Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Friday, May 14, 2010

Collusive Networks in Market-Sharing Agreements Under the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Flavia Roldan, Public-Private Sector Research Center, IESE Business discusses Collusive Networks in Market-Sharing Agreements Under the Presence of an Antitrust Authority.

ABSTRACT: This article studies how the presence of an antitrust authority affects market-sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other's market. The set of these agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This article shows that while in the absence of the antitrust authority, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough when considering the antitrust authority, and more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a pro-competitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2010/05/collusive-networks-in-marketsharing-agreements-under-the-presence-of-an-antitrust-authority.html

| Permalink

TrackBack URL for this entry:

http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341bfae553ef0133ecfc73a2970b

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Collusive Networks in Market-Sharing Agreements Under the Presence of an Antitrust Authority:

Comments

Post a comment