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Levin College of Law

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Thursday, April 14, 2011

The New Hungarian Rules on Damages Caused by Horizontal Hardcore Cartels: Presumed Price Increase and Limited Protection for Whistleblowers – An Analytical Introduction

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Csongor István Nagy, University of Szeged, Faculty of Law, Budapest University of Technology and Economics explains The New Hungarian Rules on Damages Caused by Horizontal Hardcore Cartels: Presumed Price Increase and Limited Protection for Whistleblowers – An Analytical Introduction.

ABSTRACT: The paper analyzes and evaluates the recently adopted Hungarian rules on damage liability in competition matters, which introduced a presumption that horizontal hardcore cartels lead to a 10% price increase and try to reconcile the ends of actions for damages and the leniency policy.

 

 

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2011/04/the-new-hungarian-rules-on-damages-caused-by-horizontal-hardcore-cartels-presumed-price-increase-and.html

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