August 12, 2011
The Economics of Cartels: Incentives, Sanctions, Stability, and Effects
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Mette Trier Damgaard (London Economics), Paula Ramada (London Economics), Gavan Conlon (London Economics), and Moritz Godel (London Economics) have written on The Economics of Cartels: Incentives, Sanctions, Stability, and Effects.
ABSTRACT: Economic theory has many applications in cartel cases and economic arguments and evidence is increasingly used in cartel cases. This paper brings together several different strands of economic literature to provide an overview of economic theory and empirical evidence that can help us understand cartels. The paper focuses on how sanctions affect incentives to participate in cartels, the stability of cartels, and the effects of cartels.
August 12, 2011 | Permalink
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