Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

‘What if Uncle Sam wants you?’: Principles and Recent Practice Concerning US Extradition Requests in Cartel Cases

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Philipp Girardet (SJ Berwin) asks ‘What if Uncle Sam wants you?’: Principles and Recent Practice Concerning US Extradition Requests in Cartel Cases.

ABSTRACT: Extradition procedings have for a long time formed a cornerstone of international cooperation efforts between states in their efforts to promote the efficient administration of criminal justice. However, the recent extradition of Ian Norris from the UK to the USA marks the first ever use of extradition in relation to cartel conduct and this case will have a significant impact on defence strategies in European cartel cases going forward. Extraditions are generally limited to situations where conduct amounts to criminal behaviour in both the requesting and the requested states. The European competition rules do not themselves impose criminal sanctions for cartels but allow EU Member States to introduce criminal sanctions for such conduct at national level. While only a few EU Member States have a broad criminal cartel offence for individuals which is comparable to the US cartel offence, more than half of the 27 EU Member States now have criminal sanctions for individuals for at least some types of cartel conduct. Following the extradition of Ian Norris, the risk of extradition in international cartel cases (e.g. from Europe to the USA and also between EU Member States) is now no longer a mere hypothetical possibility but a new fact of life in such cases.

July 6, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Lingering Uncertainty over the Antitrust Approach to Resale Price Maintenance

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Eugène Buttigieg (University of Malta - Law) discusses Lingering Uncertainty over the Antitrust Approach to Resale Price Maintenance.

ABSTRACT: This article considers the latest developments in the American and EU antitrust approach to fixed and minimum resale price maintenance and shows that although in both jurisdictions the courts and public enforcers have moved away from their hitherto rigid stance, the contrasting views at both federal and state level in the United States and between the European Commission and the German Cartel Office are creating uncertainty on the potential justifiability or otherwise of such agreements to the detriment of the business community. It concludes that in view of the lack of consensus on the degree of pro-competitive benefits of agreements fixing minimum RPM and the absence of empirical evidence of their pro-competitiveness, the best approach is the one announced by the Commission in the recently revised vertical restraints guidelines of maintaining a presumption of illegality but with a greater willingness to test this presumption against claimed efficiencies.

July 6, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Oliver Black, King's College London has written on Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust.

ABSTRACT: Antitrust is a body of law and policy designed to promote economic competition by regulating monopolistic functions and this book is a philosophical study of concepts that lie at the foundation of antitrust law. Although there are many legal and economic books on the subject, it is unique in its philosophical scrutiny of basic concepts. The volume is primarily directed at students, theorists and practitioners of antitrust, but will also be useful to lawyers, economists, philosophers, political scientists and others who have an interest in the discipline.

July 6, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Steven Tenn, Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics and Brett W. Wendling, Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics describe Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry.

ABSTRACT: We provide the first analysis of potential competition in the generic drug industry. Our identification strategy exploits a provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act that rewards 180 days of marketing exclusivity to the first generic drug applicant against the holder of a branded drug patent. This provision creates observable drug-level variation in both actual and potential competition that allows us to identify their separate effects. We find mixed evidence of price being used as a strategic entry deterrent. In smaller drug markets where entry is more easily deterred, we find that price falls in response to an increase in potential competition. We also find that few manufacturers enter these markets after the Hatch-Waxman exclusivity period, indicating this price reduction is an effective deterrent. In contrast, in larger drug markets the incumbent accommodates entry by lowering price only after competing manufacturers enter the market.

July 6, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, July 5, 2010

Competition Law in Latin America and the Caribbean: Statutory Harmonization and Convergence

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Pablo Marquez, University of Oxford, Pontifical University Javeriana writes on Competition Law in Latin America and the Caribbean: Statutory Harmonization and Convergence.

ABSTRACT: The general aim of this text is to show how legislatures have shaped competition law in Latin America and the Caribbean (hereinafter LATCA) and to evaluate the processes of harmonization and the resulting convergence of competition law in the region. It is found that legal families and foreign trade policies have shaped competition law in LATCA, and that aggregate market structures and different development levels have also helped to define the institutional arrangement of competition law in the region. After defining the three pillars of competition law - enforcement systems and structure, abuse of dominance and anti-competitive agreements - it is shown how LATCA national jurisdictions competition law have converged concluding that statutory prohibitions of anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance are very similar among the countries but enforcement systems are remedies are divergent and highly related to legal origins. The text concludes showing the extent to which there is uniformity of competition law in LATCA.

July 5, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Innovation in Vertically Related Markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Yongmin Chen, University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics and David E.M. Sappington, University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration - Department of Economics, write on Innovation in Vertically Related Markets.

ABSTRACT: We examine the impact of vertical industry structure on upstream process innovation. We find that vertical integration (VI) generally enhances innovation under downstream Cournot competition, but can diminish innovation under downstream Bertrand competition. We also find that under Bertrand competition, VI can increase innovation when the direct incentives for innovation are limited, but can reduce innovation when the direct incentives are pronounced.

July 5, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, July 4, 2010

TOP 10 Papers for Journal of Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy SSRN eJournal May 5, 2010 to July 4, 2010

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

RECENT HITS (for all papers announced in the last 60 days)
TOP 10 Papers for Journal of Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal

May 5, 2010 to July 4, 2010



Rank Downloads Paper Title
1 170 American Needle and the Boundaries of the Firm in Antitrust Law
Herbert J. Hovenkamp,
University of Iowa - College of Law,
Date posted to database: May 29, 2010
Last Revised: June 2, 2010
2 160 Lightening Up Market Definition
David S. Evans,
University of Chicago Law School,
Date posted to database: May 4, 2010
Last Revised: May 8, 2010
3 129 Taking a Sack: The NFL and its Undeserved Tax-Exempt Status
Andrew B. Delaney,
Vermont Law Review,
Date posted to database: May 13, 2010
Last Revised: May 26, 2010
4 126 Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control
Gregory J. Werden, Luke Froeb, Mikhael Shor,
U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division, Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management,
Date posted to database: May 20, 2010
Last Revised: June 25, 2010
5 122 The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Eric M. Fraser,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, University of Chicago - Law School,
Date posted to database: May 18, 2010
Last Revised: May 23, 2010
6 119 Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn from Restaurant Guides
D. Daniel Sokol,
University of Florida - Levin College of Law,
Date posted to database: May 3, 2010
Last Revised: June 14, 2010
7 112 Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation
Michael S. Pardo,
University of Alabama School of Law,
Date posted to database: April 6, 2010
Last Revised: May 11, 2010
8 110 An Antitrust Analysis of the Federal Trade Commission’s Complaint Against Intel
Joshua D. Wright,
George Mason University - School of Law, Faculty,
Date posted to database: June 14, 2010
Last Revised: June 14, 2010
9 99 European Commission Decisions on Anti-Competitive Behavior
Jordi Gual, Nuria Mas,
University of Navarra - IESE Business School, University of Navarra - IESE Business School,
Date posted to database: May 5, 2010
Last Revised: May 5, 2010
10 98 Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control
D. Daniel Sokol,
University of Florida - Levin College of Law,
Date posted to database: June 16, 2010
Last Revised: June 26, 2010

July 4, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)