Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Rewriting History: Antitrust Not As We Know It . . . Yet

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Tom Rosch (FTC) gave a speech on Rewriting History: Antitrust Not As We Know It . . . Yet.

ABSTRACT: The speech addresses (1) the ideal institutional architecture for a U.S. antitrust enforcement agency; (2) what lessons we can draw upon in developing the best antitrust regime from overseas; and (3) whether and to what extent there’s room in the ideal antitrust regime for federal class actions.

June 1, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

EU Competition Policy after Lisbon: Time to Review the ‘State Action Doctrine’?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Damien Gerard, Research Fellow, Chair of European Law, Louvain University (UCL) has a new piece on EU Competition Policy after Lisbon: Time to Review the ‘State Action Doctrine’?

ABSTRACT: The Lisbon Treaty removed the establishment of ‘a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted’ as an objective of the Union. Even though largely rhetorical, this is only one among various recent political expressions of defiance towards EU competition policy. This essay attempts to address, to a limited extent, those political concerns by taking issue with the so-called ‘state action doctrine’ developed by the EU courts. In contrast with current case law, the key test in assessing the legality of State measures limiting competition ought to be whether they infringe the Union's internal market rather than competition rules.

June 1, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Market Structure, Welfare, and Banking Reform in China

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Chun-Yu Ho (Georgia Institute of Technology, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research) describes Market Structure, Welfare, and Banking Reform in China.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the effects of market deregulation on consumers and state commercial banks in China, a large developing country. I jointly estimate a system of differentiated product demand and pricing equations under alternative market structures. While China's banking reforms overall have achieved mixed results, the consumer surplus of the deposit market has increased. The welfare effects from reforms are unevenly distributed, with losses skewed toward inland provinces and certain consumer groups. There is no clear evidence that the pricing of banking services has become more competitive after the reform, and such pricing remains subject to government intervention. Encouragingly, the price-cost margins of some state commercial banks have fallen over time.

June 1, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, May 31, 2010

Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Harold Houba, VU University Amsterdam - Department of Econometrics, Tinbergen Institute Evgenia Motchenkova, VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics, TILEC Quan Wen, Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics describe Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices.

ABSTRACT: Even under antitrust enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. We present a linear oligopoly model where the profit-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the discount factor goes to one. We then identify a set of necessary conditions for this seemingly counter-intuitive result.

May 31, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies 2010

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

GCR - The Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies 2009

Dear Global Competition Review news reader,

We wanted to bring to your attention the new edition of The Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies.

We welcome your feedback on this edition and hope you find our publications informative and interesting. However, if you prefer not to receive special reports in this format please 'unsubscribe' at the bottom of this e-mail.

Yours faithfully,

Global Competition Review

 

 

  • Overview

1.     Introduction
John Fingleton - Office of Fair Trading

  • Countries

1.     Albania

2.     Argentina
Viviana Guadagni, Hugo Quevedo - Quevedo Abogados

3.     Armenia

4.     Australia
Russell Miller, Paul Schoff - Minter Ellison

5.     Austria

6.     Azerbaijan

7.     Barbados

8.     Belgium

9.     Bosnia

10.   Brazil
Carlos Francisco de Magalhaes, Gabriel Nogueira Dias -
Magalhães, Nery e Dias - Advocacia

11.   Bulgaria
Anna Rizova-Clegg, Stamen Yanev -
Rizova & Partners Law Firm, part of DLA Piper

12.   Canada
Susan Paul, Barry Zalmanowitz - Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP

13.   Chile

14.   Colombia

15.   Costa Rica

16.   Croatia
Mario Krka - Divjak Topic & Bahtijarevic

17.   Cyprus

18.   Czech Republic

19.   Denmark

20.   EFTA

21.   Egypt

22.   El Salvador

23.   Estonia

24.   European Union
Dave Anderson, Rachel Cuff - Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP

25.   Faroe Islands

26.   Finland
Katri Joenpolvi, Matti Metsola - Krogerus

27.   France
Louis Vogel, Joseph Vogel - Vogel & Vogel

28.   Germany

29.   Greece
Anastasia S Dritsa - Kyriakides Georgopolous & Daniolos Issaias

30.   Hungary

31.   Iceland

32.   India
G R Bhatia, Rajiv K Luthra - Luthra & Luthra Law Offices

33.   Indonesia

34.   Ireland
Helen Kelly, Ciara Treacy - Matheson Ormsby Prentice

35.   Israel
Tamar Dolev-Green, Eytan Epstein - Epstein, Chomsky, Osnat & Co

36.   Italy

37.   Jamaica

38.   Japan

39.   Jersey

40.   Jordan

41.   Kenya

42.   Latvia

43.   Lithuania
Ramunas Audzevicius, Henrikas Celencevicius -
Motieka & Audzevicius

44.   Luxembourg
François Brouxel, Michael Mbayi - Wildgen

45.   Macedonia

46.   Mauritius

47.   Mexico
Lucia Ojeda Cárdenas - SAI Abogados SC

48.   Mongolia

49.   Netherlands
Esther Glerum-van Aalst, Andre Reznitchenko -
Kneppelhout & Korthais NV

50.   New Zealand
Torrin Crowther, Phil Taylor - Bell Gully

51.   Norway
Stein O Solberg, Steinar Eskild Trovag -
Arntzen de Besche Advokatfirma AS

52.   Pakistan

53.   Panama

54.   Papua New Guinea

55.   Peru

56.   Poland

57.   Portugal
Mário Marques Mendes, Pedro Vilarinho Pires -
Marques Mendes & Associados

58.   Romania
Sorin David, Catalin Suliman - D&B David si Baias SCA

59.   Russia

60.   Senegal

61.   Serbia
Dejan Nikoli'c, Rastko Petakovi'c - Karanovi'c & Nikoli'c Advokati

62.   Singapore

63.   Slovakia
Eric M Runesson, Nad'a Spustová - Ruzicka & partners sro

64.   South Africa
Robert Legh, Lulama Mtanga - Bowman Gilfillan

65.   Spain

66.   Sweden

67.   Switzerland
Joanna Kruk-Kubarska, Philipp Zurkinden -
Prager Dreifuss Attorneys-at-Law

68.   Taiwan

69.   Tanzania

70.   Thailand

71.   Turkey
Gönenç Gürkaynak, K Korhan Yildirim - ELIG Attorneys-at-Law

72.   Ukraine
Alexey Pustovit, Silviu Stoica - Konnov & Sozanovsky

73.   United Kingdom
Becket McGrath, Joseph Ostoyich -
Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge UK LLP

74.   United States

75.   Venezuela
Luis E Andueza, Carlos Orci - Macleod Dixon SC

76.   Zambia

 

 

 

 


May 31, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition in the Korean Internet Portal Market: Network Effects, Profit, and Market Efficiency

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Junseok Hwang, Dongook Choi, Jongeun Oh, and Yeonbae Kim (Technology Management, Economics and Policy Program, Seoul National University) describe Competition in the Korean Internet Portal Market: Network Effects, Profit, and Market Efficiency.

ABSTRACT:  Internet portals serve as platforms that coordinate advertising and user markets, and the portal market features network effects within and between both sides. We model the market structure in order to explain network effects and other factors of competition such as prices for advertisements, contents, and differentiated services offered. We empirically identify these effects with data from South Korea and analyze the role of the effects in terms of profit and market efficiency. The results indicate that a negative indirect network effect exists in the user market but is prevailed over by the direct network effect. This explains how Internet portals make profits by increasing user visits. Further, we show the existence of network effects causes consumer's surplus not to decrease with market concentration.

May 31, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Commitments in EU Competition Cases: Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, its application and the challenges ahead

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Suzanne Rab, Daphne Monnoyeur, and Anjali Sukhtankar (all Hogan Lovells) describe Commitments in EU Competition Cases: Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, its application and the challenges ahead.

ABSTRACT: The ‘commitments decision’ procedure under Regulation 1/2003, introduced on 1 May 2004, provides the European Commission with a mechanism to dispose of competition law cases by way of a formal ‘settlement’, similar to a US consent decree. Since then, it has become an important instrument of enforcement of EU competition law. In 2009 alone, there have been commitments cases involving Rambus, Microsoft, RWE and GDF.

May 31, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, May 30, 2010

TOP 10 SSRN Most Downloaded Papers for Antitrust for March 31, 2010 to May 30, 2010

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Rank Downloads Paper Title
1 307 Behavioral Antitrust
Amanda P. Reeves, Maurice E. Stucke,
Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission, University of Tennessee College of Law,
2 231 Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Antitrust Case Against Google
Geoffrey A. Manne, Joshua D. Wright,
Executive Director, International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE), George Mason University - School of Law, Faculty, 
3 216 An Introduction to Competition Concerns in the Google Books Settlement
Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Marc Miller,
New York Law School , New York Law School, 
4 198 Is the Guidance Paper on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 102 TFEU to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct Useful?
Damien Geradin,
Howrey LLP - Brussels, Belgium Office, 
5 181 Harvard, Chicago and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis
Herbert J. Hovenkamp,
University of Iowa - College of Law,
6 148 The Web Economy, Two-Sided Markets and Competition Policy
David S. Evans,
University of Chicago Law School,
7 116 When are Excessive Prices Unfair?
Pinar Akman, Luke Garrod,
University of East Anglia - Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia - ESRC Centre for Competition Policy and School of Economics,
8 103 Intel and the Death of U.S. Antitrust Law
Keith N. Hylton,
Boston University, 
9 100 Anticompetitive Effect
Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, Alan Devlin,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, Government of the United States of America - Courts of Appeals,
10 99 Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn from Restaurant Guides
D. Daniel Sokol,
University of Florida - Levin College of Law,

May 30, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Bob Lande (Baltimore - Law) has written the interesting New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations.

ABSTRACT: Illinois Brick held that only direct purchasers successfully can sue for damages under federal antitrust law. Since this left most true victims of antitrust violations without an effective remedy, most states enacted Illinois Brick Repealers (IBRs), to give indirect purchasers the right to sue for damages when firms violate analogous state laws.

Although many benefits would arise if national legislation overturned Illinois Brick, to date every attempt to achieve a comprehensive federal solution has failed. Because this thirty year stalemate is almost certain to continue, this article instead focused on reform at the state level, where reform is much more achievable. This article presents a large number of IBR options that address the spectrum of a state's potential needs, together with commentary giving the major effects, advantages and disadvantages of each. As its Conclusion, this article suggests its own Model State Illinois Brick Repealer legislation.

May 30, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)