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University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Thursday, July 7, 2011

Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

L. Lambertini and A. Tampieri Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition.

ABSTRACT: We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader's role.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2011/07/low-quality-leadership-in-a-vertically-differentiated-duopoly-with-cournot-competition.html

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