Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Predation Under Perfect Information

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Cédric Argenton, Tilburg Law and Economics Center has posted Predation Under Perfect Information.

ABSTRACT: In an oligopoly configuration characterized by high barriers to (re-)entry, a finite horizon, perfect information about demand and costs and the presence of three identical firms, we show that two of them (the predators) can choose to charge an initial price that is so low that the third (the prey) decides to exit immediately, after which the predators can enjoy higher profits, even if they do not raise their price. Predatory prices are thus observed on the equilibrium path and the predators end up earning more than in the best Bertrand (or even, collusive) equilibrium with three firms.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2010/04/predation-under-perfect-information-1.html

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