Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, April 19, 2010

On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Hassan Benchekroun (McGill - Econ) and Cees Withagen (VU University Amsterdam) provide thoughts On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game.

ABSTRACT: We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel-fringe game a la Salant 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop Nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop cartel-fringe game. Thus, the outcome of the cartel-fringe open-loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium. However the interpretation of the cartel-fringe model, where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker, as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing Nash-Cournot, does not extend to the case where firms can use closed-loop strategies.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2010/04/on-price-taking-behavior-in-a-nonrenewable-resource-cartelfringe-game.html

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