Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Friday, November 19, 2010

Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jan Eeckhout and Philipp Kircher (both UPenn - Econ) address Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms.


ABSTRACT: In a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms, we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism. Price posting prevails when meetings are rival, i.e., when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer's meeting probability. Under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex-ante. Only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non-rival, price posting is not an equilibrium. Multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex-post through auctions.

November 19, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The 2010 Merger Guidelines: Do We Need Them? Are They All We Need?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Gregory Leonard (NERA) asks The 2010 Merger Guidelines:  Do We Need Them?  Are They All We Need?

ABSTRACT: The release of the 2010 Merger Guidelines was largely an anticlimax. Unlike the 1982 and 1992 Merger Guidelines, the 2010 Merger Guidelines did not offer any radical changes in Agency policy or introduce any innovative principles or modes of analysis. Instead, the 2010 Merger Guidelines can best be characterized as reflecting existing Agency practices. To be sure, those practices have evolved over the last 18 years and, consequently, the 2010 Merger Guidelines differ from the 1992 Merger Guidelines in important respects. For example, the 2010 Merger Guidelines' focus on diversion ratios and margins reflects economic thinking about unilateral effects developed since the 1992 Merger Guidelines were issued. However, that the Agencies analyze diversion ratios and margins in merger review should not be news to any experienced antitrust practitioner.

Some commentators view the downplaying of market definition in the 2010 Merger Guidelines as a major development. However, this also should not have come as a shock to anyone. For years, many economists, including chief Agency economists Carl Shapiro and Joe Farrell, have stressed the supremacy of direct evidence of competitive effects over market definition when such direct evidence is available. Moreover, in Whole Foods, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") explicitly adopted this position.

Some commentators argue that a significant change in the 2010 Merger Guidelines as compared to the 1992 Merger Guidelines is a greater ambiguity as to the specific approach the Agencies will take in a given case, which creates uncertainty for the business community. This characterization of the difference between the 1992 and 2010 Merger Guidelines is accurate. However, it was well-known that the Agencies typically did not follow the script of the 1992 Merger Guidelines-look no further than the HHI thresholds, which were largely ignored. Again, the 2010 Merger Guidelines give a more accurate picture of actual Agency practice, which is not to follow any particular mode of analysis, but instead to focus on the mode that is most relevant given the data available and the nature of the industry.

November 19, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Exploding Offers and Buy-Now Discounts

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Mark Armstrong and Jidong Zhou (both UCL - Econ) discuss Exploding Offers and Buy-Now Discounts.

ABSTRACT: A common sales tactic is for a seller to encourage a potential customer to make her purchase decision quickly. We consider a market with sequential consumer search in which firms often encourage first-time visitors to buy immediately, either by making an “exploding offer” (which permits no return once the consumer leaves) or by offering a “buy-now discount” (which makes the price paid for immediate purchase lower than the regular price). Prices often increase when these policies are used. If firms cannot commit to their sales policy, the outcome depends on whether consumer incur an intrinsic cost of returning to a firm: if there is no such return cost, it is often an equilibrium for firms to offer a uniform price to both first-time and returning visitors; if the return cost is positive, however, firms are forced to make exploding offers.

November 19, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Partial collusion with asymmetric cross-price effects

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Luca Savorelli (University of Bologna - Econ) explains Partial collusion with asymmetric cross-price effects.

ABSTRACT: Asymmetries in cross-price elasticities have been demonstrated by several empirical studies. In this paper we study from a theoretical stance how introducing asymmetry in the substitution effects influences the sustainability of collusion. We characterize the equilibrium of a linear Cournot duopoly with substitute goods, and consider substitution e¤ects which are asymmetric in magnitude. Within this framework, we study partial collusion using Friedman (1971) solution concept. Our main result shows that the interval of quantities supporting collusion in the asymmetric setting is always smaller than the interval in the symmetric benchmark. Thus, the asymmetry in the substitution effects makes collusion more difficult to sustain. This implies that previous Antitrust decisions could be reversed by considering the role of this kind of asymmetry.

November 18, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Managerial Incentives and Stackelberg Equilibria in Oligopoly

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Marcella Scrimitore (University of Salento - Econ) explores Managerial Incentives and Stackelberg Equilibria in Oligopoly.

ABSTRACT: The paper investigates both quantity and price oligopoly games in markets with a variable number of managerial and entrepreneurial firms which defines market structure. Following Vickers (Economic Journal, 1985) which establishes an equivalence between the equilibrium under unilateral delegation and the Stackelberg quantity equilibrium, the outcomes of these games are compared with the ones in sequential multi-leaders and multi-followers games. The profitability of a managerial/entrepreneurial attitude vs leadership/followership is shown to critically depend upon the kind of strategy, price or quantity, and upon the assumed market structure. Indeed, the latter turns out to be crucial in determining the equivalence result that is shown to be contingent on the assumption that just one leader or one managerial firm operate in the market. A welfare analysis finally highlights the differences between the delegation and the se! quential games, focusing on the impact of market structure and imperfect substitutability on the equilibria of the two games.

November 18, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Changes in Policy, Transparency, & Predictability

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

James Langenfeld (Navigant Economics) discusses 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Changes in Policy, Transparency, & Predictability.

ABSTRACT: The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines ("HMGs") on August 19, 2010. The HMGs resulted from a process that obtained comments about revising the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992 HMGs), held workshops, issued proposed HMGs, and received comments on the proposed HMGs before finalization. The stated purposes of the HMGs are:

[to] describe the principal analytical techniques and the main types of evidence on which the Agencies usually rely to predict whether a horizontal merger may substantially lessen competition[,] . . . to assist the business community and antitrust practitioners by increasing the transparency of the analytical process underlying the Agencies' enforcement decisions[, and to] assist the courts in developing an appropriate framework for interpreting and applying the antitrust laws in the horizontal merger context.

This article discusses how well the HMGs achieve the first two of these goals, and offers some thoughts related to third. First, the HMGs change the landscape for evaluating mergers in several potentially important ways, at least compared to the 1992 HMGs and many typical past practices. These changes in part reflect Agency practices since the 1992 HMGs, and in part reflect an increased emphasis on certain types of analysis and reduced emphasis on others. Second, the HMGs offer many more details of the analyses and types of evidence considered by the Agencies, and in this way may help practitioners and the business community understand merger review by "increasing the transparency." At the same time, however, the HMGs may reduce the predictability of merger review by removing most of the simple benchmarks and not providing benchmarks for the newly described analyses. Third, it remains to be seen whether the courts will give the HMGs and their new analyses as much (or more) weight as they have given the 1992 HMGs.

The following section discusses the related, but distinct, concepts of transparency and predictability. The next section summarizes some of the major changes in the HMGs from the 1992 HMGs, followed by a section that describes the HMGs' elimination of many benchmarks, sections that discuss many of the specific analytic techniques in the HMGS, and a section the potential impact of the HMGs on the courts.

November 18, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Dalai Lama Was Within 100ft of Our Antitrust Conference

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The Dalai Lama was speaking next door to our antitrust conference.  Many of our antitrust conference participants got to see him walk by.  Some people who were there to see the Dalai Lama mistook Maarten Pieter Schinkel (University of Amsterdam - Economics) for actor Keanu Reeves.

November 18, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thy Lamp Unto the World: International Convergence After the 2010 Guidelines

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

William Blumenthal (Clifford Chance) explains Thy Lamp Unto the World: International Convergence After the 2010 Guidelines.

ABSTRACT: Those of us who practice competition law globally and who engage in international technical assistance are regularly struck by the wide variation in culture and expertise among the world's competition agencies, now numbering more than 100. Uniformity is decades away, if that. But serious efforts towards achieving greater uniformity are a daily event, as (i) the more prominent and sophisticated agencies routinely eyeball and borrow from one another, replacing their own practices with better practices observed elsewhere, and (ii) the newer and emerging agencies carefully read the outputs of the leading agencies with a view towards possible emulation. Even if Americans don't always read the statements from the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") carefully, foreigners do; and even if foreigners don't always elect to follow U.S. practice, they give it serious consideration. The U.S. government's description of its practice is highly influential. One need only examine the rack of submissions by national delegations at meetings of the Competition Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-the papers from the United States and the European Commission are always the first to run out. Given the range of objectives behind government policy statements, it's probably too much to ask that the statements be written with international implications as the principal concern. It's not too much to ask that the statements be evaluated with international consequences in mind.

In releasing the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, FTC and DOJ needed to address many objectives and many audiences, and they often succeeded. Promotion of multijurisdictional rationality, however, does not rank high among the Guidelines' strengths. As discussed more fully below, the Guidelines have several related shortcomings when viewed from the perspective of international implications. First, the Guidelines introduce greater flexibility and discretion, but at a cost of diminished predictability and operational specificity. They will be less useful than they might have been as a tool for teaching other jurisdictions the mechanics of sound merger analysis. Second, the greater flexibility is achieved in part through theories and methodologies that are a bit eclectic, sometimes analytically treacherous, and often expressed without clear delineation of limiting principles. The Guidelines are ripe for erroneous application by unsophisticated users. They are also at risk for pretextual application by sophisticated users who might not share our view of appropriate competition policy and who are simply seeking cover in our words. Third, the Guidelines dilute the objective of encouraging rule of law in other jurisdictions. By reducing clarity and consistency in favor of granting broader discretion to decision makers, the Guidelines waive an opportunity to serve as a template for bringing greater order to global process.

November 18, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

Lost in Translation - Antitrust Edition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

I am in New Delhi for the excellent conference that Ioannis Lianos and I have organized (see here).  Unfortunately, with New Delhi ten and a half hours ahead, I cannot seem to fall asleep on day two of my trip (I was in London Sun-Mon so I thought it would help the time zone transition-- apparently not).  I feel like Bill Murray in Lost in Translation.  I half expect Bill Kovacic or John Fingleton to yell "More Intense!" in Japanese to me tomorrow when I present my paper on cartels in a development context.

I went to bed and got up an hour and a half later - apparently my body thinks that yesterday's good night sleep was an aberration.  Thus far, I have been amazed with what I have seen of India.  It is an amazing and dynamic country.  I recommend that everyone spend time here. 

The upside of not being able to sleep is that I had a skype video call with my wife and kids just now. Let me plug my parents as amazing people.  They flew down to help out my wife the entire time I am away.

November 17, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Effect of Economic Crises on Antitrust Policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Marina Lao, Seton Hall School of Law provides an Editor’s Note: Symposium on the Effect of Economic Crises on Antitrust Policy.

ABSTRACT: Viewed narrowly, there is little connection between antitrust policy and the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. Nonetheless, the severe crisis has prompted debate on a basic antitrust policy question: whether antitrust enforcement is a luxury that the country can ill afford during periods of deep economic recession. The origins of the crisis have also exposed serious regulatory and market failures that have touched off debate on several broader issues. For example, have these failures called into question popular assumptions underlying modern antitrust policy – that markets are robust, self-correcting and can adequately protect consumers with minimal government intervention? And, to the extent that the assumptions have been undermined, what effect would (or should) it have on antitrust policy? Should there be less reliance on microeconomics in contemporary antitrust analysis? Should antitrust policy become more regulatory? The authors in this Symposium provide diverse analyses of some of the antitrust issues that are implicated. This Editor’s Note introduces the Articles and also independently touches on some of the issues.

November 17, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Framework of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Paul Denis (Dechert) discusses The Framework of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.

ABSTRACT: The two principal reasons that the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines achieved longevity, judicial acceptance, and international imitation were: (1) for the most part, it asked the right questions; and (2) it provided a structured framework in which to ask those questions.  If those attributes of the 1992 Guidelines are viewed as evaluative criteria against which to judge any revisions, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines are a mixed bag.

The revised Guidelines evidence a decided move away from asking the "right" questions, substituting for those questions a greater exposition on the direction of antitrust merger analysis, the general principles underlying it, and some of the tools that might be employed in conducting that analysis.  The additional exposition adds explanatory power at a general level but probably spells an earlier obsolescence for the final document.  Predictions of the demise of the structured framework appear to have been premature.  The framework remains largely intact even while the Agencies attempt to side-step the statutory requirement of market definition.

November 17, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Illustrations of Price Discrimination in Baseball

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Daniel A. Rascher, University of San Francisco and Andrew D. Schwarz, OSKR, LLC provide Illustrations of Price Discrimination in Baseball.

ABSTRACT: Price discrimination of this nature, focused on differing degrees of quality, bundled goods, volume discounts, and other forms of second-degree price discrimination, is commonplace in MLB. Indeed, it is safe to say that every single MLB ticket is sold under some form of price discrimination. As teams grow increasingly sophisticated in their pricing strategies, price discrimination is becoming more precise, more wide-spread, and more profitable, while at the same time providing for more opportunities for more fans to find tickets at a price they are willing to pay. Unlike a baseball game, where one team must lose and one must win, price discrimination allows for win-win economic outcomes for teams and fans alike.

November 17, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Developments in Cable Broadband Networks

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Hyun-Cheol Chung (OECD) describes Developments in Cable Broadband Networks.

ABSTRACT: The position of cable operators within the pay TV market has changed drastically in recent years. Although video service remains core to the cable industry’s business model, cable TV’s market share has been dropping significantly with intense competition from direct broadcast satellite services (DBS), Internet protocol Television (IPTV) services, digital terrestrial television services (DTT) and finally from over-the-top (OTT) service providers that supply video over an existing data connection from a third party. Cable still has a strong market position for video, particularly because of its existing relationships with content providers but the market is likely to become more competitive as other substitutable offers become available over a range of media.

November 17, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, November 16, 2010

WARNING: Improper Use of the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines Can Result in Overly Narrow Markets, Mistaken Inferences of Market Power, and Wrong-Headed Analyses

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michael Doane (Competition Economics), Luke Froeb & Steven Tschantz (Vanderbilt University) provide a WARNING:  Improper Use of the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines Can Result in Overly Narrow Markets, Mistaken Inferences of Market Power, and Wrong-Headed Analyses.

ABSTRACT: Every first-year law student has heard the story of the man who was mowing his lawn when he realized that his hedge also needed trimming.  Since he didn't own a hedge trimmer, he lifted the lawnmower up, turned it on its side, and then accidentally cut off his fingers.  He sued the manufacturer, claiming that the label should have warned him not to trim his hedge with a lawnmower.  

With all of the tools in the new Guidelines-natural experiments, merger simulation, market delineation, and "Upward Pricing Pressure" ("UPP") to name a few-it is easy for an antitrust practitioner to feel a little like the protagonist of this urban legend.  We are given a lot of tools, but no warning label on how or when to employ them. 

Predictably, economists have jumped into this void by coming up with cases or examples of when the tools would give the wrong answer. Most of the criticism is directed against UPP, but the criticism could just as easily be directed against any of the tools mentioned in the guidelines.  Some of this criticism is over-stated as there is little in the Guidelines to suggest that the agencies are going to misuse the tools in the way that the critics suppose. 

But since the new Guidelines are a little short on guidance, and since they did not come with a warning label, we are going to try to clear up some confusion by providing one.

WARNING:  Improper use of the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines can result in overly narrow markets, mistaken inferences of market power, and wrong-headed analyses. 

But they can just as easily do the opposite.  It depends on how you use them.  Incidentally, the same was true of the old Merger Guidelines

November 16, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Multimarket linkages, buyer power, and the productivity puzzle

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Noriaki Matsushim, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University and Laixun Zhao, Research Institute of Economics and Business, Kobe University explore Multimarket linkages, buyer power, and the productivity puzzle

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the relationship between firms' productivity improvement and the volume of exports, and shows that it can be sometimes negative. Specifically, we simultaneously take into account intermediate retailers (i.e., vertically) and multimarket linkages (i.e., horizontally). We find that an improvement of the manufacturing productivity affects the bargained wholesale prices in opposite directions in asymmetric markets, causing retailers to make corresponding changes that look surprising. This result can explain for the empirical "left productivity puzzle" found in Ghemawat et al. (2010). Related to this issue is the relationship between buyer power (caused by a retail merger) and profitability. Contrary to the existing literature, in an extended setup, we find that the merger between the downstream duopolists does not improve their profits if their bargaining power is strong vs. upstream suppliers.

November 16, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition in Mobile Telephony in France and Germany

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Lukasz Grzybowski, University of Cape Town (UCT) and Chiraz Karamti, Telecom Bretagne analyze Competition in Mobile Telephony in France and Germany.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the development of mobile telephony in France and Germany in 1998–2002. We conduct this analysis in relation to the antitrust investigation initiated by the French competition authority in 2002 due to exchange of strategic information and a share-fixing agreement between network operators. The results suggest a significant difference between price elasticities of demand in these two countries. Moreover, consumers perceive mobile telephony as a substitute for fixed-line connection in France and as a complement in Germany. In the time period of the share-fixing agreement among French network operators there were no adverse shifts in the levels of prices and subscriptions.

November 16, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Consumer demand for variety: intertemporal effects of consumption, product switching and pricing policies

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ricardo Ribeiro (LSE) has posted Consumer demand for variety: intertemporal effects of consumption, product switching and pricing policies.

ABSTRACT: The concept of diminishing marginal utility is a cornerstone of economic theory. The consumption of a good typically creates satiation that diminishes the marginal utility of consuming more. Temporal satiation induces consumers to increase their stimulation level by seeking variety and therefore substitute towards other goods (substitutability across time) or other differentiated versions (products) of the good (substitutability across products). The literature on variety-seeking has developed along two strands, each focusing on only one type of substitutability. I specify a demand model that attempts to link these two strands of the literature. This issue is economically relevant because both types of substitutability are important for retailers and manufacturers in designing intertemporal price discrimination strategies. The consumer demand model specified allows consumption to have an enduring effect and the marginal ! utility of the different products to vary over consumption occasions. Consumers are assumed to make rational purchase decisions by taking into account, not only current and future satiation levels, but also prices and product choices. I then use the model to evaluate the demand implications of a major pricing policy change from hi-low pricing to an everyday low pricing strategy. I find evidence that consumption has a lasting effect on utility that induces substitutability across time and that the median consumer has a taste for variety in her product decisions. Consumers are found to be forward-looking with respect to the duration since the last purchase, to price expectations and product choices. Pricing policy simulations suggest that retailers may increase revenue by reducing the variance of prices, but that lowering the everyday level of prices may be unprofitable.

November 16, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, November 15, 2010

Continuity and Change in the 2010 Merger Guidelines

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Malcolm B. Coate (FTC) & Joseph J. Simons (Paul, Weiss) describe Continuity and Change in the 2010 Merger Guidelines.

ABSTRACT: For almost 30 years, the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies have described a structured, step-by-step analytical methodology in their Merger Guidelines. Prior revisions to the Guidelines were designed, in significant part, to clarify actual practice at the agencies in light of historical experience, while keeping the underlying methodology intact. The 2010 Merger Guidelines are supportive of this tradition; the document clarifies actual practice in certain respects and retains much of the core presentation. However, the revision is also innovative, because it modifies the methodology to place greater emphasis on evidence of adverse competitive effects. Most of this "evidence" is completely consistent with past practice and uncontroversial. One type of "evidence" is not.

The 2010 Guidelines introduce margin evidence to support inferences on competitive behavior, market definition, and post-merger price effects. This type of evidence has not previously been systematically used by the agencies in their merger investigations. While we understand that the margin evidence and the models related to it might be proven applicable in particular fact situations, we are concerned that the Guidelines, as written, would apply these types of economic evidence to a broad set of mergers without basis. Doing so would run the risk of drastically increasing the number of mergers subject to challenge.

For most transactions reviewed by the Agencies, markets must still be defined, shares measured, unilateral or collusive effects evaluated, entry studied, and efficiencies analyzed, all within an interactive review process in which facts uncovered in any aspect of the investigation may require re-evaluation of an initial conclusion reached in other portions of the review. Within this standard structure, the revised Guidelines add numerous minor innovations. These include a more comprehensive overview for market definition, higher structural statistics, additional insights into unilateral and collusive effects, a more flexible entry section, and new openness to innovation-based efficiencies.

In this comment, we first discuss the Guidelines' increased emphasis on evidence related to a merger's adverse effect on competition. Then in section III, we address the analytical techniques introduced by the revision that relate to direct predictions of unilateral effects. We also explain how the new Guidelines can be used to modify the pre-existing structural approach in a way that makes it consistent with the new unilateral effects techniques. Next, in Section IV, we list some of the important improvements to the standard Guidelines methodology that has come to define modern merger analysis. Finally, in section V, we add some cautions related to the use of the theoretical innovations detailed in Section III. Section VI concludes by linking the Guidelines approach to the controlling legal authority developed from Philadelphia National Bank to General Dynamics to Baker Hughes.

November 15, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Merger Simulations with Observed Diversion Ratios

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Lars Mathiesen, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), Øivind Anti Nilsen, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) - Department of Economics, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), and Lars Sorgard, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) - Department of Economics explain Merger Simulations with Observed Diversion Ratios.

ABSTRACT: A common approach to merger simulations used in antitrust cases is to calibrate demand from market shares and a few additional parameters. When the products involved in the merger case are differentiated along several dimensions, the resulting diversion ratios may be very different from those based upon market shares. This again may affect the predicted post-merger price effects. This article shows how merger simulation can be improved by using observed diversion ratios. To illustrate the effects of this approach we use diversion ratios from a local grocery market in Norway. In this case diversions from the acquired to the acquiring stores were considerably smaller than suggested by market shares, and the predicted average price increase from the acquisition was 40 % lower using this model rather than a model based upon market shares. This analysis also suggests that even a subset of observed diversion ratios may significantly change the prediction from a merger simulation based upon market shares.

 

November 15, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Antitrust Compliance: Perspectives and Resources for Corporate Counselors, 2nd Edition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Antitrust Compliance: Perspectives and Resources for Corporate Counselors, 2nd EditionIncludes CD-ROM
Antitrust Compliance: Perspectives and Resources for Corporate Counselors, 2nd Edition Product Code: 5030553 Publication Date: October 31, 2010 ISBN: 978-1-60442-896-4 Page Count: 240 Trim Size: 8-1/2 x 11 Sponsoring Entities: Section of Antitrust Law Topics: Antitrust Law, Business Law, Corporate Law Format: Book - 5030553 Pricing: $199.00 (Regular) $179.00 (Section of Antitrust Law) ABA Members, Sign in now to receive this discount! Quantity:  
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About Antitrust Compliance: Perspectives and Resources for Corporate Counselors, 2nd Edition
Lawyers advising corporate clients -- whether they be outside or in-house counsel -- are under constant pressure to ensure that their clients are well-informed about the antitrust laws and how to comply with them. With a new administration vowing to increase enforcement, a carefully planned and well-executed compliance program is essential to minimize risk for corporate clients.

This second edition of Antitrust Compliance contains new and updated chapters to aid outside and in-house counsel charged with developing or updating their clients' antitrust compliance program. It provides detailed essays exploring specific compliance issues from the perspective of experienced practitioners and antitrust compliance manuals, presentations and other materials that can be customized for use in actual corporate employee training situations.

This publication includes a CD-ROM containing most of the compliance presentations and other resources for ease in adapting that information to your specific circumstances.

November 15, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)