August 20, 2010
Antitrust Screening: Making Compliance Programs Robust
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, LECG, LLC, Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics, Patrick Bajari, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and
Joseph E. Murphy have a new short paper on Antitrust Screening: Making Compliance Programs Robust.
ABSTRACT: One of the prime issues in the antitrust and competition law1 compliance field is how to deal with the risk of collusive or cartel behavior which involves willful violations of the law. In the past much of antitrust compliance work has focused on training, perhaps accompanied by an antitrust compliance manual. But regardless of the amount of employee training they conduct and the existence of written materials, it is likely that most practitioners feel they do not have a handle on this area of risk. In this paper we discuss the role that empirical screens for conspiracies and manipulations can play in assisting compliance programs, by looking at certain quantifiable red flags and applying statistical analysis to determine priority areas which merit further focus.
August 20, 2010 | Permalink
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