Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Saturday, March 19, 2011

Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in particular EU antitrust enforcement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Wouter P. J. Wils, European Commission, King's College London - School of Law has posted Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in particular EU antitrust enforcement.

ABSTRACT: This paper discusses discretion and prioritisation in public antitrust enforcement, in particular in the enforcement of EU antitrust law. First, the paper defines the notion of discretion and discusses the rationale of discretion. Second, it examines the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the European Commission, showing that the Commission has a broad discretion concerning the question which suspected or alleged infringements to pursue, but no discretion as to the content of the antitrust prohibitions. With regard to fines, the Commission has a significant degree of discretion, although this discretion is potentially neutralised by the General Court's unlimited jurisdiction. Third, a brief comparison is made with and between the competition authorities of the EU Member States, highlighting divergence as to discretion to set priorities. The last chapter of the paper sets out various reasons for allowing competition authorities discretion to set priorities as to which cases of suspected or alleged infringements of the antitrust prohibitions they investigate and pursue, as well as a number of risks related to prioritisation.

March 19, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, March 18, 2011

Norwegian Centre for Competition Policy will be established in Bergen

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

A press release reports:

– Our ambition is to make Bergen a capital for competition policy – not only in Norway but in the Nordic countries and in time perhaps in Europe, said the Director General for Competition, Knut Eggum Johansen.

During a seminar on March 17, he presented the plans to establish a national centre for competition policy in collaboration with the University of Bergen (UiB) and the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH).

At the same time, the Minister for Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs Rigmor Aasrud announced that the Ministry is prepared to support the start of the centre with NOK 500 000. 

– The conditions for building up a national centre for competition policy in Bergen are very good, said Aasrud. She points out that Bergen has an extensive academic environment with an interest in and knowledge of competition economics and competition law.

Result of the move
The establishment of the centre can be seen as a result of the move by the Competition Authority from Oslo to Bergen. The Director points out that the interaction and cooperation between the Authority and the academic environment at UiB and NHH has always been very good. 

– Competition policy is interdisciplinary, and it is important to ensure the interaction between the fields of law and economics. The new centre will build on the expertise that already exists at UiB, NHH and the Competition Authority, said Eggum Johansen.

Interdisciplinary
The Bergen Centre for Competition Law and Economics (BECCLE) will, among other things, collect the permanent academic staff at UiB and NHH, postdocs and PhD students working on competition policy issues into a single environment. The centre will play an active role both in research and education and by organizing seminars and conferences in the field of competition policy.

The news about the centre was released at a seminar organized by the Competition Authority in connection with the end of Knut Eggum Johansen’s term as Director General for Competition at the end of March.

 

March 18, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Quality Competition or Quality Cooperation? License-Type and the Strategic Nature of Open Source vs. Closed Source Business Models

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Sebastian von Engelhardt, University of Jena - Economics Department has written on Quality Competition or Quality Cooperation? License-Type and the Strategic Nature of Open Source vs. Closed Source Business Models.

ABSTRACT: In the ICT sector, product-software is an important factor for the quality of the products (e.g. cell phones). In this context, open source software enables firms to avoid quality competition as they can cooperate on quality without an explicit contract. The economics of open source (OS) versus closed source (CS) business models are analyzed in a general two-stage model that combines aspects of non-cooperative R&D with the theory of differentiated oligopolies: In stage one, firms develop software, either as OS or CS, or as a an OS-CS-mix if the license allows. In stage two, firms bundle this with complementary products and compete à la Cournot. The model allows for horizontal product differentiation in stage two. The finding are: 1.) While CS-decisions are always strategic substitutes, OS-decisions can be strategic complements. Furthermore, CS is a strategic substitute to OS and vice versa. 2.) The type of OS-license plays a crucial role: only if the license prohibits a direct OS-CS code mix (like the GPL), then Nash-equilibria with firms producing OS code exist for all parameters. 3.) In the equilibrium of a mixed industry with restricted licenses, OS-firms offer lower quality than their CS-rivals.

March 18, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Entry and Exit of Physicians in a two-tiered public/private Health Care System

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Martin Gächter (University of Innsbruck, Department of Economics and Statistics), Peter Schwazer (Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics), and Engelbert Theurl (University of Innsbruck, Department of Economics and Statistics) describe the Entry and Exit of Physicians in a two-tiered public/private Health Care System.

ABSTRACT: Firm turnover has recently attracted increased interest in economic research. The entry of new firms increases competition and promises efficiency gains. Moreover, changes in the market structure influence productivity growth, because firm entry usually leads to increased innovation. The health care market exhibits important differences as compared to other markets, including various forms of market failure and, as a consequence, extensive market regulation. Thus, the economic effects of entries and exits in health care markets are less obvious. The following paper studies the determinants of entry and exit decisions of physicians in the private sector of the outpatient part of the Austrian health care system. We apply a Poisson panel estimation to a data set of 2,379 local communities and 121 districts in Austria in the time period 2002 - 2008. We are particularly interested in the question how public physicians (GPs/specialists) and their private counterparts influence the entrance and exit of private physicians. We find a significantly negative effect of existing capacities, measured by both private and public physician density of the same specialty, on the entry of new private physicians. On the contrary, we find a significantly positive effect of private GPs on the entry of private specialists. Interestingly, this cooperation/network effect also works in the other direction, as a higher density of private specialists increases the probability of the market entry of private GPs. Based on the results of previous literature, we thus conclude that private physicians establish networks to cooperate in terms of mutual referrals etc. Our estimations for market exits basically confirm the entry results, as higher competitive forces positively influence the market exit of private physicians.

March 18, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Evaluating Innovation and Moral Hazard in Pharmaceuticals

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Paris Cleanthous (University of Cyprus - Econ) is Evaluating Innovation and Moral Hazard in Pharmaceuticals.

ABSTRACT: This paper formulates an empirical methodology that evaluates pharmaceutical innovation in the American antidepressant market by quantifying patient welfare benefits from innovation. While evaluating pharmaceutical innovation in antidepressants, I uncover and address the moral hazard issue that arises due to the existence of prescription drug insurance coverage. A combination of market-level data, drug and patient characteristics are used to estimate demand for all antidepressants between 1980 and 2001. The paper estimates large and varied patient welfare gains due to innovation and helps explain a detected divergence between social and private patient benefits by the existence of insurance.

March 18, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 17, 2011

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Wighted Welfare and Price Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz (Universidad del País Vasco) and Maximo Sedano (Universidad del País Vasco) address Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Wighted Welfare and Price Competition.

ABSTRACT: In this paper we analyse the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods. Firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. The private firm maximises profits while the public firm maximises the weighted sum of the consumer and producer surpluses (wighted welfare). It is shown that the result obtained in equilibrium depends crucially on the weigth given to the consumer surplus in weighted welfare and on the degree to which goods are substitutes or complements. We also anlyse whether the equilibria obtained maximise the sum of the consumer and producer suspluses or not. Finally we study whether the nationality of the private firm influences the results.

March 17, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Quality competition with profit constraints: Do non-profit firms provide higher quality than for-profit firms?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Kurt R. Brekke (Department of Economics and Helth Economics Bergen, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration), Luigi Siciliani (Department of Economics and Centre for Health Economics, University of York, Heslington), and Odd Rune Straume (Universidade do Minho - NIPE) ask Quality competition with profit constraints: Do non-profit firms provide higher quality than for-profit firms?

ABSTRACT: In many markets, such as education, health care and public utilities, firms are often profit-constrained either due to regulation or because they have non-profit status. At the same time such firms might have altruistic concerns towards consumers. In this paper we study semi-altruistic firms’ incentives to invest in quality and cost-reducing effort when facing constraints on the distribution of profits. Using a spatial competition framework, we derive the equilibrium outcomes under both quality competition with regulated prices and quality price competition. Profit constraints always lead to lower cost-efficiency, whereas the effects on quality and price are ambiguous. If altruism is high (low), profit-constrained firms offer higher (lower) quality and lower (higher) prices than firms that are not profit-constrained. Compared with the first-best outcome, the cost-efficiency of profit-constrained firms is too low, while! quality might be over- or underprovided. Profit constraints may improve welfare and be a complement or substitute to a higher regulated price, depending on the degree of altruism.

March 17, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Baker on FCC Merger Review Process

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jon Baker (FCC/American University) has a great post on the FCC’s Merger Review Process.

March 17, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

OFT & CC publish joint commentary on retail mergers and Commentary on Retail Mergers

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

OFT & CC publish joint commentary on retail mergers and Commentary on Retail Mergers.

March 17, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Bargaining and delay in patent licensing

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ana Mauleon (Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, CEREC, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium and Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), Vincent Vannetelbosch (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), and Cecilia Vergari (Department of Economic Sciences, University of Bologna, I-40125 Bologna, Italy) theorize on Bargaining and delay in patent licensing.

ABSTRACT: We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royal- ties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We show that the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-f! ront fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties.

March 17, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Product innovation and market acquisition of firms

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jean Gabzewicz (Professor Emeritus, Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) and Ornella Tarolla (University of Rome "La Sapienza", Italy) explore Product innovation and market acquisition of firms.

ABSTRACT: The paper explores the incentives for an incumbent firm to acquire an entrant willing to sell a product innovation, rather than openly compete with this entrant and, in case of acquisition, the incentives to sell simultaneously both the existing products and the new one, rather than specializing on a single variant. We prove that, in some circumstances, an incumbent firm can find it profitable to make an acquisition proposal to the entrant in order to deter entry. Nevertheless, in this acquisition scenario, a product proliferation strategy is never observed at equilibrium. Rather, the incumbent restricts itself to offer either its own variant or the product innovation produced by the entrant, depending on the quality differential existing between them. It follows that, while being available for sale, sometimes the innovation simply remains unexploited.

March 17, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, March 16, 2011

Consumer Search Markets with Costly Second Visits

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Maarten C.W. Janssen (University of Vienna - Econ) and Alexei Parakhonyak (State University Higher School of Economics (Russia)) describe Consumer Search Markets with Costly Second Visits.

ABSTRACT: This is the first paper on consumer search where the cost of going back to stores already searched is explicitly taken into account. We show that the optimal sequential search rule under costly second visits is very different from the traditional reservation price rule in that it is nonstationary and not independent of previously sampled prices. We explore the implications of costly second visits on market equilibrium in two celebrated search models. In the Wolinsky model some consumers search beyond the first firm and in this class of models costly second visits do make a substantive difference: equilibrium prices under costly second visits can both be higher and lower than their perfect recall analogues. In the oligopoly search model of Stahl where consumers do not search beyond the first firm, there remains a unique symmetric equilibrium that has firms use pricing strategies that are identical to the perfect recall case.

March 16, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Quantification of Harm in Private Antitrust Actions in the United States

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Herb Hovenkamp (Iowa - Law) has posted on the Quantification of Harm in Private Antitrust Actions in the United States.

ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the theory and experience of United States courts concerning the quantification of harm in antitrust cases. This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, and to the private damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has developed. It is submitted for the Roundtable on the Quantification of Harm to Competition by National Courts and Competition Agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Feb., 2011.

In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government. Further, when the individual states in our federal system file their actions under federal antitrust law they are entitled to assert claims for damages as well. The vast majority of private antitrust actions in the United States include a claim for damages, which must be trebled. The damages measure authorized by the Clayton Act is based purely on compensation, and Congress has never seriously considered changing it. As it turns out, compensation for losses is rarely the measure that is also sufficient to produce the optimal level of deterrence of anticompetitive practices.

Even in the case of a simple naked cartel producing no efficiency gains whatsoever, the overcharge measure produces optimal deterrence only if we have some way of knowing ex ante what the probability of detection and successful prosecution is. Trebled damages under United States law would be about right if the probability of cartel detection and prosecution were .33. In all probability, however, the detection rate for naked cartels is not higher than .2, making a trebling multiplier too low. In other cases such as mergers and most vertical restraints, the probability of detection is 100% because the act is either public or else known to the plaintiff from its onset. In such cases trebled damages are probably excessive.

The indirect purchaser rule in federal antitrust law in the United States awards the entire overcharge to direct purchasers from the violator, and no damages at all to indirect purchasers except in a few atypical situations. In reality, most damages are passed on, and thus direct purchaser intermediaries are typically overcompensated. Further, nearly all of their harm results from lost output rather than the overcharge itself. As a result, in the typical situation the indirect purchaser rule both mismeasures damages and assigns the damages action to the wrong person.

March 16, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Welfare effects of outsourcing in duopolistic markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jan Konig (Free University of Berlin) has posted Welfare effects of outsourcing in duopolistic markets.

ABSTRACT: This paper shows the strategic aspects of international outsourcing in a duopolistic market. Due to different costs of integrated production and outsourcing, the choice of a firm influences the strategy of the competitor via the output price. Therefore, the resulting market constellation depends on the fixed costs and the difference between marginal costs. We show that the three market constellations, both firms produce integrated, both use outsourcing and the firms operate with different strategies are possible. Also the welfare effects of the different outcomes are analysed. If the optimal firms decision is characterized by different strategies, this constellations for given costs is pareto superior to a constellation with equal strategies. On the other hand, for given costs, a resulting constellation of equal strategies can be pareto inferior or pareto superior to a constellation with different strategies. 

March 16, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition and entrepreneurship as engines of growth

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

G. Fazio (UCL) has posted Competition and entrepreneurship as engines of growth.

ABSTRACT: The thesis aims to bridge topics traditionally belonging to different areas of the subject: competition and entrepreneurship coming from microeconomics and industrial organization; and growth, from macroeconomics. It centres around the notion that market structure and conduct affect performance and hence growth. Firms optimize by anticipating changes in consumers' demand and in suppliers' behaviour, which are a function of the market structure and its changes. Market-entry can be explained by the level of competition in a market which can be altered by the implementation of specific policies (for instance, the way a competition authority handles mergers). Failing to have an appropriate antitrust regime will ultimately harm entrepreneurship since it will affect one's ability to understand and to handle the risks associated with launching a new venture. The thesis also explores how different definitions of entrepreneurship! explain varying innovation mechanisms (neck-and-neck and leapfrogging) and how this dovetails with the structure and conduct within a market. For transition economies, we find that competition policy has played a growth-enhancing role and that this effect may be larger than the impact associated with privatization, and we also find evidence of policies' complementarities. These findings are also echoed by our individual-level analysis. We analyse the determinants of high growth expectations entrepreneurial entry (HGE) using individual data drawn on working age population, based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys for the 1998-2004 period. We find that HGE is more likely to occur when the entrepreneur perceives a gap in the market with no other producers supplying the same product. This reinforces the theory that the amount of competition faced by an entrepreneur affects the rate of HGE and also provides a microeconomic foundation for the country-level growth eff! ects described for transition countries.

March 16, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

Competition and Critical Mass

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jaap W.B. Bos (Maastricht University School of Business and Economics), Yee Ling Chan (Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University), James W. Kolari (Mays Business School, Texas A&M University), and Jiang Yuan (Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University) explore Competition and Critical Mass.

ABSTRACT: Empirical literature and related legal practice using concentration as a proxy for competition measurement are prone to a fallacy of division, as concentration measures are appropriate for perfect competition and perfect collusion but not intermediate levels of competition. Extending the classic Cournot-type competition model of Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Cowling (1976) used to derive the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of market concentration, we propose an adaptation of this model that allows collusive rents for all, none, or some of the firms in a market. Application of our model and new critical mass measures to data for U.S. commercial banks in the period 1984-2004 confirms that concentration measures are unreliable competition metrics. Our results lead us to conclude that critical mass is a promising new market power metric for competition analyses. Policy and future research implications are briefly discussed.

March 15, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Antitrust Immunity for Airline Alliances

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Volodymyr Bilotkach (UC Irvine - Econ) and Kai Hüschelrath (WZB) discuss Antitrust Immunity for Airline Alliances.

ABSTRACT:The market developments in international air transportation have led to the dominance of three global airline alliances: Star, SkyTeam, and oneworld. At the same time, members of these alliances receive increasingly more freedom in coordinating various aspects of joint operations, including scheduling and pricing decisions, as well as the right to form revenue-sharing joint ventures in international markets. Although the significant consumer benefits generated by airline cooperation are undisputed, the recent developments raise antitrust concerns. Against this background, the article compares the key competitive effects of airline alliances and antitrust immunity with the economic lines of reasoning in recent policy actions to develop recommendations for a full-fledged assessment of antitrust immunity for airline alliances.

March 15, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the Competition Policy Indexes

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Paolo Buccirossi (LEAR), Lorenzo Ciari (LEAR and EUI), Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University Berlin), Giancarlo Spagnolo (University of Rome), and Cristiana Vitale (LEAR) undertake Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the Competition Policy Indexes.

ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices and summarise them so as to allow cross-country and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been calculated for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period 1995-2005.

March 15, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Competitive Effects of Rail Freight Mergers in the Context of European Liberalization

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Oliver Stehmann & Hans Zenger (both DG Comp) explore The Competitive Effects of Rail Freight Mergers in the Context of European Liberalization.

ABSTRACT: The recent liberalization of rail freight services in Europe has created the possibility of cross-border competition and market integration for European rail freight operators. In other regulated network industries, such as the electricity sector, liberalization subsequently led to a significant number of cross-border mergers. A merger wave also followed the deregulation of U.S. rail freight in the early 1980s. It is therefore not unlikely that an increased number of rail freight mergers might occur in Europe in the upcoming years. This article discusses the competitive effects of such mergers in the context of recently liberalized markets. In particular, it draws from the experience of recent cross-border mergers that were notified before the European Commission. This article proposes several conclusions for market definition, the assessment of the theory of harm, and possible efficiency defenses.

March 15, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 14, 2011

2011 Lear Conference: The Economist and the Judge Private Litigation and Damage Assessment in Antitrust and IPRs Cases

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Rome 23-24 June 2011
The Economist and the Judge
Private Litigation and Damage Assessment in Antitrust and IPRs Cases



  DAY 1 - Thursday, June 23th  

14.00 - Registration
14.30 - Welcome address
Paolo BUCCIROSSI, Lear

First Session - The EU, National Courts and the US
What is the plan of the European Commission to foster damage actions by the victims of antitrust infringements? What part of this plan has been already accomplished and what remains to be done? Is this plan appropriate? Should we expect an increase in law suits? To what extent this increase (if any) will be made also of unmeritorious cases? Does Europe lag behind the US in the development of an efficient system of private enforcement? Is this really a curse or is the US system which has been pushed too far? Are national judges already well-equipped to deal with these cases? Are the procedures for private litigation appropriate in the European Member States? What about the resources?

Chair:
Mario SIRAGUSA*, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP

15.00
Carlos ESTEVA MOSSO, DG Competition – European Commission
Jacqueline RIFFAULT SILK, Court of Appeal, paris
Massimo SCUFFI, Tribunale di Aosta
Victoria A. LAZEAR, Cornerstone Research

Q&A

16.30 - Coffe break

Second Session - Intellectual Property Rights
Is there any substantial difference between the assessment of damages in antitrust cases and IPRs infringements? Do antitrust and IPR’s cases bring any real novelty in the work of judges, or it will be “business as usual” for them? What are the specificity of cases that involve infringements of IPRs?

17.00
Giorgio FLORIDIA, Università Cattolica di Milano
Gabriella MUSCOLO, Tribunale di Roma
Vincenzo DENICOLO’*, Università di Bologna

Q&A

19.00 - Cocktail party


  DAY 2 - Friday, June 24th  

First Session - Antitrust
Are judges aware of the role that economics can play in antitrust damage cases? Are the methods that economists employ too obscure or prone to manipulation to provide a reliable basis for a decision? Are firms resistant to the use of economists in the assessment of damage? Do firms understand the role that economists vs other possible advisers, such as accountants, can play in these cases? Do firms find the analyses and methods employed by economists too difficult to understand? Or do they believe that judges would not rely on them?

Chair:
Alberto PERA, Gianni, Origoni, Grippo & Partners LLP

9.00
Peter DAVIS, UK Competition Commission
Gunnar NIELS, Oxera
Ionnis LIANOS, University College London
TBA, UK CAT

Q&A

11.00 - Coffe break

Second Session - Class action
Do final consumers have really access to a fair compensatory measures? What is the situation with regard to class actions? Are they happening in the EU? What could be done to foster them, while avoiding unmeritorious cases? Have they really provided a fair compensation to the damaged consumers? Is the Italian legislation capable of supporting class actions? Are firms worried by the possibility of class actions? What roles can economists play?

Chair:
Silvia D’ALBERTI*, Allen & Overy, LLP

11.30
Paolo PALMIGIANO, Lloyds Bank Group
Luciano PANZANI, Tribunale di Torino
Luigi PROSPERETTI, Università di Milano

Q&A

* to be confirmed

March 14, 2011 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)