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June 2, 2010
CELF II: Settling into a Weak effet utile Standard for Private State Aid Enforcement
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Thomas Jaeger, Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law addresses CELF II: Settling into a Weak effet utile Standard for Private State Aid Enforcement.
ABSTRACT: The judgment in CELF II clarifies that national courts must freeze illegal aid until a final binding authorization is given, but does not change the overall picture or alter the narrow bounds for national court action set by CELF I.
June 2, 2010 | Permalink
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