Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Citation Count for Antitrust Professors Who Began Tenure Track Teaching in 2000 or Later

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

I use [first name] /2 [last name] and AFT(1999) as my search term in the JLR data base for US law professors (except in the case of Thom Lambert because where I went with the full name and middle initial because there is a Thomas A. Lambert, Thomas C. Lambert and Thomas F. Lambert).  Note that where people write in more than one field with regularity, I note it.  I included people who write at least 30 percent in antitrust.  I do not distinguish when people began their career but people who started teaching around 2000 have a head start against those of us who started towards the end of the decade.  Of course, a JLR search privileges those who write primarily in US law reviews and primarily on US antitrust.  I include some non-US scholars who have had a number of US law review placements. I also include Geoff Manne, who left tenure track but is still a lecturer and still active in scholarship.

Update 10/14/10.  Because Chris Sagers began his career as Chris Sagers and now authors his work as Christopher Sagers, I have revised the list to accommodate both.

Name (School) Citations (Other field of significant scholarship)

  1. Phil Weiser (Colorado) 500 (Telecom)
  2. Dan Crane (Michigan) 301
  3. Damien Geradin (Tilburg, Michigan) 284
  4. Chris Sprigman (Virginia) 195 (Intellectual Property)
  5. Barak Richman (Duke) 160 (Health Care)
  6. Darren Bush (Houston) 148
  7. Scott Hemphill (Columbia) 116 (Intellectual Property)
  8. Salil Mehra (Temple) 109 (Asian Law)
  9. Josh Wright (George Mason) 97
  10. Daniel Sokol (Florida) 95
  11. Andrew Chin (Carolina) 94 (Intellectual Property)
  12. Geoff Manne (Lewis & Clark) 85
  13. Thom Lambert (Missouri) 79
  14. Avishalom Tor (Haifa) 75 (Behavioral L&E)
  15. Maurice Stucke (Tennessee) 73
  16. Marc Edelman (Barry) 61 (Sports Law)
  17. Barak Orbach (Arizona) 59 (Regulation)
  18. Christopher Sagers (Cleveland State) 58
  19. Hillary Greene (UConn) 57
  20. Michal Gal (Haifa) 54
  21. Ariel Katz (Toronto) 51 (Intellectual Property)
  22. Robin Cooper Feldman (Hastings) 42 (Health Care)
  23. Mark Bauer (Stetson) 38
  24. Max Huffman (IU - Indianapolis) 23
  25. Wentong Zheng (Bufallo) 17 
  26. Gabe Feldman (Tulane) 16 (Sports Law)

April 13, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Redistributional Impact of Non-Linear Electricity Pricing

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Severin Borenstein, University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group analyzes The Redistributional Impact of Non-Linear Electricity Pricing.

ABSTRACT: Utility regulators frequently focus as much or more on the distributional impact of electric rate structures as on their efficiency. The goal of protecting low-income consumers has become more central with recent increases in wholesale power costs and anticipation of significant costs of greenhouse gas emissions in the near future. These concerns have led to the widespread use of increasing-block pricing (IBP), under which the marginal price to the household increases as its daily or monthly usage rises. There is no cost basis for differentiating marginal price of electricity by consumption level, so perhaps nowhere is the conflict between efficiency and distributional goals greater than in the use of IBP. California has adopted some of the most steeply increasing-block tariffs in electric utility history. Combining household-level utility billing data with census data on income distribution by area, I derive estimates of the income redistribution effected by these increasing-block electricity tariffs. I find that the rate structure does redistribute income to lower-income groups, cutting the bills of households in the lowest income bracket by about 12% (about $5 per month). The effect would be about twice as large if not for the presence of another program that offers a different and lower rate structure to qualified low-income households. I find that the deadweight loss associated with IBP is likely to be large relative to the transfers. In contrast, I find that the means-tested program transfers income with much less economic inefficiency. A much larger share of the revenue redistributed by the IBP tariff, however, comes from the wealthiest quintile of households, so IBP may be a more progressive structure of redistribution. In carrying out the analysis, I also show that a common approach to studying (or controlling for) income distribution effects by using median household income within a census block group may substantially understate the potential effects.

April 13, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Networked Competition Governance in the EU: Delegation, Decentralization or Experimentalist Architecture?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Yane Svetiev (Brooklyn - Law) questions Networked Competition Governance in the EU: Delegation, Decentralization or Experimentalist Architecture?

ABSTRACT: The paper focuses on the reforms of the institutional arrangements for implementation of European competition law. The reforms were implemented at the Commission’s initiative and were intended to decentralize implementation and increase the role of member state competition authorities in this process. Nonetheless, the Commission remains a key player in the new European Competition Network, a fact that has been praised by those who emphasise the importance of maintaining coherence, and also criticized by those who argue for a more robust role of member states in shaping EU competition policy. In examining the detailed provisions of the Modernization Regulation together with the available experience about the operation of the competition network, the paper emphasises the novel requirements for reporting of implementation activities and the formalisation of peer evaluation procedures as mechanisms to generate, distil and distribute learning among its members. The need to introduce flexibility in the implementation framework arose not only because EC competition law was to apply to a greater number of different (national) economies, but also because the economic landscape has become more heterogeneous in general. Thus, old policy templates are unlikely to be of assistance to competition decision-makers: while reliance on economic analysis focuses competition enforcement on market outcomes, the static economic toolkit is not always helpful in analyzing competitive effects in highly dynamic markets. In the new production environment, competition decision-makers (including the Commission) can benefit from access to local knowledge about firm capacities for innovation and collaboration. The ECN could therefore be viewed as a vehicle for dynamic coherence: in the absence of a common policy template applicable across national or market contexts, coherence is based on identifying shared objectives, as well as learning about and participating in the review of the efforts of peer authorities.

April 13, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, April 12, 2010

The Monopolist as Victim: Constitutional Law in Antitrust - Part I

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Adi Ayal (Bar Ilan - Law) explains The Monopolist as Victim: Constitutional Law in Antitrust - Part I.

ABSTRACT: Constitutional law dictates that when one person's use of property infringes upon another's, a balancing test be administered to examine whether state action is justified. The case at point here is that of a monopolist arguing for freedom of trade and right to property infringed upon by state action purporting to protect consumers. The question addressed is whether a monopolist as such is to be deprived such consideration, and what arguments such a monopolist might bring forth.

The setting is Israeli constitutional law, specifically two relatively new Basic Laws expressly guaranteeing the right to free determination of property and the right to freedom of occupation. I show that a monopolist would have firm ground on which to stand when arguing the Restrictive Trade Practices Law may violate constitutional standards and subsequently should be constrained by expressly allowed judicial review.

April 12, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Promoting Innovation: Just How “Dynamic” Should Antitrust Law Be?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Tom Rosch (FTC) asks Promoting Innovation: Just How “Dynamic” Should Antitrust Law Be?  This is a very interesting speech and worth reading about the use of a more expansive FTC Section 5.

ABSTRACT: First, to what extent do antitrust and intellectual property share the same objectives? Second, to what extent has Section 2 of the Sherman Act served those objectives? And, third, to the extent Section 2 has failed to serve those objectives, under what circumstances should Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act pick up the slack?

April 12, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Lost in Conversation: The Compensatory Function of Antitrust Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Harry First, New York University - School of Law explains Lost in Conversation: The Compensatory Function of Antitrust Law.

ABSTRACT: Today’s conversation about antitrust civil remedies generally, and the private action specifically, focuses most often on optimal deterrence and effectiveness. Generally lost in conversation is the basic idea that antitrust violations cause economic harm, and that those victimized by that harm should be entitled to damages from those who have violated the law.

This article seeks to revive the underappreciated compensatory function of antitrust. The article reviews the debates over the Sherman and Clayton Acts, showing that compensation was the main focus of debate, traces the shift from compensation to deterrence in a series of Supreme Court cases decided in the 1960s and 1970s, and concludes with a review of three areas in which a focus on compensation could produce results different than current law and enforcement practice - indirect purchaser suits, suits by persons injured outside the United States, and federal government suits under Section 4A of the Clayton Act for damages that the United States has suffered from antitrust violations.

April 12, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Behavioral Economics, Consumer Protection, and Antitrust

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michael Salinger (Boston University) explains Behavioral Economics, Consumer Protection, and Antitrust.

ABSTRACT: In both consumer protection and antitrust, the use of standard economic analysis has generally been to limit the scope of government intervention. The interest in behavioral economics (and some of the resistance to it) stems from the belief that it justifies intervention that conventional economic analysis suggests is unwarranted. Proponents see behavioral economics as the antidote to the Chicago School poison. Opponents see it as a mutated bacterium, resistant to the economic medicine that has led to improved policy. In this article, I will provide some background on behavioral economics and assess what insights it provides for consumer protection and antitrust policy.

April 12, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The pro-competitive effect of imports from China: an analysis of firm-level price data

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Matteo Bugamelli (Bank of Italy) Silvia Fabiani (Bank of Italy) and Enrico Sette (Bank of Italy) have some interesting findings on The pro-competitive effect of imports from China: an analysis of firm-level price data.

ABSTRACT: The entry of China into world markets has been one of the strongest recent shocks to world trade and advanced countries. industrial sectors. This is particularly true for Italy where labour-intensive, low-technology production represents a large share of output. Using Italian manufacturing firm-level data on output prices over the period 1990-2006, we test whether increased import competition from China has affected firms' pricing strategies causing a reduction in the dynamics of prices and markups. After controlling for other price determinants (demand and cost, domestic competition and import penetration), we find that this is indeed the case. Comparing China's share of world exports to Italy with China's total world export market share proves the causal nature of the relationship we find. Inspired by and in line with recent advances in the literature on international trade, we also show that the p! rice effects of Chinese competitive pressures are stronger in less technologically advanced sectors and, within these sectors, on smaller firms.

April 12, 2010 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)