Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Wednesday, November 23, 2011

Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Joseph E. Harrington (Johns Hopkins - Econ) and Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford GSB) have an interesting article on Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices.

ABSTRACT:Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms’ prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.

 

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2011/11/private-monitoring-and-communication-in-cartels-explaining-recent-collusive-practices.html

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