Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Thursday, April 14, 2011

Safe Harbours in Merger Guidelines: What Should They Be?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Qing Gong Yang, New Zealand Institute of Economic Research and Michael Pickford ask Safe Harbours in Merger Guidelines: What Should They Be?

ABSTRACT: Safe harbours in merger guidelines define post-merger market concentration or concentration change thresholds below which proposed mergers are unlikely to be anti-competitive; anti-competitiveness is usually measured as a substantial lessening of competition. Yet competition agencies have different safe harbours. We used merger models to run many simulations involving a wide range of market structures and merger-induced aggregations. The post-merger unilateral price increases in these scenarios were used to gauge what the safe harbours should be to keep price increases below a specified threshold. The safe harbour thresholds commonly used were found typically to be too restrictive, in that they failed to screen out mergers that were almost certainly competitively benign.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2011/04/safe-harbours-in-merger-guidelines-what-should-they-be.html

| Permalink

TrackBack URL for this entry:

http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341bfae553ef014e86e6f568970d

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Safe Harbours in Merger Guidelines: What Should They Be?:

Comments

Post a comment