Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, November 21, 2011

Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion - The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Miguel Alexandre Fonseca, University of Exeter Business School and Hans-Theo Normann, Heinrich-Heine Universitaet Duesseldorf - Department of Economics, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods have an interesting paper on Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion - The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments.

ABSTRACT: We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong evidence that talking helps to obtain higher profits for any number of firms, however, the gain from communicating is non-monotonic in the number of firms, with medium-sized industries having the largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2011/11/explicit-vs-tacit-collusion-the-impact-of-communication-in-oligopoly-experiments.html

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