Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, March 1, 2010

Unilateral versus Coordinated Effects: Comparing the Impact on Consumer Welfare of Alternative Merger Outcomes

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Matt Olczak (CCP- University of East Anglia) has written on Unilateral versus Coordinated Effects: Comparing the Impact on Consumer Welfare of Alternative Merger Outcomes.

ABSTRACT: The nature of tacitly collusive behaviour often makes coordination unstable, and this may result in periods of breakdown, during which consumers benefit from reduced prices. This is allowed for by adding demand uncertainty to the Compte et al. (2002) model of tacit collusion amongst asymmetric firms. Breakdowns occur when a firm cannot exclude the possibility of a deviation by a rival. It is then possible that an outcome with collusive behaviour, subject to long/frequent break downs, can improve consumer welfare compared to an alternative with sustained unilateral conduct. This is illustrated by re-examining the Nestle/Perrier merger analyzed by Compte et al., but now also taking into accoun

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2010/03/unilateral-versus-coordinated-effects-comparing-the-impact-on-consumer-welfare-of-alternative-merger.html

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