Theory, Contracts and Incentives, Auction Theory, Competition Policy, Regulation, Vertical relations, Industrial Policy, The Economics of R&D, Empirical Industrial Organization, Experiments in Industrial Organization.

Keynote Speakers
Neil Gandal (Tel-Aviv University)
Jacob Goeree (California Institute of Technology and University of Zurich)
Scientific Committee
Giacomo Calzolari, Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna
Roberto Cellini, Università di Catania
Paolo G. Garella, Università di Milano
Stephen Martin, Purdue University
Bradley Ruffle, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Hans-Theo Normann, Düsseldorf University
David Perez-Castrillo, Universitat Autonoma Barcelona
Marco Vivarelli, Università Cattolica di Milano

Programme chairs
Alessandra Chirco, Università del Salento
Marcella Scrimitore, Università del Salento

Submissions
Papers should be sent by February 28, 2011 to dmeq@unisalento.it. Authors are informed of acceptance by March 31. The final version of accepted papers should be sent no later than May, 15.
Workshop website: http://www.workshopIO.unisalento.it/
Contacts: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Matematico-Statistiche, Università del Salento. Tel.
+39 0832 298772; fax +39 0832 298757; email: dmeq@unisalento.it.

January 12, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Loss Leading as an Exploitative Practice

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Zhijun Chen (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X, Department of Computer Science [Auckland] - The University of Auckland) and Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics) explore Loss Leading as an Exploitative Practice.

ABSTRACT: Large retailers, enjoying substantial market power in some local markets, often compete with smaller retailers who carry a narrower range of products in a more efficient way. We find that these large retailers can exercise their market power by adopting a loss-leading pricing strategy, which consists of pricing below cost some of the products also offered by smaller rivals, and raising the prices on the other products. In this way, the large retailers can better discriminate multi-stop shoppers from one-stop shoppers — and may even earn more profit than in the absence of the more efficient rivals. Loss leading thus appears as an exploitative device, designed to extract additional surplus from multi-stop shoppers, rather than as an exclusionary instrument to foreclose the market, although the small rivals are hurt as a by-product of exploitation. We show further that banning below-cost pricing increases consumer surplus! , small rivals' profits, and social welfare. Our insights apply generally to industries where a firm, enjoying substantial market power in one segment, competes with more efficient rivals in other segments, and procuring these products from the same supplier generates customer-specific benefits. They also apply to complementary products, such as platforms and applications. There as well, our analysis provides a rationale for below-cost pricing based on exploitation rather than exclusion.

January 12, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Resale Price Maintenance: Consignment Agreements, Copyrighted or Patented Products and the First Sale Doctrine

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Herbert J. Hovenkamp, University of Iowa - College of Law analyzes Resale Price Maintenance: Consignment Agreements, Copyrighted or Patented Products and the First Sale Doctrine.

ABSTRACT: The rule of reason adopted for resale price maintenance in the Supreme Court’s Leegin decision, which upset the century old Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality, requires some reconsideration of a number of issues about antitrust treatment of RPM. Under the old per se rule, bona fide “consignment” agreements were not covered by Section 1 of the Sherman Act at all because there was said to be no qualifying “agreement” between the supplier and the dealer. Rather the dealer was simply said to be acting as an agent of the seller. However, insofar as RPM produces competitive dangers, such as those occasioned by powerful dealers, these harms do not seem to depend on whether the transfer from the supplier to the dealer was a sale or a consignment.

Secondly, while Leegin took RPM in one direction, applying a rule of reason to conduct that had previously been unlawful per se, the Supreme Court’s Quanta Computer decision went in the other direction, restoring an invariant rule prohibiting resale price maintenance requirements from being enforced by means of patent infringement suits.

January 11, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Signaling with Performance and the Effect of Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Toru Suzuki (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena) explains Signaling with Performance and the Effect of Competition.

ABSTRACT: Candidates compete to persuade a decision maker. The decision maker wishes to select a candidate who possesses a certain ability. Then, as a signaling, each candidate decides whether to perform a task whose performance statistically reflects the ability. However, since the cost of the performance is the same across all candidates, the performance is a poor signaling device. This paper analyzes a "signaling game with performance" in which the standard single crossing condition is violated. It is shown that more competition makes the equilibrium signaling more informative when the level of competition is moderate. Moreover, the equilibrium signaling can perfectly reveal the ability under a certain level of competition. On the other hand, too much competition always makes the equilibrium signaling less informative.

January 11, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Negative and Positive Effects of Competition in a Preemption Game

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Toru Suzuki (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena) describes Negative and Positive Effects of Competition in a Preemption Game.

ABSTRACT: Agents compete to acquire a limited economic opportunity of uncertain profitability. Each agent decides how much he acquires public signals before making investment under fear of preemption. I show that equilibria have various levels of efficiency under mild competition. The eect of competition on the equilibrium strategy is dierent depending on which class of equilibrium we focus on. However, when competitive pressure is sufficiently high, there exists a unique equilibrium. Finally, I show that the eect of competition on efficiency is dierent between the common value and the private value setting. Strong competition leads to the least efficient equilibrium for the common value setting but efficiency can be improved by competition in the private value setting.

January 11, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Endogenous quality choice under upstream market power

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Borja Mesa Sánchez (Dpto. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico) describes Endogenous quality choice under upstream market power.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes how the existence of upstream market power affects endogenous quality choice in a setting where two downstream firms are locked in a bilateral monopoly with their own input suppliers. The main result is that the degree of product differentiation is reduced as upstream market power increases. This holds under Bertrand and Cournot competition, although differentiation is higher in the former. If competition takes place in a Cournot fashion and downstream firms have no bargaining power at all, they choose no differentiation. I also show the effects of an upstream and a downstream merger. When input suppliers merge to monopoly, the quality choice is not affected by the upstream market power and differentiation always emerges. When the downstream segment is shaped by a monopoly, goods become homogeneous unless input suppliers have weak bargaining power. If input prices are high enough before the downstream! merger, a downstream monopoly leads to an increase in social welfare.

January 11, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, January 10, 2011

Call for Papers: SECOND WORKSHOP FOR JUNIOR RESEARCHERS ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

CALL FOR PARTICIPATION
     
          SECOND WORKSHOP FOR JUNIOR RESEARCHERS ON THE LAW
     AND ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW
     
     
     From June 5 to June 7, 2011, the International Max Planck 
     Research School for Competition and Innovation - 
     http://www.ip.mpg.de/go/ipmrs-ci - and the Professorship 
     for Intellectual Property at ETH Zurich -
     http://www.ip.ethz.ch - will jointly organize their Second 
     Workshop for Junior Researchers on the Law and Economics of 
     Intellectual Property and Competition Law.
     
     The workshop will enable a small number of junior 
     researchers from law and from economics to engage in an 
     intensive, rigorous discussion of their own scholarly work. 
     Several senior professors from law and from economics
     departments in Europe and the United States will provide 
     feedback on the research projects. Commentators include 
     faculty of both hosting institutions as well as Professors 
     Dan L. Burk (University of California at Irvine), Michael 
     Meurer (Boston University), and Timothy Simcoe (Boston 
     University).
      
     The workshop will be held in Wildbad Kreuth, a lovely 
     region one hour south of Munich, Germany. The organizers 
     will fund travel and hotel expenses for all invited 
     workshop participants.
     
     
     APPLICATION PROCEDURE:
      
     Excellent junior researchers (doctoral students, postdocs, 
     research fellows and assistant professors) from law and 
     from economics are invited to submit their application 
     online at:
      
      http://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=ipcomp_2011
     
     
     PAPER SUBMISSION INFORMATION:
      
     After registering a user account, please fill out the "New 
     submission" form. You must attach an extended abstract or a 
     draft paper ("Upload Paper", PDF or Word) as well as a 
     curriculum vitae with a list of two references 
     ("Attachment", PDF or Word) in order to complete the 
     submission. Incomplete submissions will not be accepted; 
     reference letters are not required at the time of 
     submission. 
      
     The submission deadline is February 28, 2011. 
      
     Notifications of acceptance will be sent out by March 21, 
     2011. 
      
     Papers are due for circulation among workshop participants 
     and commentators on May 15, 2011. For junior researchers 
     from economics, research projects should relate to 
     industrial organization, competition, innovation and/or 
     intellectual property and may include formal models as well 
     as empirical or experimental approaches. For junior 
     scholars from law, research projects should relate to 
     intellectual property and/or competition law and must use 
     law and economics as a research methodology. In order to 
     achieve a good international mix of workshop participants,
     submissions from researchers from outside Europe are 
     particularly encouraged.
      
      
     FURTHER INFORMATION:
      
     The International Max Planck Research School for 
     Competition and Innovation is a joint initiative by the Max 
     Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition 
     Law as well as the Department of Economics, the Munich 
     School of Management, and the Faculty of Law of the Ludwig 
     Maximilians University of Munich. Any questions concerning 
     the workshop should be directed to:
      
     CONTACT:       Prof. Stefan Bechtold
     Email:         sbechtold@ethz.ch
     Tel:           +41-44-632-2670
     
     

January 10, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

15th International Conference on Competition, Berlin on 13 ‑ 15 April 2011

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The International Conference on Competition has been organised by the Bundeskartellamt every other year since the early 1980s. The conference is one of the most prominent international events dealing with competition law issues. 

The 15th International Conference on Competition will take place in Berlin on 13 ‑ 15 April 2011. Its general theme will be:  

"A Spotlight on Cartel Prosecution"

The formal part of the conference starts in the morning of Thursday, 14 April 2011 with three keynote speeches, following a welcoming address by Harald Wolf, Mayor and Senator of Berlin. The keynote speeches will be given by Rainer Brüderle, the German Federal Minister of Economics and Technology, Joaquín Almunia, Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Competition, and Dr Rüdiger Grube, CEO of Deutsche Bahn AG. 

The keynote speeches will be followed by four panel discussions.  

The first panel discussion under the title 'Intensified cartel prosecution - hitting the mark or overshooting the target?' will take a close look at intensified cartel prosecution as practised by competition authorities over the last few years, seen from the perspective of companies, authorities and academics. The discussion will include, among other issues, types and levels of sanctions.

The second panel under the title 'Cartel prosecution as a global task - conflicts, cooperation, convergence' will deal specifically with issues arising from the fact that more and more jurisdictions around the world have introduced instruments for the prosecution of cartel agreements. To what extent is this likely to create points of friction in the prosecution of individual cartels, and what is the need and scope for cooperation between competition authorities or even convergence between legal systems?

The third panel discussion under the title 'Requirements of proof in court - the economic approach' addresses an issue which is not limited to anti-cartel enforcement but is of particular significance in this area: What is the level of proof that courts demand of economic arguments presented to them, for example with regard to assessing the economic damage caused by cartel agreements?

The fourth panel will deal with the topic 'The evaluation of agency activities - a critical view from the in- and outside' and associated issues: What are the effects of intervention by competition authorities, not only on competition itself, but also on the economy as a whole, and how can competition authorities communicate the significance and effects of their actions appropriately and convincingly?   

The conference will bring together leading personalities and competition experts from all over the world, providing a forum for the exchange of knowledge and experience.

The working languages of the conference will be German and English (simultaneous interpreting services will be provided).

The event starts on Wednesday, 13 April 2011, with a welcome evening. The formal part of the conference starts on the morning of Thursday, 14 April, and ends on Friday, 15 April, at lunchtime. The conference venue will be the Hilton Hotel Berlin, which is centrally located in Berlin.

Conference Agenda

Wednesday, 13 April 2011

from 16.00 h
Registration

 

19.00 Uhr
Evening programme

Reception and buffet dinner in Restaurant "Zur Nolle"


Thursday, 14 April 2011 - morning

from 09.00 h
Registration

10.00 h
Opening of the 15th International Conference on Competition
Andreas Mundt; President of the Bundeskartellamt

A Spotlight on Cartel Prosecution

10.15 h
Welcoming address
Harald Wolf; Mayor of Berlin and Senator for Economics, Technology and Women's Issues

10.30 h
Speech
Rainer Brüderle; Federal Minister of Economics and Technology

11.00 h
Q&A
Andreas Mundt (Moderator); President of the Bundeskartellamt

11.15 h
Coffee break

11.45 h
Speech
Joaquín Almunia; Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Competition

12.15 h
Q&A
Prof Dr Carl Baudenbacher (Moderator); President of the EFTA Court

12.30 h
Speech
Dr Rüdiger Grube; CEO of Deutsche Bahn AG

13.00 h
Lunch


Thursday, 14 April 2011 - afternoon

14.00 - 15.15 h
Panel I: Intensified cartel prosecution - hitting the mark or overshooting the target?

Moderator
Anne-José Paulsen; President, Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court

Panelists
Wolfgang Bauer; CEO, Dyckerhoff AG

Bruno Lasserre; President, Autorité de la concurrence, France

Prof Dr Massimo Motta; Dean, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics

Josef Sanktjohanser; President, German Retail Federation

Discussion

15.15 h
Coffee break


15.45 - 17.00 h
Panel II: Cartel prosecution as a global task - conflicts, cooperation, convergence

Moderator
Dr Frank Montag; Chairman, Competition Lawyers' Association

Panelists
Philip Collins; Chairman, Office of Fair Trading, UK

Prof Dr Vincent Martenet; President, Competition Commission, Switzerland

Gary Spratling; Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, San Francisco

Dr Eckart Sünner; Chief Compliance Officer, BASF SE

Discussion

19.30 h
Evening programme

Reception and dinner in the historic "Wasserwerk" building


Friday, 15 April 2011 - morning

09.30 - 10.45 h
Panel III: Requirements of proof in court - the economic approach

Moderator
Prof Dr Frédéric Jenny; Chairman, OECD Competition Committee

Panelists
Sir Christopher Bellamy; Senior Consultant, Linklaters LLP, London

Alfred Dittrich; Judge at the General Court of the European Union

Dr Wolfgang Kirchhoff; Judge at the German Federal Court of Justice

Prof Dr Lars-Hendrik Röller; President, European School of Management and Technology, Berlin

Discussion

10.45 h
Coffee break


11.15 - 12.30 h
Panel IV: The evaluation of agency activities - a critical view from the in- and outside

Moderator
Peter Freeman; Chairman, Competition Commission, UK

Panelists
Prof Dr Stephen Davies; Professor of Economics, University of
East Anglia, UK

Prof Dr Josef Drexl; Director, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law

Dr Alexander Italianer; Director General, GD Competition, European Commission

William E. Kovacic; Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, USA

Discussion

12.30 Uhr
Closing speech
Andreas Mundt; President of the Bundeskartellamt

January 10, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)