Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University and Haizhen Lin, Indiana University explore Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions.

ABSTRACT: The recent financial crisis and recession provide an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus static efficiency tradeoff in antitrust enforcement policy. We examine implications of the optimal antitrust enforcement model when dynamic efficiency is incorporated. The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, some suggestions for modifying enforcement in light of its dynamic costs, and implies antitrust enforcers should put a greater weight on dynamic efficiency during recessions.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2010/06/optimal-antitrust-enforcement-dynamic-competition-and-changing-economic-conditions.html

| Permalink

TrackBack URL for this entry:

http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341bfae553ef0133ef5ef52f970b

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions:

Comments

Post a comment