Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Thursday, November 24, 2011

Airline Pricing and Airport Charges in Hub-Spoke Networks with Congestion

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ming Hsin Lin, Osaka University of Economics - Faculty of Economics and Yimin Zhang address Airline Pricing and Airport Charges in Hub-Spoke Networks with Congestion.

ABSTRACT: This article investigates airline pricing and airport congestion charges in hub-spoke networks. When a public hub airport and two public spoke (local) airports independently levy their charges, airlines will eventually set a ticket price that overcharges the passengers for congestion delay cost and overcompensates for airline markups. Privatizing only local airports will always lead to more overcharge, whereas privatizing only the hub airport or all airports could result in lesser overcharge if the network markets are competitive. The degree of overcharge under a private hub and public local airports is always lesser than that under a public hub and private local airports, implying that privatizing a hub airport could yield higher social welfare than privatizing a local airport. Furthermore, investigation on compensation for airline markups also finds that privatizing a hub airport is preferable to privatizing a local airport. These findings have policy implications for airport privatization.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2011/11/airline-pricing-and-airport-charges-in-hub-spoke-networks-with-congestion.html

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