Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms, and Collectivist Business Cultures

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Andreas Stephan, University of East Anglia - Centre for Competition Policy has a new article on Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms, and Collectivist Business Cultures.

ABSTRACT: The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.