Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

DOJ Files Complaint Against Dean Foods in Consumated Merger Case

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The complaint is here.  It should be an interesting case.

The Impact of Mergers on the Degree of Competition in the Banking Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Vittoria Cerasi (Bicocca University), Barbara Chizzolini (Bocconi University) and Marc Ivaldi (Toulouse School of Economics) have written on The Impact of Mergers on the Degree of Competition in the Banking Industry.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the relation between competition and concentration in the banking sector. The empirical answer is given by testing a monopolistic competition model of bank branching behaviour on individual bank data at county level (départements and provinces) in France and Italy. We propose a measure of the degree of competiveness in each local market that is function also of market structure indicators. We then use the econometric model to evaluate the impact of horizontal mergers among incumbent banks on competition and discuss when, depending on the pre-merger structure of the market and geographic distribution of branches, the merger is anti-competitive. The paper has implications for competition policy as it suggests an applied tool to evaluate the potential anti-competitive impact of mergers.

Google Book Settlement Conference

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

HALF-DAY CONFERENCE ON THE AMENDED GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT
THE CHALLENGE OF BUILDING A DIGITAL LIBRARY THAT BENEFITS ALL
Brussels, Friday, 12 February 2010

PROGRAMME
13:45 – 14:00 Registration and Coffee
14:00 – 14:10 Welcoming Remarks
Nicolas Petit, Lecturer, ULg, Co-director, IEJE
SESSION 1 – IMPLICATIONS OF THE GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT – THE ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE
CHAIR Nicolas Petit, Lecturer, ULg, Co-director, IEJE
14:10 – 14:30 The Google Book Settlement: Towards a True Digital Library or an Online
Billboard?
Alain Strowel, Professor, FUSL and ULg, Attorney
14:30 – 15:00 How to Fix the Google Book Settlement?
James Grimmelmann, Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School
15:00 – 15:30 How Fair is the Google Book Settlement?
Pamela Samuelson, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley
(videoconference)
15:30 – 16:00 Discussion
16:00 – 16:30 Coffee Break
SESSION 2 – CONSEQUENCES OF THE GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE – THE STAKEHOLDERS’
PERSPECTIVE
CHAIR Alain Strowel, Professor, FUSL and ULg, attorney
16:30 – 16:45 The View of Google
Philippe Colombet, Head of Google Books France [TBC]
16:45 – 17:00 The View of the European Commission
Grazyna Piesiewicz-Stepniewska, European Commission, DG Information
Society
17:00 – 17:15 The View of the Libraries
Harald Mueller, Librarian, Max Planck Institute (Heidelberg), speaking for the
International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA)
17:15 – 17:30 The View of the Publishers
Kurt Van Damme, Association of Flemish Publishers
17:30 – 17:45 The View from a Competition Lawyer
Ian Forrester, Partner, White & Case LLP
17:45 – 18:15 Roundtable Discussion and Conclusions by the Chair

Download Conference Programme - Google Book Settlement - 12 February 2010 - Brussels

Quantifying antitrust damages: Towards non-binding guidance for courts

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The EU has released a study on Quantifying antitrust damages: Towards non-binding guidance for courts.

Study prepared for the European Commission
Oxera
and a multi-jurisdictional team of lawyers led by Dr Assimakis Komninos
With economic assistance from
Dr Walter Beckert, Professor Eric van Damme,
Professor Mathias Dewatripont,
Professor Julian Franks, Dr Adriaan ten Kate
and Professor Patrick Legros
December 2009

Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michele Boldrin (Minnesota- Econ) and David K Levine (UCLA- Econ) ask Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation?

Job Opportunity for JDs - Legal Economics in Boston

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

From Einer Elhauge (Harvard Law):

• The firm with which I consult, Legal Economics, is looking to hire a JD with economics background to work on consulting matters related to the application of economics to legal issues for me and other Harvard professors. The person would have to be brilliant, hardworking, and interested in working in Harvard Square. It generally pays more than law firms for comparable seniority. If you know anyone who might be interested, please ask them to send me a resume.

 

NYU Annual Survey of American Law Symposium "Critical Directions in Antitrust"

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

NYU Annual Survey of American Law Symposium "Critical Directions in Antitrust"

Greenberg Lounge
Vanderbilt Hall
40 Washington Square South
Friday, February 19, 2010
9:30 AM – 4:00 PM

Please join us for this symposium, which will bring together academics and practitioners in the field of antitrust law. The symposium’s three panels will explore recent developments in antitrust and potential new directions for enforcement. CLE credit is available to attendees. Please register here.

Schedule

9:30 am	REGISTRATION AND BREAKFAST
10:00 am	OPENING REMARKS HARRY FIRST Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University School of Law RICHARD REVESZ Dean, New York University School of Law
10:15 am	PANEL 1: GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
Government enforcement agencies play a key role in enforcing the antitrust laws. The FTC, DOJ, and FCC all review mergers and challenge anticompetitive behavior. This panel reviews recent changes and developments in government enforcement and discusses what the role of government enforcement should be.
Moderator:	HARRY FIRST Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University School of Law
Panelists:	KEVIN ARQUIT Partner, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, LLP JONATHAN BAKER Chief Economist, Federal Communications Commission HOWARD SHELANSKI Deputy Director for Antitrust, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics PHILIP WEISER Deputy Assistant Attorney General for International, Policy, and Appellate Matters, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division ROBERT WILLIG Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, The Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs at Princeton Universtiy
11:45 am	COFFEE BREAK
12:00 pm	PANEL 2: ANTITRUST AND INNOVATION
One of the most important questions facing antitrust practice in the coming decades is that of how antitrust should encourage and interact with innovation. There is a tension between policies that encourage innovation, such as granting temporary monopolies to innovators, and the antitrust laws that foster competition. How should these interests be balanced?
Moderator:	ELEANOR FOX Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University School of Law
Panelists:	HERBERT HOVENKAMP Ben and Dorothy Willie Chair, University of Iowa School of Law JANUSZ ORDOVER Professor of Economics, New York University ROBERT PITOFSKY Dean Emeritus, Joseph and Madeline Sheehy Professor of Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, Georgetown Law MARIUS SCHWARTZ Professor of Economics, Georgetown University
1:15 pm	LUNCH BREAK
2:30 pm	PANEL 3: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
This panel will discuss developments in private antitrust suits, including class actions following government investigations and suits brought by competitors over harm to competition.
Moderator:	ILENE GOTTS Partner, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz
Panelists:	JONATHAN JACOBSON Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, LLP STACEY ANNE MAHONEY Partner, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP J. DOUGLAS RICHARDS Managing Partner of the New York Office, Cohen Milstein DANIEL RUBINFELD Robert L. Bridges Professor of Law, Professor of Economics, University of California Berkeley
3:45 pm	CLOSING REMARKS

Net Neutrality on the Internet

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

UCL Centre for Law and Economics (Public Policy Section) invites you to a lecture on  Net Neutrality on the Internet Speaker:  Professor Nick Economides, NYU Stern Business School Thursday 21 January, 3-5pm  Room L103 at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Charles Clore House, Russell Square, London WC1 About this lecture: The presentation will discuss net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided  market model. Platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and  may set fees to content - and application providers on the Internet.  When access is monopolized, for reasonable parameter ranges, net  neutrality regulation (requiring zero fees to content providers)  increases the total industry surplus as compared to the fully private  optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on  content providers. However, there are also parameter ranges for which total industry surplus is reduced. Imposing net neutrality in duopoly with multi-homing content providers and single-homing consumers  increases the total surplus as compared to duopoly competition with  positive fees to content providers. The speaker will also discuss the desirability, from an economic welfare perspective, or not of net neutrality regulation.  About the speaker: Professor Nicholas Economides is an internationally recognized academic authority on network economics, electronic commerce and public policy. His fields of specialization and research include the economics of networks, especially of telecommunications, computers, and information, the economics of technical compatibility and standardization, industrial organization, the structure and organization of financial markets and payment systems, antitrust, application of public policy to network industries, strategic analysis of markets and law and economics. Professor Economides has published more than 100 articles in top academic journals in the areas of networks, telecommunications, oligopoly, antitrust, product positioning and on the liquidity and the organization of financial markets and exchanges. He holds a PhD and MA in Economics from the University of California at Berkeley, as well as a BSc (First Class Honors) in Mathematical Economics from the London School of Economics. Previously, he taught at Columbia University (1981-1988) and at Stanford University (1988-1990). He is editor of the Information Economics and Policy, Netnomics, Quarterly Journal of Electronic Commerce, the Journal of Financial Transformation, Journal of Network Industries, on the Advisory Board of the Social Science Research Network, editor of Economics of Networks Abstracts by SSRN and former editor of the International Journal of Industrial Organization. His website on the Economics of Networks has been ranked as one of the top four economics sites worldwide by The Economist magazine.   Professor Economides is Executive Director of the NET Institute, http://www.NETinst.org, a worldwide focal point for research on the economics of network and high technology industries. He is advisor to the US Federal Trade Commission, the governments of Greece, Ireland, New Zealand and Portugal, the Attorney General of New York State, major telecommunications corporations, a number of the Federal Reserve Banks, the Bank of Greece and major Financial Exchanges. He serves on the Advisory Board of the Economist Intelligence Unit. He has commented extensively in broadcast and in print on high technology, antitrust and public policy issues. You are invited to the following event: UCL: Net Neutrality on the Internet (Economides) Date: Thursday, January 21, 2010 from 3:00 PM - 5:00 PM (GMT) Location: Room L103, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Charles Clore House Russell Square WC1 London United Kingdom

Can you attend this event?  Respond Here

Merger Failures

Posted D. Daniel Sokol

Albert Banal-Estañol (Department d’Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra) and Jo Seldeslachts (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin) discuss Merger Failures.

ABSTRACT: This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interaction between the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informational asymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation and coordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree to merge and abstain from putting forth any post-merger effort, counting on the other partner to make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goes ahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers are more likely to fail.

Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ángel L. López (IESE Business School) and Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics) explain Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination.

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way. If the incumbent benefits from customer inertia, then it has an incentive to insist in the highest possible access markup even if access charges are reciprocal and even in the absence of actual switching costs. If instead the entrant benefits from customer activism, then foreclosure is profitable only when switching costs are large enough. 

Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Chiara Fumagalli (Bocconi University), Massimo Motta (Bologna University), and Thomas Rønde (Copenhagen Business School)  analyze Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion.

ABSTRACT: This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.

Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Céline Bonnet (Toulouse School of Economics) and Pierre Dubois (Toulouse School of Economics) explain  Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance.

Does Product Market Competition Lead Firms to Decentralize?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Nicholas Bloom (Department of Economics, Stanford University), Raffaella Sadun (Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit), and John Van Reenen (Department of Economics, London School of Economics) asks Does Product Market Competition Lead Firms to Decentralize?

ABSTRACT: There is a widespread sense that over the last two decades firms have been decentralizing decisions to employees further down the managerial hierarchy. Economists have developed a range of theories to account for delegation, but there is less empirical evidence, especially across countries. This has limited the ability to understand the phenomenon of decentralization. To address the empirical lacuna we have developed a research program to measure the internal organization of firms - including their decentralization decisions - across a large range of industries and countries. In this paper we investigate whether greater product market competition increases decentralization. For example, tougher competition may make local manager's information more valuable, as delays to decisions become more costly. Since globalization and liberalization have increased the competitiveness of product markets, one explanation for the trend! towards decentralization could be increased competition. Of course there are a range of other factors that may also be at play, including human capital, information and communication technology, culture and industrial composition. To tackle these issues we collected detailed information on the internal organization of firms across nations. The few datasets that exist are either from a single industry or (at best) across many firms in a single country . We analyze data on almost 4,000 firms across twelve countries in Europe, North America and Asia. We find that competition does indeed seem to foster greater decentralization.

If you are in New York on Janaury 29, 2010 you must attend this conference

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

For those of you who are practitioners, academics or students in the New York area, I strongly encourage you to attend the Next Generation of Antitrust Scholarship Conference.  This is the first of its kind collaboration among the NYU School of Law, American Association of Law Schools – Antitrust and Trade Regulation Section, and the American Bar Association – Section of Antitrust Law.

Many of the best of the Next Generation of Antitrust law professors will be presenting their works.

Friday, January 29, 2010
8:20 AM - 4:15 PM

NYU School of Law
108 West 3rd Street, Lipton Hall
[View on Google Map]

Registration
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/scholars2010/

Agenda
8:20-8:50am: REGISTRATION AND CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST

8:50-9:00am: INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

9:00-10:30am: SESSION 1
Speaker: Thom Lambert (Missouri) - “A Decision-Theoretic Rule of Reason for Minimum Resale Price Maintenance”
Discussant: Janusz Ordover (NYU)
 
Speaker:  Avishalom Tor (Haifa) - “Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of Reason after Leegin”
Discussant:  Patrick Bolton (Columbia)
 
Speaker:  Maurice Stucke (Tennessee) - “Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral Economics Analysis of Cartels”
Discussant:  Tim Greaney (St. Louis)

Panel Discussant: James Yoon (NY AG)
Moderator:  Richard Steuer (Mayer Brown)

10:30-10:45am: BREAK

10:45-12:15pm: SESSION 2
Speaker: Shahar Dillbary (Alabama) - “Predatory Bundling and the Exclusionary Standard”
Discussant:  Harry First (NYU)
 
Speaker:  Scott Hemphill (Columbia) - “Generic Drug Challenges Prior to Patent Expiration”
Discussant:  David Hyman (Illinois)
 
Speaker:  Barak Orbach (Arizona) - “The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox”
Discussant:  John Lopatka (Penn State)

Panel Discussant: Steven Edwards (Hogan & Hartson)
Moderator:  Stacey Mahoney (Gibson Dunn)

12:15-1:00pm: LUNCH

1:00-2:30pm: SESSION 3
Speaker: Salil Mehra (Temple) - “Paradise is a Walled Garden”
Discussant:  Spencer Waller (Chicago Loyola)
 
Speaker:  Hillary Greene (Connecticut) - “Antitrust Censorship of Economic Protest”
Discussant:  Marina Lao (Seton Hall)
 
Speaker:  Ariel Katz (Toronto) - “Beyond “Essential Facilities”: Innovation, Intellectual Property and Competition Policy across the Atlantic”
Discussant:  Eleanor Fox (NYU)

Panel Discussant: Jay Himes (Labaton)
Moderator:  Robert Hubbard (NY AG)

2:30-2:45pm: BREAK

2:45-4:15pm: SESSION 4
Speaker: Daniel Sokol (Florida) - “Antitrust, Institutions and Merger Control”        
Discussant:  Tom Arthur (Emory)
 
Speaker:  Ioannis Lianos (University College London) - “Generalist Judges, Specialized Tribunals, Sector Specific Regulators and Competition Authorities: Close Encounters of the Third Kind”
Discussant:  Peter Carstensen (Wisconsin)
 
Speaker:  Max Huffman (IU-Indy) - “Behavioral Exploitation and Antitrust”
Discussant:  Ned Cavanaugh (St. Johns)

Panel Discussant: Michael Weiner (Skadden)
Moderator:  Stephen Houck (Menaker & Herrmann)

Conference Co-sponsors
NYU School of Law
American Association of Law Schools – Antitrust
American Bar Association – Section of Antitrust Law

Conference Co-organizers
Harry First – NYU School of Law
Ilene Knable Gotts – Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
Edward Cavanaugh – St. John’s School of Law
D. Daniel Sokol – University of Florida Law Levin College of Law

Abstract
This conference is the first ever conference for the Next Generation of Antitrust Scholars.  Much has changed in both the law and economic theory of antitrust in the past 30 years.  The purpose of this event is to convene a conference of the next generation of antitrust law professors (people who started their teaching career in or after 2000) and provide them an opportunity to present their latest research.  Senior antitrust scholars and practitioners in the field will comment on the papers.

For more information, visit the American Bar Association - Section of Antitrust Law website at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/scholars2010/.

Technological Leadership and Persistence of Monopoly under Endogenous Entry: Static versus Dynamic Analysis

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Eugen Kovac (Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Germany) Viatcheslav Vinogradov (CERGE-EI), Krešimir Žigiæ (CERGE-EI) explainTechnological Leadership and Persistence of Monopoly under Endogenous Entry: Static versus Dynamic Analysis.

ABSTRACT: We build a dynamic oligopoly model with endogenous entry in which a particular firm (leader) invests in an innovation process, facing the subsequent entry of other firms (followers). We identify conditions that make it optimal for the leader in the initial oligopoly situation to undertake pre-emptive R&D investment (strategic predation) eventually resulting in the elimination of all followers. Compared to a static model, the dynamic one provides new insights into the leader’s intertemporal investment choice, its optimal decision making, and the dynamics of the market structure over time. We also contrast the leader’s investment decisions with those of the social planner.

The International Cartel Workshop - February 10-12, 2010 • Paris, France

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

AGENDA (as of 01.03.10) 2010 International Cartel Workshop Le Westin, Paris, France

                                         

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

Registration Hours:

February 9                16:00 – 19:00

February 10              13:00 – 18:00

February 11                8:00 – 18:00

February 12                8:00 – 18:00

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

13:15-13:35   CONFERENCE DELEGATES SEATED; WELCOMING REMARKS

  Ilene Knable Gotts, Chair,

ABA

Section of Antitrust Law

  A. Neil Campbell, Chair, IBA Antitrust Committee

  Scott D. Hammond, Conference Co-Chair

  Gary R. Spratling,Conference Co-Chair

13:35-13:45   INTRODUCTION TO WORKSHOP

  James M. Griffin, Conference Planning Committee

13:45-15:45   DEMONSTRATION I:  The decision to self-report and seek leniency in multiple 

                       jurisdictions

  Scene One:  The board meets to weigh its options and decide a course of action

  

  Marcelo Calliari, Tozzini Freire Advogados, São Paulo, Brazil

  James M. Griffin, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC

  Aimee L. Imundo, Senior Counsel, Competition Law & Compliance, General Electric

     Company, Washington, DC 

  Katherine L. Kay, Stikeman Elliott LLP, Toronto, Canada

  Gerwin Van Gerven, Linklaters LLP, Brussels, Belgium

  Scene Two:  The company seeks a marker and negotiates the terms for perfecting its

                        leniency application in the United States

 

 

  James M. Griffin, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC

  Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Matters, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, DC

           

                       

  Scene Three:  The company seeks a marker and negotiates the terms for perfecting its

                            leniency application at the European Commission

  Paul Malric-Smith, Head of Unit, Directorate General Competition, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

  Gerwin Van Gerven, Linklaters LLP, Brussels, Belgium

15:45-16:00     BREAK

16:00-18:00  DEMONSTRATION II: The prosecution:  Beginning the cartel investigation; seven  jurisdictions devise their strategy

Australia

Marcus Bezzi, Executive General Manager, Enforcement & Compliance Division, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Canberra, Australia

Canada

John Pecman, Senior Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Criminal Matters, Competition Bureau Canada, Gatineau, Canada

European Union

Ewoud C. Sakkers, Head of Unit, Directorate General Competition, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

Japan

Hiroo Iwanari, Director, Investigation Division IV, Investigation  Bureau, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Tokyo, Japan

Korea

Bongsam Shin, Director, International Cartel Division, Cartel Bureau, Korea Fair Trade Commission, Seoul, Korea

United Kingdom

Ali Nikpay, Senior Director, Cartels and Criminal Enforcement, UK Office of Fair Trading, London, United Kingdom

United States

Lisa M. Phelan, Chief, National Criminal Enforcement Section, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, DC

18:00-19:00    DELEGATES RECEPTION

Introduction:    Michel Debroux

                     Hogan & Hartson LLP, Paris, France

Speaker:            Bruno Lasserre

                           President, Autorite de la Concurrence, Paris, France

Thursday February 11, 2010

8:45-10:45  DEMONSTRATION III:  Search warrants and dawn raids in various jurisdictions

  Scene One:  FBI searches

  

  Ray V. Hartwell III, Hunton & Williams LLP, Washington, DC

  Lisa M. Phelan, Chief, National Criminal Enforcement Section, U.S.           

     Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, DC

                         

  Scene Two:  Dawn raids in the European Union

 

  Carolyn E. Galbreath, Member and Director, Cartels Division, Irish Competition   

     Authority, Dublin, Ireland

  Julian Joshua, Howrey LLP, Brussels, Belgium

  Ewoud C. Sakkers, Head of Unit, Directorate General Competition, European Commission,   

     Brussels, Belgium 

  Scene Three:  Dawn raids in Japan

Hiroo Iwanari, Director, Investigation Division IV, Investigation Bureau, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Tokyo, Japan

   Tsutomu Nakato, Hibiya Sogo Law Offices, Tokyo, Japan

  Scene Four:  Inspections in Brazil

  Mariana Tavares De Araujo, Secretariat of Economic Law, Ministry of Justice, Brazil

  Barbara Rosenberg, Barbosa Müssnich Aragão, São Paulo, Brazil 

10:45-11:00   

BREAK

11:00-12:45 DEMONSTRATION IV:  The defense responds to government investigation

 D. Jarrett Arp, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC

 Linda Evans, Clayton Utz, Sydney, Australia

 D. Martin Low, McMillan LLP, Toronto, Canada

 Philip Mansfield, Allen & Overy LLP, London, United Kingdom

 Michael O’Kane, Peters & Peters, London, United Kingdom

 Harumichi Uchida, Mori Hamada Matsumoto, Tokyo, Japan

 Sylvia van Es, Vice President, Senior Legal Counsel, Philips International, B.V., Eindhoven, Netherlands

 Hoil Yoon, Yoon Yang Kim Shin & Yu, Seoul, Korea

                         

12:45-13:30    LUNCHEON

13:30-14:45  LUNCHEON PROGRAM V.  Judicial Roundtable

INTRODUCTION:  Ilene knable gotts, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, New York, NY

Moderator:  A. Neil Campbell,McMillan LLP, Toronto, Canada

  

Australia

     The Honorable Justice John Middleton, Federal Court of Australia, Melbourne, Australia

  European Union
  The Honorable Judge Nicholas Forwood, The General Court, Court of Justice of the European Union, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

  United States

     The Honorable Judge Ruben Castillo, United States District Court Judge, Northern District of Illinois, Chicago, IL

14:45-16:15   DEMONSTRATION VI:  Conducting the internal investigation – legal, ethical and practical issues faced by corporate counsel in dealing with corporate employees

  Scene One:  Internal investigation at principal European facility of US-headquartered corporation which has obtained amnesty/immunity markers in all jurisdictions

 

  Jochen B. Burrichter, Hengeler Mueller, Düsseldorf, Germany

  Donald C. Klawiter, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Washington, DC

  Gerwin Van Gerven, Linklaters LLP, Brussels, Belgium

  Scene Two:  Internal investigation at Japan-headquartered corporation, which does not have

                        amnesty/immunity in any jurisdiction                        

 

  Gary L. Halling, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, San Francisco, CA

     

  Tsutomu Nakato, Hibiya Sogo Law Offices, Tokyo, Japan                      

  Kimitoshi Yabuki, Yabuki Law Office, Tokyo, Japan

16:15-16:30       
BREAK

16:30-18:00  DEMONSTRATION VII:  Plaintiffs’ strategies for pursuing private damage claims

  Scene One:  Meeting of class action plaintiffs’ counsel

  Michael D. Hausfeld, Hausfeld LLP, Washington, DC

  Stephen Kon, SJ Berwin, London, United Kingdom

  Francis O. Scarpulla, Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason LLP

  Bruce L. Simon, Pearson Simon Warshaw & Penny LLP, San Francisco, CA

  Bonny E. Sweeney, Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, San Diego, CA

  Charles M. Wright, Siskinds LLP, London, Ontario, Canada

  Scene Two:  Meeting with corporate general counsel considering whether to opt out of class

 

  Bruce L. Simon, Pearson Simon Warshaw & Penny LLP, San Francisco, CA

  Lauren C. Ravkind, Kenny Nachwalter, PA, Austin, TX

  A. Paul Victor, Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, New York, NY

   Scene Three:  Plaintiffs’, defense and government lawyers discuss discovery issues in context of

                            conflicting objectives

      

   Michael D. Hausfeld, Hausfeld LLP, Washington, DC

   Phillip A. Proger, Jones Day, Washington, DC    

   Bruce L. Simon, Pearson Simon Warshaw & Penny, San Francisco, CA

   Phillip H. Warren, Chief, San Francisco Field Office, U.S. Department of  Justice, Antitrust Division, San Francisco, CA

18:00              

ADJOURN

     

Friday, February 12, 2010

8:45-9:45   DEMONSTRATION VII:  Making the decision – the General Counsel, the Board

                   and outside counsel meet to decide whether to admit the violation and cooperate or to

                   defend against the government investigation                                              

  Scene One:  The corporation decides to admit the violation and cooperate

 

  Jae Hong Ahn, Kim & Chang, Seoul, Korea

  William J. Baer, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC

  Kathleen M. Beasley, Haynes & Boone LLP, Dallas, TX

  Cani Fernández, Cuatrecasas Abogados SRL, Madrid, Spain & Brussels, Belgium

  James A. Wilson, Vorys Sater Seymour and Pease LLP, Columbus, Ohio

  Scene Two:  The corporation decides to defend against all government investigations                

 

  Stephen Fishbein, Shearman & Sterling LLP, New York, NY

  Joy K. Fuyuno, White & Case, LLP, Tokyo, Japan

  Pierre Kirch, Paul Hastings JanofskyP & Walker LLP, Paris, France

  Tsutomu Nakato, Hibiya Sogo Law Offices, Tokyo, Japan

  Robert W. Tarun, Baker & McKenzie LLP, San Francisco, CA

  Kimitoshi Yabuki, Yabuki Law Office, Tokyo, Japan

9:45-10:00      

BREAK

10:00-11:45 DEMONSTRATION IX:  Negotiating a disposition-U.S., EU and Brazil

  Scene One:  Negotiating a plea agreement in the U.S.

 

 Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Matters, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, DC

  James H. Mutchnik, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, IL

  Michael O’Kane, Peters & Peters, London, UK

  Phillip H. Warren, Chief, San Francisco Field Office, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of

   Justice, San Francisco, CA

  Scene Two:  Discussing a settlement in the European Union

 

  Kris Dekeyser, Head of Unit, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

  Stephen Kinsella, Sidley Austin LLP, Brussels, Belgium

  Michael J. Reynolds, Allen & Overy, LLP, Brussels, Belgium

  Ewoud C. Sakkers, Head of Unit, Directorate General Competition, European Commission,    

   Brussels, Belgium

     

 Scene Three:  Negotiating a disposition in Brazil

  

 Cesar Costa Alves de Mattos, Commissioner, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica

   (CADE), Brazil 

 Barbara Rosenberg, Barbosa Müssnich Aragão, São Paulo, Brazil 

11:45-12:30   LUNCHEON                         

     

12:30-14:30   LUNCHEON PROGRAM X:  Enforcers Roundtable – Eight Jurisdictions

MODERATOR:  Gary R. Spratling,Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, CA

Australia

The Honorable Graeme Samuel, Chairman, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,

Canberra, Australia

Brazil

The Honorable Mariana Tavares De Araujo,Secretariat of Economic Law, Ministry of Justice, Brazil

Canada

The Honorable Melanie L. Aitken, Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau Canada, Gatineau, Canada

European Commission

The Honorable Neelie Kroes,Competition Commissioner, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

(invited)

Japan

TBD, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Tokyo, Japan

Korea

The Honorable Ho-Yul Chung, Chairman, Korea Fair Trade Commission, Seoul, Korea

United Kingdom

The Honorable Philip Collins, Chairman, U.K. Office of Fair Trading, London, U.K.

United States

The Honorable Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, DC

     

14:45-16:15  DEMONSTRATION XI:  Extra-territorial jurisdiction, class certification, and                       calculation of damages; counsel for plaintiffs and defendants and their experts

                      analyze and litigate issues relevant to damage actions

Scene One: 

U.S. plaintiffs’ lawyers meet with plaintiffs’ expert

 Michael D. Hausfeld, Hausfeld LLP, Washington, DC

 Jeffrey J. Leitzinger, Econ One, Los Angles, CA  

 Bruce L. Simon,Pearson Simon Warshaw & Penny LLP, San Francisco, CA

                                   

Scene Two:

U.S. defense lawyers meet with defense expert

Edward P. Henneberry, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliff LLP, Washington, DC

Roxann E. Henry, Howrey LLP, Washington, DC

Janusz Ordover, CompassLexecon, New York, NY

Kevin R. Sullivan,King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC

16:15-16:30  BREAK

16:30-18:00  DEMONSTRATION XII: Preliminary negotiations between class counsel and  

                      counsel  for the amnesty applicant; settling direct and indirect damage claims with      

                      the other defendants

Scene One:   Plaintiffs’ lawyers negotiate settlement and cooperation obligations with counsel

                      for the amnesty applicant

                     

Michael D. Hausfeld, Hausfeld LLP, Washington, DC

Stephen Kon, SJ Berwin LLP, London UK

Thomas Mueller, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC

Phillip A. Proger, Jones Day, Washington, DC

Bruce L. Simon,Pearson Simon Warshaw & Penny LLP, San Francisco, CA

Gerwin Van Gerven, Linklaters LLP, Brussels, Belgium

Scene Two:  Plaintiffs’ lawyers representing direct purchasers negotiate settlement with   

                      counsel for a company that does not have amnesty

D. Jarrett Arp,Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC

Michael D. Hausfeld, Hausfeld LLP, Washington, DC

Stephen Kon, SJ Berwin LLP, London UK

Michael R. Lazerwitz, Clearly Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Washington, DC

Michael J. Reynolds, Allen & Overy LLP, Brussels, Belgium

           

Scene Three:  Plaintiffs’ lawyers representing indirect purchasers negotiate settlement

                         with counsel for a company that does not have amnesty

Roxann E. Henry,Howrey LLP, Washington, DC

Francis O. Scarpulla, Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason LLP,  

Bonny E. Sweeney, Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, San Diego, CA

Kevin R. Sullivan, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC

18:00   

ADJOURN—

New York attorneys should pick up their personalized CLE   certificates

Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project

Fifth in a Series of Five FTC/DOJ Workshops

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Federal Trade Commission Conference Center

A G E N D A

9:00 - 9:15

W

ELCOME

Christine Varney

Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice

9:15 - 10:15

PANEL 1: MARKET CONCENTRATION AND THE STRUCTURAL P

M

ODERATOR: PHIL WEISER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

P

ANELISTS

Mark Cooper

Director of Research, Consumer Federation of America

Fellow, Silicon Flatirons, University of Colorado

Fellow, Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School

Albert A. Foer

President, American Antitrust Institute

Andrew I. Gavil

Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law

Charles F. Rule

Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

10:15 - 11:15

PANEL 2: PRICE DISCRIMINATION/LARGE BUYERS

M

ODERATOR: HOWARD SHELANSKI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS

P

ANELISTS

Susan Creighton

Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

John Fingleton

Chief Executive, UK Of

fi ce of Fair Trading

Joe Sims

Partner, Jones Day

John Thorne

Senior Vice President and Deputy General Counsel

Verizon Communications Inc.

11:15 - 11:30

Break

11:30 - 12:30

PANEL 3: ENTRY

M

ODERATOR: HOWARD SHELANSKI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS

P

ANELISTS

George S. Cary

Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP

Margaret Guerin-Calvert

Vice Chairman and Senior Managing Director, Compass Lexecon

John E. Kwoka, Jr.

Neal F. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of Economics

Northeastern University

Joshua D. Wright

Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law

12:30 - 2:00

Lunch

2:00 - 3:00

PANEL 4: EFFICIENCIES AND MERGER REMEDIES

M

ODERATOR: PHIL WEISER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

P

ANELISTS

Jim Lowe

Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

John M. Nannes

Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

Constance Robinson

Partner, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP

Alvin Velazquez

Assistant General Counsel, Service Employees International Union

3:00 - 3:15

Break

3:15 - 4:15

PANEL 5: CLOSING PANEL

M

ODERATOR: PHIL WEISER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

P

ANELISTS

William Baer

Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP

Thomas O. Barnett

Partner, Covington & Burling LLP

Einer Elhauge

Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

Janet L. McDavid

Partner, Hogan & Hartson LLP

Damien Neven

Chief Competition Economist, Directorate General for Competition,

European Commission

Competition in Agriculture - DuPont Loses Cases Against Monsanto

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Below is a copy of Judge Webber’s ruling last week in the Federal Circuit granting Monsanto judgment on the pleadings on its claims that DuPont was not authorized by its license agreement to stack OGAT with Roundup Ready (while remaining free to stack any non-glyphosate traits with Roundup Ready), and that DuPont’s stacking was also a breach of contract, not just unlicensed.Monsanto's press release is also below.

Download DuPont Ruling
Download 2010-01-19 - OGAT Release Ruling

Competition Law, Consumer Goods and Retail – a major focus for regulators

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

	Competition Law, Consumer Goods and Retail – a major focus for regulators Tuesday 23 March 2010, The King's Fund, London W1   The focus of competition regulators on the supply chain and retailing of fast-moving consumer goods continues to grow. More enforcement activity at EU and national level is expected. This conference will examine the key areas of concern. Register here to receive practical advice and expert comment on: • Information flows - the dangers: supplier/retailer contacts; 'hub and spoke' cartels; information exchange; collaboration to achieve environmental and other policy objectives; trade associations • The customer/competitor relationship - resale price maintenance; category management; pricing (rebates, over-riders, stocking allowances, delisting) • Buyer power - nature and sources; buyer alliances; approaches of regulators • Consolidation: FMCG and retail mergers • Online distribution and sales restrictions Chaired by John Davies Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Global Head Consumer and Healthcare Sector Group Speakers include: Paul Csiszár Director Basic Industries, Manufacturing and Agriculture DG Competition, European Commission Alastair Mordaunt Director, Services, Office of Fair Trading Derek Ridyard Director, RBB Economics Isabel Taylor Partner, Slaughter and May   Jaime Folguera Partner, Uría & Menéndez David Parker Associate Director, Frontier Economics Oliver Bretz Partner, Clifford Chance LLP Susan Hinchliffe Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP Andrea Gomes da Silva Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP
	Law Business Research Limited 87 Lancaster Road London W11 1QQ Registered in England and Wales number 03281866 Vat registration number GB 681 598586

Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Iñaki Aguirre (UPV/EHU), Simon Cowan (University of Oxford) and John Vickers (All Souls College, Oxford) explain Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature.

ABSTRACT: This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and oputput when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions -involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the different markets- are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive effects on social welfare and output.