Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Wednesday, November 24, 2010

On Price Taking Behavior in a Nonrenewable Resource Cartel-Fringe Game

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Hassan Benchekroun Department of Economics, CIREQ. McGill University and Cees Withagen Department of Spatial Economics, VU University Amsterdam provide thoughts On Price Taking Behavior in a Nonrenewable Resource Cartel-Fringe Game.

ABSTRACT: We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel-fringe game à la Salant 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop Nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop cartel-fringe game. Thus, the outcome of the cartel-fringe open-loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium. However the interpretation of the cartel-fringe model, where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price-taker, as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing Nash-Cournot, does not extend to the case where firms can use closed-loop strategies.

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