Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Tuesday, December 28, 2010

Predation in Off-Patent Drug Markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Laurent Granier (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines) and Sébastien Trinquard (UNOCAM - Union nationale des organismes d'assurance maladie complémentaire - UNOCAM) discuss Predation in Off-Patent Drug Markets.

ABSTRACT: In 2009, Sanofi-Aventis, whose generic subsidiary is Winthrop, merges with the generic firm, Zentiva. This paper fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning mergers in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their market share, some brand-name firms produce generics themselves, called pseudo- generics. We develop a Cournot duopoly model by considering the pseudo-generics production as a mergers' catalyst. We show that a brand-name company always has an incentive to purchase its competitor. The key insight of this paper is that the brand-name laboratory can increase its merger gain by producing pseudo-generics beforehand. In some cases, pseudo-generics would not otherwise be produced and this production is then a predatory strategy.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2010/12/predation-in-off-patent-drug-markets.html

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