Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Multimarket contact effect on collusion through diversification

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Hwa Ryung Lee (Berkeley - Econ) explores Multimarket contact effect on collusion through diversification.

ABSTRACT: This study establishes the potential positive relationship between multimarket contact (MMC) and sustainable collusive profits under demand fluctuations. In particular, I focus on the correlation structure between demand shocks over multiple markets and show how it can lead to a positive link between collusive profit and MMC. Simple theoretical models show that, regardless of whether demand shocks are observable or not, MMC may improve collusive profits through diversification of demand shocks over overlapping markets. If firms meet in multiple markets and link those markets in the sense that deviation in any market will trigger simultaneous retaliations in every market, then a cheating firm will optimally deviate in every market. Demand fluctuation that a firm is facing in its markets in total will be reduced as the number of markets increases, unless demand shocks are perfectly and positively correlated between the mar! kets. The reduction of demand fluctuations can boost collusion (1) by reducing the temptation to deviate in the period of high demand when demand shocks are observable and (2) by reducing the frequency of costly punishment on the equilibrium path when demand shock is unobservable. The conclusion in the case of observable demand shock provides us with a new testable implication that price competition will be muted by MMC in periods of high demand.

October 12, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics and Dan Vu Cao, Georgetown University - Department of Economics discuss Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents.

ABSTRACT: We extend the basic Schumpeterian endogenous growth model by allowing incumbents to undertake innovations to improve their products, while entrants engage in more “radical” innovations to replace incumbents. Our model provides a tractable framework for the analysis of growth driven by both entry of new firms and productivity improvements by continuing firms. Unlike in the basic Schumpeterian models, subsidies to potential entrants might decrease economic growth because they discourage productivity improvements by incumbents in response to reduced entry, which may outweigh the positive effect of greater creative destruction. As the model features entry of new firms and expansion and exit of existing firms, it also generates a non-degenerate equilibrium firm size distribution. We show that when there is also costly imitation preventing any sector from falling too far below the average, the stationary firm size distribution is Pareto with an exponent approximately equal to one (the so-called “Zipf” distribution”).

October 12, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The AstraZeneca Judgment: Implications for IP and Regulatory Strategies

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

David Hull (Covington) explains The AstraZeneca Judgment: Implications for IP and Regulatory Strategies.

ABSTRACT: In a judgment issued on 1 July 2010, the General Court largely upheld the Commission's decision imposing a €60 million fine on AstraZeneca for abusing its dominant position by engaging in certain IP and regulatory strategies aimed at protecting its product against generic competition and parallel imports from other Member States.

October 12, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Of 'Good' and 'Bad' Subsidies: European State Aid Control Through Soft and Hard Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michael Blauberger, University of Bremen writes Of 'Good' and 'Bad' Subsidies: European State Aid Control Through Soft and Hard Law.

ABSTRACT: European state aid control, a part of competition policy, typically follows the logic of negative integration. It constrains the potential for member states to distort competition by reducing their ability to subsidise industry. In addition, this paper argues, ambiguous Treaty rules and heterogeneous member state preferences have enabled the European Commission to act as a supranational entrepreneur, not only enforcing the prohibition of distortive state aid, but also developing its own vision of ‘good’ state aid policy. In order to prevent or to settle political conflict about individual decisions, the Commission has sought to establish more general criteria for the state aid that it still deems admissible. These criteria have been codified into a complex system of soft law and, more recently, hard state aid law. The Commission has thus created positive integration ‘from above’ and increasingly influences the objectives of national state aid policies.

October 12, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, October 11, 2010

Mergers & Acquisitions in the United States: A Practical Guide for Non-U.S. Buyers

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Mergers and acquisitions of U.S. companies by foreign corporations are complex and often unique. In addition to already existing legal and regulatory complexities, today’s economic and national security concerns make it even more challenging for counsel to guide corporations through the legal, tax, and political pathways they must navigate to conduct M&A with foreign entities in the U.S.

Mergers & Acquisitions in the United States: A Practical Guide for Non-U.S. Buyers is the only full-length treatise that guides U.S. attorneys, foreign counsel, and investment bankers through proven legal, tax, and political strategies in the complex arena of foreign acquisition and merger within the U.S. This highly practical reference is the one resource that will help practitioners and companies gain insight into all aspects of foreign acquisition of U.S. companies, including:

  • Sarbanes-Oxley Disclosure—chapter co-authored by Michael Oxley
  • Lobbying, Media, and Other Political Considerations—chapter co-authored by Michael Oxley
  • National Security Concerns
  • Products Liability
  • Tax Implications
  • Antitrust Regulation
  • Import/Export Controls
  • Employment Law—Including ERISA
  • Immigration Issues

Mergers & Acquisitions in the United States: A Practical Guide for Non-U.S. Buyers is expertly-authored by partners at Baker & Hostetler, each a leading expert in his or her practice area. Among the issues addressed by this new resource, this product offers expert insight into the:

  • Essential nuts and bolts of M&A with foreign entities
  • Potential for products liability litigation in the U.S.
  • Practical strategies useful under the special circumstances of foreign acquisition
  • Legal considerations in transactions as they relate to the special circumstance of foreign acquirers
  • New elements and impacts of transparency
  • Recent rise in shareholder activism and steps to take in the foreign M&A


  • The United States Remains Open for Business - Elliot J. Feldman

Part I: Deal Making

  • Types of Acquisitions and Mergers: The Process and the Players - Ronald A. Stepanovic
  • Acquisitions: Documentation, Approvals and Litigation Risks - Robert A. Weible
  • The Alternative Dispute Resolution Clause Is Not Boilerplate - Margaret Rosenthal, Dawn Kennedy
  • What Is Different When the Acquirer Is Foreign? - Christoph Lange

Part II: Structuring the Deal: Taxes and Treaties

  • Domestic Tax Issues - Jeffrey H. Paravano, John R. Lehrer II
  • The U.S. International Tax Regime - Paul M. Schmidt, Michael W. Nydegger
  • International Treaty Protections for Foreign Investment in the United States - Michael S. Snarr

Part III: Due Diligence and Valuing the Deal

  • Labor And Employment Law: What Foreign Investors Need to Know - David A. Grant, Marc A. Antonetti, Terry Connerton
  • Intellectual Property - Kenneth J. Sheehan, Mark H.Tidman, with Stephen S. Fabry, Phong D. Nguyen, A. Neal Seth, Monica S. Verma

Part IV: Perceived Obstacles to Deals in the U.S.

  • Antitrust Issues in Acquisitions - Lee H. Simowitz
  • Sarbanes-Oxley: Practical Issues in Potential Mergers and Acquisitions of Publicly Traded Companies on U.S. Exchanges - Michael G. Oxley, Peggy A. Peterson
  • The U.S. Justice System and Products Liability Law - James V. Etscorn, Trevor M. Stanley

Part V: Post-9/11 and New Conditions

  • National Security Review of Acquisitions by Foreigners - John J. Burke
  • Managing the Separate Regulatory and Political Processes for Investment in the United States - Michael G. Oxley, Peggy A. Peterson
  • Immigration Options for Foreign Acquirers of U.S. Companies - Marcela S. Stras
  • Customs Law Considerations for Foreign Acquisitions in the United States - Michael S. Snarr
  • Export Control, Sanctions and Anti-Corruption Laws and Regulations Affecting Acquisitions by Foreigners - John J. Burke
  • Foreign Ownership and Trade Remedies - Elliot J. Feldman

October 11, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions When Antitrust Enforcement Resources are Scarce

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michal S. Gal, University of Haifa - Faculty of Law, New York University describes When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions When Antitrust Enforcement Resources are Scarce.

ABSTRACT: This article seeks to explore whether institutional solutions to antitrust enforcement problems can be transported from one jurisdiction to another. It does so by focusing on the effects of scarce enforcement resources (both financial and human) on optimal institutional design. The prevalence of this characteristic in small, developing and transition economies makes it an interesting and important subject to study. Accordingly, the following question is raised: if a country has a small institutional endowment, can it transplant the institutional structure of another jurisdiction with a large resource endowment and simply shrink it to fit its budget - like the shrinking of the house in Alice in Wonderland - or should it apply a different institutional structure? To answer this question, the article first analyzes the effects of a limited institutional endowment on the effective enforcement of antitrust law. It then analyzes the tools which have been employed or that can be employed to limit such negative effects, such as prioritizing and sharing. One of the more interesting solutions relates to the interplay between substantive rules and institutional structures: a combination of poorly equipped institutions with limited economic expertise and antitrust laws which require complex analysis of market conditions and their effect on welfare are apt to create erroneous decisions; thus, as this article argues, designing an efficient antitrust regime also involves the creation of a delicate balance between institutional conditions and substantive rules.

October 11, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Airport Privatization and International Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Toshihiro Matsumura, University of Tokyo - Institute of Social Science and Noriaki Matsushima, Osaka explore Airport Privatization and International Competition.

ABSTRACT: We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. Using the simple international duopoly model, we show that the outcome where both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium while that where no airport is privatized is another equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large.

October 11, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model for Breaking Up the Banks that are Too-Big-to-Fail?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Roberta S. Karmel, Brooklyn Law School asks Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model for Breaking Up the Banks that are Too-Big-to-Fail?

ABSTRACT: During the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the debates on regulatory reform that followed, there was general agreement that the “too-big-to-fail” principle creates unacceptable moral hazard. Policy makers divided, however, on the solutions to this problem. Some argued that the banking behemoths in the United States should be broken up. Others argued that dismantling the big banks would be bad policy because these banks would not be able to compete with universal banks in the global capital markets, and in any event, breaking up the banks would be impossible as a practical matter. Therefore, better regulation was the right solution. This approach was generally followed in the financial reform legislation (“Dodd-Frank”) that was passed. Yet voices in favor of a return to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 wall between commercial and investment banking, or using some other techniques for curtailing risky bank activities, continue to be heard and studied. Therefore, further inquiry concerning the question of whether and how the big financial institutions should be curtailed remains relevant, even after the passage of Dodd-Frank.

In the past, the United States has taken a variety of approaches to reining in banks. These include capital constraints, geographical restrictions, activities restrictions and conflict of interest restrictions. The primary techniques for reining in big banks considered by Congress or financial regulators in current regulatory reform efforts are increasing capital requirements, taxing financial transactions and walling off proprietary trading and/or derivatives trading from commercial banking. In addition, the reform legislation will put into place a resolution regime for failed financial institutions. All of these approaches are discussed in this Article.

One approach that has not been tried or even seriously discussed with regard to the big banks is the approach that was used to break up the utility pyramids created during the 1920s, that is the antitrust approach utilized in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. This targeted and highly effective regulatory framework empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to dismantle and simplify the corporate structures of the utilities without destroying them. This program was so successful that even after it was essentially completed the statute and SEC regulation of utilities remained on the books until quite recently. This article argues that this approach should be considered as a solution to the too-big-to-fail problem since it combines deconcentration, capital limits, activities restrictions and conflict of interest restrictions as an alternative to antitrust regulation, outside of adversarial prosecutorial case development.


October 11, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

What Was the Impact of the European Microsoft Decision on the Browser Market?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

What Was the Impact of the European Microsoft Decision on the Browser Market?  According to the NY Times, "Six months into the process, the initiative appears to be having only a minor influence on consumers, prompting a renewed debate about the effectiveness of such antitrust remedies."  My colleague Bill Page, whose excellent book on antitrust and Microsoft tracked similar issues in the US, might suggest (at least I assume he would, it is 5:45am my time and I am not going to call him at home) that the outcome is not surprising because the legal system failed consumers by overrating government’s ability to influence outcomes in a dynamic market.

October 11, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Economics of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Mariateresa Maggiolino, Bocconi University - Department of Law discusses The Economics of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights.

ABSTRACT: Economics studies the market conduct of agents, such as individuals, firms, and institutions; it describes the consequences of these behaviors and, if its explanations are successful, it may even provide forecasts and policy suggestions. Therefore legal scholars, who wish to offer well-founded and reliable policy suggestions as to the proper way of shaping, interpreting and enforcing statutes, may find it useful to employ economics to ‘bridge’ legal rules with the empirical phenomena these rules address.

Competition and innovation are, as a matter of fact, the two empirical phenomena that antitrust, patent and copyright provisions address. Therefore, legal scholars, who want to elaborate well-founded and reliable policy suggestions about antitrust and IP statutes, may profitably employ economics to understand how competition and innovation develop.

Like any other social science, economics encompasses both a 'hard core' of well-established principles and concepts, and a ‘fringe’ of new models and insights, which introduce new research questions and explore some of the issues that hard core theories cannot solve.

Usually, scholars that use economics as a bridge between legal provisions and empirical phenomena rely on these hard core theories, because they already belong to common knowledge and, hence, are more administrable for lawyers, judges, and jurors. In fact, textbook economics of IP is quite basic: although the Chicago school has described it only recently, it is rooted in the instrumental/utilitarian approach and in the cost-benefit analysis of neo-classic economics, as well as in the transaction costs insights that derive from the Coase theorem. Likewise, the current textbook economics of antitrust law consists of various industrial organization models, which originate from the application of the above mentioned principles of neo-classic economics to imperfect market realities.

Yet, competition and innovation are kaleidoscopic phenomena that, sometimes, extend beyond the reach of these hard core economic theories. For instance, the industrial organization models that nowadays shape antitrust law are so focused on short-run price and output effects that they cannot fully explain how innovation causes economic growth by changing the long-run performance of firms and markets. And this is an issue (!), especially when antitrust enforcers confront business conduct that involves IPRs - whether agreements, monopolists’ conduct, or mergers—because this conduct produces both short run and long run effects on both competition and innovation. Likewise, despite what orthodox economics suggests, some empirical studies show that in specific industries there is no linear relationship between the scope of IPRs and innovation. And this is an issue too (!), because if broader and stronger IPRs do not boost innovation, the recent propertization phenomenon may turn out to be counterproductive.

As a consequence, some scholars have recently began to look at ‘fringe’ economic theories in order to provide a better ‘bridge’ between antitrust and IP rules, on the one hand, and competition and innovation, on the other hand.

While not attempting to provide an exhaustive discussion of past and current economic theories, the chapter explores the mainstream economic backbone of present antitrust and IP laws (Part A and B) and what future developments these legal rules could undergo because of the influence of some fringe economic theories (Parts C and D). Part A explains that the present antitrust discourse mirrors the ‘normative meaning’ of the perfect competition model, but employs industrial organization models - sometimes, far too sophisticated and complex models - in order to explain firms’ actual behaviors. Part B discusses how neo-classic economics justifies the existence of patents and copyrights by using both the appropriability theory and the Coase theorem. Then, given that industrial organization models cannot fully explain dynamic efficiency and long run phenomena, Part C looks at some heterodox economic theories that place innovation and change at the heart of the competitive process. Similarly, given that arguably the neo-classic justification for IPRs does not always support a proper set of incentives for follow-on inventions and derivative creations, Part D describes how one of those heterodox economic theories, that is to say, evolutionary economics, seems to be capable of striking a better equilibrium between present and future innovation, by elaborating on the ideas of knowledge and learning processes. The chapter concludes with the finding that no drastic change is required in order to apply these fringe economic theories to an understanding of present antitrust and IP rules.

October 11, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, October 10, 2010

Implementing Competition Law and Policy - A global perspective, New Delhi, India, Friday, November 19, 2010 from 8:45 AM - 6:00 PM (GMT+0530)

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Global Competition Law Conference:
Implementing Competition Law and Policy, Global Perspectives
19 November 2010, New Delhi, India

The recent adoption of competition law statutes in East and South Asia, culminating with the enactment of the Indian Competition Act and the Chinese Antimonopoly Law, mark a significant development to the global business community. Merger control, the application of competition law to unilateral conduct such as distribution agreements, competition issues in intellectual property rights, and state activities in the economy create important challenges in the enforcement of competition law in these crucial markets for policymakers, multinational corporations, law firms and economic consultancies. A number of panels and roundtables will examine these issues, composed by the international and local leaders of the competition/regulatory law and M&A practice.

The public conference will be preceded by an invitation only one-day workshop on the issue of economic development and competition law, a theme that is of particular importance to the global as well as to the local business community.
View the website for the invitation only conference

Major policy makers, academics and practitioners from around the world will analyze these topics and will share their unique expertise in the area of competition law and more specifically in merger control, evidence in competition law, joint ventures, distribution, cartels, and the interaction between competition and intellectual property.

The Centre for Law and Economics (Competition, Regulation and Public Policy section) at UCL acknowledges the support of our Exclusive Indian Legal Partner, Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A Shroff & Co.

Registration Fees:
£130 early bird ticket, available until 5pm on 1 October 2010
£170 standard ticket
£130 UCL alumni / Staff / Students ticket
Group discount of 10% discount on the standard ticket price is available for groups (3 or more delegates from the same organization)

The registration fee includes:
- Conference lunch and all other refreshments during the conference on 19 November
- Delegate pack with the conference materials
- Certificate of Participation from the UCL Faculty of Laws

There are three methods of payment for this conference that you can use once you have chosen your ticket: 

1. Via credit card - using Google Checkout button at the bottom of the page
2. Via bank transfer - an invoice will be issued with our bank details
3. Via cheque (in GBP) - choose to pay via cheque  

To view options 2 and 3, make sure that you click on the 'show' link next to the Other Payment Options section at the bottom of the booking page.

View the conference website

Conference Schedule

08:15 Registration
08:45 Welcome and Introduction
Ioannis Lianos (UCL) & Daniel Sokol (University of Florida)
09:00 Keynote Speakers:
His Excellency Mr. Salman Khurshid (Minister of State for Corporate Affairs of India)
Justice S. H. Kapadia (Chief Justice of India) (tbc)
09:30 Parallel Sessions
PANEL 1: Mergers

Laura Carstensen (UK Competition Commission)


  • Simon Baxter (Skadden, Arps)
  • Dhanendra Kumar (Chairman CCI)
  • Vijaya Sampath (Bharti Airtel)
  • Paul Seabright (University of Toulouse, IDEI)
  • Pallavi Shroff (Amarchand Mangaldas)
PANEL 2: Evidence in competition law proceedings (burden of proof, standard of proof, presumptions, economic evidence, admissibility and evaluation)

David Lewis (former Chairman, Competition Tribunal of South Africa)


  • Jean Yves Art (Associate General Counsel, Microsoft)
  • Cristina Caffarra (Vice-President and Head of European Competition Practice, Charles River Associates)
  • John Kallaugher (UCL & Latham & Watkins LLP)
  • Damien Neven (Chief Economist, DG Competition, European Commission)
  • Naval Satarawala Chopra (Amarchand Mangaldas)
11:15 Parallel Sessions
PANEL 3:  Competition Issues in Joint Ventures and Distribution Issues

Damien Neven (Chief Economist, DG Competition, European Commission)


  • Kiran Desai (Mayer Brown International)
  • Ashok Gupta  (Aditya Birla Group)
  • Jeremy Calsyn (Cleary Gottlieb)
  • Ioannis Lianos (UCL)
  • Stephen Malherbe (Genesis Analytics)
  • Suzanne E Wachsstock (Chief Antitrust Counsel, American Express)

Scott D. Hammond (US Department of Justice Antitrust Division)


  • John Beyer (Nathan Associates)
  • Marcus Bezzi (Executive General Manager, Enforcement & Compliance Division, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission)
  • Ariel Ezrachi (University of Oxford)
  • Scott D. Hammond (US Department of Justice Antitrust Division)
  • P N Parashar (Member, Competition Commission of India)
  • Maarten Pieter Schinkel (University of Amsterdam)

Key note speakers:

  • John Fingleton (Chief Executive at the UK Office of Fair Trading / Chair of the Steering Group, International Competition Network)
14:00 Parallel Sessions
PANEL 5: Intersection between Antitrust and Intellectual Property law issues

Howard Shelanski (Deputy Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission)


  • Andrea Appella (Deputy General Counsel, European & Asia, News Corporation)
  • Harry First (NYU Law School)
  • Damien Neven (Chief Economist, DG Competition, European Commission)
  • Robbert Snelders (Cleary, Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP)
  • Doug Melamed (General Counsel, Intel)
  • P N Parashar (Member, Competition Commission of India)
Government Barriers to Competition

Pradeep S. Mehta (Secretary General, Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS))


  • Allan Fels (Dean, The Australia and New Zealand School of Government and Former Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission)
  • Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, (Director, India Development Forum)
  • Martha Licetti (Head of Competition Policy, World Bank)
  • Rahul Sarin (Member, Competition Appellate Tribunal)
  • Daniel Sokol (University of Florida)
  •  Bharat Vasani (GC, Tata Sons)
16:00 Enforcers' Roundtable:
Limits to the discretion of competition authorities: a comparative perspective
(due process, judicial review, priorities setting, guidelines and reductive versus expansive interpretation of the law, comity principles)

Frederic Jenny (Cour de Cassation (Judge of the French Supreme Court) and Chairman, OECD Competition Committee)


  • Marcus Bezzi (Executive General Manager of the Enforcement & Compliance Division, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission)
  • Laura Carstensen (Deputy Chairman, UK Competition Commission)
  • John Fingleton (Chief Executive at the UK Office of Fair Trading / Chair of the Steering Group, International Competition Network)
  • Dhanendra Kumar (Chairman, Competition Commission of India)
  • Damien Neven (Chief Economist, DG Competition, European Commission)
  • Shan Ranburuth (South African Competition Commission)
  • Scott D. Hammond (US Department of Justice Antitrust Division)
18:00 Close of Conference

The public conference on 19 November is preceded by an invitation only workshop on the issue of economic development and competition law, a theme that is of particular importance to the global as well as to the local business community.

Additional speakers at this workshop include:

  • William Kovacic - Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission
  • Masahiko Aoki - Stanford University
  • Tom Arthur - Emory Univ. Law School
  • Aditya Bhattacharjea - Delhi School of Economics
  • Thomas Cheng - University of Hong Kong, Law
  • Vivek Ghosal - Georgia Institute of Technology, Economics
  • Abel Mateus - New University of Lisbon
  • George Priest - Yale Law School
  • Patrick Rey - IDEI, Toulouse 
  • Barak Richman - Duke University
  • Paul Seabright - IDEI, Toulouse
  • Rahul Singh - National University of India, Bangalore


Friday, November 19, 2010 from 8:45 AM - 6:00 PM (GMT+0530)

Add to my calendar Add to my calendar


The Taj Mahal Hotel
1 Mansingh Road
New Delhi 110 011

Google | Microsoft | Yahoo

Hosted By

UCL Law Faculty

The Faculty of Laws at UCL has a world-class reputation for research, and has been rated by the UK government in the highest categories for both research and teaching.

We value research not only in contributing to the quality of our teaching and the supervision we give our students, but also in its contribution to the development of law and its influence on legal practice and public policy.

The Faculty was ranked 2nd in the UK by The Times Good University Guide (subject table: Law) in 2008. UCL is ranked 4th in the World University rankings.

See more UCL Laws events at

October 10, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Crony Capitalism and Monopoly Power in Israel

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

There was a short but powerful Wall Street Journal op-ed about the problem of concentrated interests that (badly) run Israel's economy.  See here.  The important point is "These conglomerates choke Israel's hapless consumers. Israeli citizens must also pay monopoly rents of between 20% and 30% on everything they consume, according to researchers at Israel's ministry of finance. This lack of competition has contributed to low per-capita productivity (about half that of the U.S.) and dismally low wages for Israeli workers."

October 10, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)