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April 5, 2011
Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Daniel Sokol (University of Florida Law - also better known as "me", "Danny", or "that tall and lanky guy who talks fast") and Jim Fishkin (Dechert) have a new piece and I think interesting article that was just published in the Vanderbilt Law Review (En Banc) on Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law. We think that this piece makes an important contribution to the discussion of merger efficiencies.
ABSTRACT: This Essay provides an overview of U.S. antitrust merger practice in addressing efficiencies both in terms of actual practice before the agencies and in scholarly work as a response to Jamie Henikoff Moffitt‘s Vanderbilt Law Review article Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis.
April 5, 2011 | Permalink
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