Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Vodafone: Price Regulation as a Substitute for Intervention under Article 102 TFEU

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Thomas Ackermann (University of Munich) argues Vodafone: Price Regulation as a Substitute for Intervention under Article 102 TFEU.

ABSTRACT: Article 102(2)(a) TFEU states that abusive conduct may consist in imposing unfair prices or trading conditions. However, decisions prohibiting exploitative prices under Article 102 TFEU are scarce for a number of reasons. First, in the absence of barriers to entry, markets can generally be trusted to bring down excessive prices. This calls at least for a certain measure of self-restraint with regard to legal intervention. Secondly, standards for the assessment of the exploitative nature of high prices are notoriously difficult to find and to apply. Thirdly, even if prices are found to be exploitative it remains open to doubt how such abuses can be effectively remedied. Finally, the situation becomes even more complex if supra-competitive prices are not charged by a single dominant firm, but by oligopolists so that the additional issue of collective dominance arises.

Clinical Integration: Linchpin of Real Reform

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Melinda Hatton (American Hospital Assoc.) discusses Clinical Integration: Linchpin of Real Reform.

ABSTRACT: During the year-long debate over health care reform, removing barriers to clinical integration received far less attention than it should have. It was preempted by debate over more voluble issues like single payer options, individual mandates, and filling donut holes. Now that attention has turned to making health reform-officially, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010-work for patients and caregivers, the issue is getting the attention it deserves.

Clinical integration is another way of talking about teamwork: hospitals, doctors, nurses, and other caregivers working together to provide the right care at the right time in the right setting. While the notion of working together seems unremarkable, our current health care system is built on a system of nearly unbridgeable silos, where hospitals, doctors, nursing homes, social workers, physical therapists, and other caregivers work and bill separately. So, instead of a continuum of care best suited to a patient's needs, each silo looks to do the best it can with the particular segment of care it controls.

The new law takes aim at these silos through a "a robust set of delivery system reforms aimed at incentivizing physicians, hospitals and other providers to modernize the delivery of health care by pursuing collaborative models and different cooperative arrangements to promote high quality, patient-centered care." The reforms they refer to are wide-ranging and include a Medicaid global payment system demonstration, an accountable care organization program, medical "homes" for Medicaid patients with chronic conditions, and a Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation charged with finding and testing innovative payment and service delivery models.

In a recent Washington Post editorial, the new Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services chief, Don Berwick, reinforced the collaborative nature of health care reform: "[It] will help us pay for quality outcomes, not volume, with innovative tools such as bundled payments, incentives for hospitals that prevent readmissions, and accountable care organizations in which health-care providers who work in teams deliver better care with lower costs."

But bridging silos is no easy task. It requires both a cultural shift among caregivers too used to working independently, and coordinated efforts by at least five different federal agencies to overhaul a legal and regulatory system predicated on maintaining silos and punishing deviation.

DG Competition Qualiative Stakeholder Survey Report is Out

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

DG Competition has carried out for the first time a comprehensive stakeholder survey about its activities. The survey was in two parts: an in-depth qualitative survey targeting professional stakeholders and a broad and general survey of EU citizens. Both surveys were carried out by independent market research companies.

• Memo: DG Competition publishes the results of Stakeholder Survey

Qualitative Eurobarometer survey about the perceived quality of DG Competition's actions

This survey was based on in-depth interviews, carried out in early 2010 by TNS qual+ among lawyers, companies, economic consultants, business and consumer associations, Member States' ministries as well as national competition authorities who have directly contributed to the work of DG Competition in recent years. The results consist of seven individual reports reflecting each stakeholder group's specific views, as well as an aggregate report summarizing the results of the individual surveys.

• DG Competition Stakeholder Study - Aggregate Report en fr de
• Stakeholder Report - Companies en
• Stakeholder Report - Lawyers en
• Stakeholder Report - Economic consultancies en
• Stakeholder Report - Business Associations en
• Stakeholder Report - Consumer Associations en
• Stakeholder Report - Member States Ministries en
• Stakeholder Report - National Competition Authorities en

Quantitative Flash Eurobarometer study about EU citizens' perception about competition policy

This survey was carried out by phone among 25,000 citizens by Gallup Hungary in November 2009 in all EU Member States.

• Summary Report en fr de
• Full Analytical Report en fr de

Exclusivity and Exclusion on Platform Markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Subhasish M. Chowdhury (School of Economics, University of East Anglia) and Steven Martin (Purdue University) describe Exclusivity and Exclusion on Platform Markets.

ABSTRACT: We examine conditions under which a platform firm can exclude rivals by bundling a product that some on one side of the market regard as essential with its platform, and pursue implications for market performance. We show that the impact of an exclusive dealing contract between the upstream firm and one of the downstream firms on market performance depends on the strength of consumer preferences for the products of the two downstream firms and the relative size of the market segment for which the complementary consumption good is essential. In some cases this may reduce the net social welfare.

Draft Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Florian Wagner-von Papp (UCL Law) looks at Draft Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements.

ABSTRACT: Among the innovations of the Draft Guidelines, anticipated to replace the 2001 Guidelines, is a chapter on information exchanges. This chapter, on which this note focuses, will without doubt attract criticism, but is to be welcomed. It does not establish safe harbours and emphasises the need for a case-by-case analysis. This note argues that this may be disappointing from a practitioner's point of view, but that this inevitably results from the diversity of information exchanges

France Telecom: When is State Aid Financed through State Resources?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

M. M. Slotboom (Simmons & Simmons) discusses France Telecom: When is State Aid Financed through State Resources?

ABSTRACT: The France Télécom judgment demonstrates that inventive governments may favour their national industries with government measures that fall outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. The situation at hand is a direct result of the policy choice made by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Sloman Neptun, that government measures must result in a transfer of State resources in order to qualify as aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) EC.

Series: Global Competition Law and Economics

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

I am off on Monday to speak in DC at a US Chamber sponsored program for the Competition Commission of India.  The US Chamber has done important work on various competition issues through its various initiatives around the world.  Someone else speaking on Monday asked me about my forthcoming book series.  On the assumption that a number of other people also are wondering about its status, let me provide readers about where we are in the process.  The first book is being edited and has a cast of some excellent authors in economics and law.  Our conference in India will serve as the basis for the second book.  See here.

As for the series generally, the Stanford University Press website gives a rich description:

Forthcoming Series: Global Competition Law and Economics

Ioannis Lianos and D. Daniel Sokol, Editors

Competition law and economics (known in the United States as antitrust) is an area of cutting-edge academic work with significant policy implications. Once confined to the United States and a few other countries, antitrust has taken off as an area of study in a relatively short period of time. More than 100 jurisdictions now have competition laws. Increasingly, enforcement activities abroad have far-reaching implications for any antitrust regime. Moreover, developments in economic thinking have helped to reformulate attitudes in both academic and policy circles. This book series will be at the forefront of the development of new ideas and approaches within the field.



“Given the increasingly global dynamics of competition law and economics, Lianos and Sokol will make an important contribution to the field of antitrust with this new series.”
—Einer Elhauge, Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

"With the growth in the number of competition agencies worldwide, there is an increasing opportunity to apply sophisticated economic reasoning to shape competition policy and make it work for the long run interests of society. A series in global competition policy is a welcome development that should accelerate the dissemination of knowledge in this important area of policy.”
—Dennis Carlton, Katherine Dusak Miller Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Booth School of Business

"This series promises to offer a vital set of books that will fill a real need. The interaction of competition law, economics, and institutions in view of globalized markets is a critical problem of our times."
—Eleanor Fox, Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, NYU School of Law

"I am delighted that this new series on Global Competition Law and Economics has been launched. Competition law involves the economic analysis of markets within the context of a legal process. This series promises to contribute vital scholarship to this important and ever-growing area of economic policy."
—Richard Whish, King's College London, School of Law

"With over 100 jurisdictions enforcing competition policy, officials need to know how to cooperate with other authorities, and undertakings devising a global strategy need to how to comply with the requirements of many different authorities operating under different legislation. Both groups need to understand competition advocacy. Skills in both economics and law are required. Laws that suit large well-developed countries may not suit smaller or less developed countries. The two series editors are well known internationally in the area of competition law, and I am sure that they will attract excellent authors for the different volumes of the series. This new series of books will fill a gap and is warmly welcome."
—Valentine Korah, University College London, Faculty of Laws

"With the recent global proliferation of competition laws, many of these competition authorities are in a phase of learning and experimentation. This makes it an opportune time for practitioners and scholars to exchange ideas, discuss the challenges we face, and develop new solutions. The new book series, Global Competition Law and Economics, is exactly the time of venue that will assist in this process by promoting the communication of what we know right now and enhancing the development of what we'll know tomorrow."
—Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics

 

Entry Deterrence in the Presence of Learning-by-Doing

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ana Espinola-Arredondo; Felix Munoz-Garcia (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University) explain Entry Deterrence in the Presence of Learning-by-Doing.

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates a signaling entry deterrence model under learning-by-doing. We show that a monopolist’s practice of entry deterrence imposes smaller welfare losses (or larger welfare gains) when learning effects are present than when they are absent, making the intervention of antitrust authorities less urgent. If, however, the welfare loss associated to entry deterrence is still significant, and thus intervention is needed, our paper demonstrates that the incumbent’s practice of entry deterrence is easier to detect by a regulator who does not have access to accurate information about the incumbent’s profit function. Learning-by-doing hence facilitates the regulator’s ability to detect entry deterrence, thus suggesting its role as an “ally” of antitrust authorities.

Leibowitz Speech on FTC/CMS Workshop on Accountable Care Organizations

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The remarks of FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz at the FTC/CMS Workshop on Accountable Care Organizations are available here.

A Primer on Antitrust Damages

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Herbert J. Hovenkamp, University of Iowa - College of Law provides A Primer on Antitrust Damages.

ABSTRACT: This paper considers the theory of antitrust damages and then discusses some simple models for proving them. Antitrust damages theory begins with the premise that many practices alleged to violate the antitrust laws cause no consumer harm. Others are inefficient and have few socially redeeming virtues. Still others may simultaneously increase both the efficiency of the participants and their market power. A perfectly designed antitrust policy would exonerate the first set of practices, condemn the second set, and condemn the third set only when the social cost of the restraint exceeds its social value or they produce net harm to consumers. A theory of damages based on these principles would make antitrust violations unprofitable when they are harmful but leave them alone when they are not. The practice of antitrust damages pursues a very different route, however. Mainly this is a consequence of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which commands that damages be measured by plaintiff’s losses rather than alternatives that come much closer to providing appropriate levels of deterrence.

The discussion of application considers rationales for trebling, damages in overcharge cases and for exclusionary practices in competitor suits, lawsuits involving nascent plaintiffs who have no established profit record and those involving terminated firms who are no longer in business. It compares “yardstick,” “before-and-after,” and so-called “market share” methodologies. It concludes with discussions of the “disaggregation” requirement, which requires that the expert isolate those elements of damage that result from an antitrust violation and those that should appropriately be attributed to other causes, and a brief discussion of the impact of common law joint and several liability.

Private Damage Actions Related to European Competition Law in Italy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Claudio Tesauro and Dario Ruggiero (both Bonelli Erede Pappalardo Law Firm) explain Private Damage Actions Related to European Competition Law in Italy.

ABSTRACT: Competition law based civil claims are brought, in Italy, by competitors rather than consumers. In addition to the recently approved ‘collective action', some other initiatives could be taken in order to improve effectiveness of private actions. An example of these initiativese might be the ‘multiple damage’, already suggested by the ECJ in Manfredi and in the national follow up case.

Open Source and Merger Policy: Insights from the EU Oracle/Sun Decision

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Simonetta Vezzoso, University of Trento - Law Department addresses Open Source and Merger Policy: Insights from the EU Oracle/Sun Decision.

ABSTRACT: In Europe, the merger between Oracle and Sun raised a series of substantial competition concerns, especially related to the acquisition by Oracle of MySQL, an open source business, and its impact on the database market. In the end, the acquisition was unconditionally cleared by the Commission. The open source nature of MySQL played a decisive role in the competition assessment of the merger conducted by the European competition authority according to the "significant impediment to effective competition" legal test. In this Article we will review the Commission's decision with the specific aim of determining to what extent the open source nature of MySQL's business model actually affected the scrutiny of Sun's acquisition by Oracle under the relevant test. In particular, it will be questioned whether Oracle's public announcement concerning its future behaviour on the database and related markets can be expected to duly address the concerns voiced by the Commission in the course of the merger proceedings. We will conclude that that Judge Easterbrook's much quoted conclusion that - [t]he GPL and open-source software have nothing to fear from the antitrust laws - may possibly need some qualification.

Life Under the Chinese AML - Not So Bad for Multinationals

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Peter Wang and Sebastien Evrard have an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal titled Life After China's Antimonopoly Law Foreign companies are discovering they might not be the law's prime targets after all.  Their conclusion:

Although foreign companies complain with some justification of growing problems doing business in China, the fact remains that Beijing has shown considerable restraint in its application of a law that easily could have become a blunt tool against foreign firms.

The Economics of Collective Brands

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Arthur Fishman, Bar Ilan University - Department of Economics, Avi Simhon, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Finkelshtain, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Nira Yacouel, explain The Economics of Collective Brands.

ABSTRACT: We consider the consequences of a shared brand name such as geographical names used to identify high quality products, for the incentives of otherwise autonomous firms to invest in quality. We contend that such collective brand labels improve communication between sellers and consumers, when the scale of production is too small for individual firms to establish reputations on a stand alone basis. This has two opposing effects on member firms’ incentives to invest in quality. On the one hand, it increases investment incentives by increasing the visibility and transparency of individual member firms, which increases the return from investment in quality. On the other hand, it creates an incentive to free ride on the group’s reputation, which can lead to less investment in quality. We identify parmater values under which collective branding delivers higher quality than is achievable by stand alone firms.

AAI's 4th Annual Conference on the Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The American Antitrust Institute announces that FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz will address the luncheon audience during the AAI's 4th Annual Conference on the Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement at the National Press Club in Washington D.C.  on December 7, 2010.   Please click here to learn more and to register.  Since 2007, this event has served as a vehicle for the antitrust community to come together to network, discuss an updated and comprehensive profile of private enforcement as a business, and to learn about matters of common  concern.   This year, our program will cover some of the most current and relevant issues in antitrust, including Congress's action on ACPERA, Iqbal's expansion of Twombly's reach, interpretations of FTAIA, and the ongoing challenges to class certification.    For the past three years, nearly 80 of the antitrust community's leading practitioners, regulators, academics and other though-leaders attended this exclusive event.  Because interest has outgrown our facilities, we are expanding the program this year to accommodate more attendees. The venue will be the Grand Ballroom of the National Press Club.   AGENDA - DECEMBER 7, 2010 - NATIONAL PRESS CLUB - WASHINGTON DC 9:00 a.m. - Welcome Bert Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute   9:30 a.m. - A Portrait of the Private Enforcement Industry Today Patrick E. Cafferty, Partner, Cafferty Faucher LLP  Bert Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute Deborah Garza, Partner, Covington & Burling Andrew Gavil, Professor, Howard University School of Law Robert Lande, Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore; AAI Director   11:00-11:15 a.m. BREAK   11:15 a.m. - Developments in Class Certification             Eric L. Cramer, Shareholder, Berger & Montague, P.C. Joshua P. Davis, Professor and Director, Center for Law and Ethics, University of San Francisco School of Law John Schmidtlein, Partner at Williams & Connolly LLP Hal Singer, Managing Director and Principal, Navigant Economics   12:15 p.m. - Luncheon Sponsored by Kurtzman Carson Consultants Jonathan Leibowitz, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission   1:45 p.m. - Networking Break   2:15 p.m. - International Issues Moderator: Linda P. Nussbaum, Director, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. Are interpretations of FTAIA going too far in reducing the availability of the U.S. courts?             James Robertson Martin, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro LLP A report on developments in the European Union Speaker to be announced.   3:15 p.m. -Recent Developments Involving Twombly/Iqbal, ACPERA, and RPM Presentations, panel discussion, and audience participation. Legislation Update Pamela Gilbert, Partner, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca; AAI Director Motions to Dismiss J. Douglas Richards, Partner, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC  Recoveries W. Joseph Bruckner, Partner, Lockridge Grindal Nauen, PLLP Moderated Question and Answer Session Moderated by: Robert Kaplan, Partner, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer    4:30 p.m. - Closing Bert Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute   4:30-6:00 p.m. - Cocktail Reception Sponsored by Econ One Research     Presented with Support from (list incomplete): ·      Adams Holcomb LLP ·      Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC  ·      Dickstein Shapiro LLP   ·      Econ One Research  ·      Grant & Eisenhofer PA ·      Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer  ·      Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC  ·      Rust Consulting/Kinsella Media  ·      Spector Roseman Kodroff & Willis

Contact Information   2919 Ellicott Street, NW Washington, DC 20008 P: 202-276-6002  F: 202-966-8711 www.antitrustinstitute.org

AAI's 4th Annual Conference on the Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The American Antitrust Institute announces that FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz will address the luncheon audience during the AAI's 4th Annual Conference on the Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement at the National Press Club in Washington D.C.  on December 7, 2010.   Please click here to learn more and to register.  Since 2007, this event has served as a vehicle for the antitrust community to come together to network, discuss an updated and comprehensive profile of private enforcement as a business, and to learn about matters of common  concern.   This year, our program will cover some of the most current and relevant issues in antitrust, including Congress's action on ACPERA, Iqbal's expansion of Twombly's reach, interpretations of FTAIA, and the ongoing challenges to class certification.    For the past three years, nearly 80 of the antitrust community's leading practitioners, regulators, academics and other though-leaders attended this exclusive event.  Because interest has outgrown our facilities, we are expanding the program this year to accommodate more attendees. The venue will be the Grand Ballroom of the National Press Club.   AGENDA - DECEMBER 7, 2010 - NATIONAL PRESS CLUB - WASHINGTON DC 9:00 a.m. - Welcome Bert Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute   9:30 a.m. - A Portrait of the Private Enforcement Industry Today Patrick E. Cafferty, Partner, Cafferty Faucher LLP  Bert Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute Deborah Garza, Partner, Covington & Burling Andrew Gavil, Professor, Howard University School of Law Robert Lande, Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore; AAI Director   11:00-11:15 a.m. BREAK   11:15 a.m. - Developments in Class Certification             Eric L. Cramer, Shareholder, Berger & Montague, P.C. Joshua P. Davis, Professor and Director, Center for Law and Ethics, University of San Francisco School of Law John Schmidtlein, Partner at Williams & Connolly LLP Hal Singer, Managing Director and Principal, Navigant Economics   12:15 p.m. - Luncheon Sponsored by Kurtzman Carson Consultants Jonathan Leibowitz, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission   1:45 p.m. - Networking Break   2:15 p.m. - International Issues Moderator: Linda P. Nussbaum, Director, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. Are interpretations of FTAIA going too far in reducing the availability of the U.S. courts?             James Robertson Martin, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro LLP A report on developments in the European Union Speaker to be announced.   3:15 p.m. -Recent Developments Involving Twombly/Iqbal, ACPERA, and RPM Presentations, panel discussion, and audience participation. Legislation Update Pamela Gilbert, Partner, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca; AAI Director Motions to Dismiss J. Douglas Richards, Partner, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC  Recoveries W. Joseph Bruckner, Partner, Lockridge Grindal Nauen, PLLP Moderated Question and Answer Session Moderated by: Robert Kaplan, Partner, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer    4:30 p.m. - Closing Bert Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute   4:30-6:00 p.m. - Cocktail Reception Sponsored by Econ One Research     Presented with Support from (list incomplete): ·      Adams Holcomb LLP ·      Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC  ·      Dickstein Shapiro LLP   ·      Econ One Research  ·      Grant & Eisenhofer PA ·      Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer  ·      Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC  ·      Rust Consulting/Kinsella Media  ·      Spector Roseman Kodroff & Willis

Contact Information   2919 Ellicott Street, NW Washington, DC 20008 P: 202-276-6002  F: 202-966-8711 www.antitrustinstitute.org

Pitfalls in Vertical Arrangements

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Gianpaolo Rossini, University of Bologna - Department of Economics and Cecilia Vergari, University of Bologna - Department of Economics discuss Pitfalls in Vertical Arrangements.

ABSTRACT: A popular way of obtaining essential inputs requires the establishment of an input production joint venture (IPJV) in the upstream (U) section of the vertical chain of production by firms competing and selling …final goods in the downstream (D) section of the vertical chain. In spite of the apparently simple arrangement there are many possible governances for the management of the IPJV according to the ownership structure and to the degree of delegation granted to the IPJV by parent …firms. We explore the best sustainable governance arrangement for the IPJV. We address this question in a duopoly framework and we …find a large area of impossible vertical arrangements associated with technological asymmetry. The most likely governance of the vertical arrangement associated to the IPJV is total independence.

Resale Price Maintenance and Restrictions on Dominant Firm and Industry-Wide Adoption

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Oystein Foros (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration), Hans Jarle Kind (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) and Greg Shaffer (University of Rochster) address Resale Price Maintenance and Restrictions on Dominant Firm and Industry-Wide Adoption.

ABSTRACT: We consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance (RPM) to dampen competition. We find that even though the motive for using RPM is thus anticompetitive, market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers. Indeed, we find that when there are a large number of firms in the market, consumer welfare under a laissez-faire policy might be as high or almost as high as it would be under an alternative policy in which RPM is banned. Government interventions that put an upper limit on the extent of industry-wide adoption of RPM can have adverse welfare effects in the model. We further show that proposed guidelines in the United States and Europe may come close to minimizing welfare.

Boost for Commission's Antitrust Enforcement Policy: ECJ Overturns General Court's Decision in De Beers Case

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Cormac Little (William Fry) explains the Boost for Commission's Antitrust Enforcement Policy: ECJ Overturns General Court's Decision in De Beers Case.

ABSTRACT: The ECJ recognises the Commission's broad discretion in assessing commitments offered under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Therefore, the Commission should continue to rely on Article 9 in seeking an efficient solution to competition issues.  

The European Antitrust Review 2011

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The European Antitrust Review 2011

• Introduction
  1. Introduction

     Alexander Italianer

     Director-General DG Competition

• EU Substantive Areas
  1. Cartels and Leniency

     Ief Daems, Kristian Hugmark, Julian Joshua

     Howrey LLP

  2. Competition & Innovation

     Riccardo Croce, Will Sparks

     Hammonds LLP

  3. Compliance

     Nicola Clark, Riccardo Croce, Tom S Pick

     Hammonds LLP

  4. Economics Overview

     Simon Trussler

     FTI Consulting Limited

  5. Mergers

     Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Craig Pouncey

     Herbert Smith LLP

  6. Merger Efficiencies and Remedies

     Alexandros Papanikolaou, Michael Rosenthal

     Hunton & Williams LLP

  7. Merger Referrals

     Juan Rodriguez

     Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

  8. Plaintiff Recovery Actions

     Ingrid Gubbay, David Romain

     Hausfeld & Co LLP

  9. Private Antitrust Litigation

     Jesús Alfaro, Tim Reher

     CMS Albiñana & Suárez de Lezo and CMS Hasche Sigle

  10. Public Affairs

      Louise Harvey, Gwendoline Motte

      FD Blueprint

  11. Public Procurement

      Ohad Soudry

      Hammonds LLP

  12. State Aid

      Paris Anestis, Sarah Jordan

      Howrey LLP

  13. Trade

      Vassilis Akritidis, Jochen P Beck, Riccardo Croce, Yves Melin

      Hammonds LLP

  14. Vertical Agreements

      Astrid Ablasser-Neuhuber, René Plank

      bpv Hügel Rechtsanwälte

• EU Industry Sectors
  1. Chemicals

     Flavia Distefano

     McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP

  2. Energy

     Javier Ruiz Calzado, María E Leoz Martín-Casallo, Rita Motta

     Latham & Watkins LLP

• Country Chapters
  1. Austria

     Astrid Ablasser-Neuhuber, Florian Neumayr

     bpv Hügel Rechtsanwälte

  2. Czech Republic

     Dagmar Bicková, Arthur Braun

     bpv Braun Partners

  3. France: Abuse of Dominance

     Louis Vogel, Joseph Vogel

     Vogel & Vogel

  4. France: Cartels

     Natasha G Assadi-Tardif, Marc Lévy

     SJ Berwin

  5. France: Merger Control

     Antoine Choffel, Alexandre Glatz, Yann Utzschneider

     Gide Loyrette Nouel AARPI

  6. Germany: Abuse of Dominance

     Michael Dietrich, Marco Hartmann-Rüppel

     Taylor Wessing

  7. Germany: Cartels

     Tilman Siebert

     SJ Berwin LLP

  8. Germany: Merger Control

     Martina Maier, Philipp Werner

     Howrey LLP

  9. Germany: Private Antitrust Litigation

     Tilman Siebert

     SJ Berwin LLP

  10. Hungary

      Geoff Bennett, László Kelemen, Gergely Prinz

      Szabó Kelemen & Partners Attorneys

  11. Ireland

      Helen Kelly

      Matheson Ormsby Prentice

  12. Israel

      Tamar Dolev Green, Eytan Epstein

      Epstein, Chomsky, Osnat & Co

  13. Italy: Overview

      Silvia D'Alberti, Lucio D'Amario

      Allen & Overy - Studio Legale Associato

  14. Italy: Cartels

      Davide Balboni, Laura Matilde Cerri

      SJ Berwin LLP

  15. Italy: Telecoms

      Eutimio Monaco, Sara Santaloia

      Bird & Bird

  16. Latvia

      Liga Hartmane, Ivo Maskalans

      Klavins & Slaidins LAWIN

  17. Lithuania

      Ramunas Audzevicius, Mantas Jouzaitis, Tomas Samulevicius

      Motieka & Audzevicius

  18. Netherlands: Cartels

      Marleen de Putter, Esther Glerum-van Aalst, Andre Reznitchenko

      Kneppelhout & Korthals

  19. Netherlands: Merger Control

      Michel Chatelin, Agnès de Putter, Rozemarijn Hagendoorn

      Eversheds Faasen

  20. Portugal

      Mário Marques Mendes, Pedro Vilarinho Pires

      Marques Mendes & Associados

  21. Romania

      Mihaela Ion, Silviu Stoica

      Popovici Nitu & Asociatii

  22. Spain: Overview

      Juan Jiménez Laiglesia, Luis Sotelo

      DLA Piper Spain

  23. Spain: Cartels

      Ramón García-Gallardo

      SJ Berwin LLP

  24. Spain: Merger Control

      Marcos Araujo, Konstantin J Jörgens, Crisanto Pérez-Abad

      Garrigues

  25. Switzerland

      Alexander Bürgi, Gerald Brei, Marcel Dietrich, Franz Hoffet

      Homburger

  26. Turkey

      Bahadir Balki, M Fevzi Toksoy

      ACTECON Competition and Regulation Consultancy in collaboration with Hammonds LLP

  27. Ukraine

      Irina Drofenko

      Engarde Attorneys-at-law in collaboration with Hammonds LLP

  28. United Kingdom: Cartels

      Amanda Butler, Philipp Girardet, Simon Holmes

      SJ Berwin LLP

  29. United Kingdom: Merger Control

      Davina Garrod

      Bingham McCutchen

  30. United Kingdom: Private Enforcement

      Neil Davies, Lesley Farrell, Michael Reiss

      SJ Berwin LLP