« Merger Remedies Versus Efficiency Defence: An Analysis of Merging Parties’ Litigation Strategy in EC Merger Cases | Main | Did We Avoid Historical Failures of Antitrust Enforcement During the 2008-09 Financial Crisis? »
February 12, 2010
The Economics of Railroad “Captive Shipper” Legislation
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Russ Pittman (DOJ) has an interesting new work on The Economics of Railroad “Captive Shipper” Legislation.
ABSTRACT: Recent rate increases by U.S. freight railroads have refocused attention on regulation, deregulation, and regulatory reforms in the railroad industry. Legislation introduced into Congress would render a variety of railroad behavior newly subject to the jurisdiction of the antitrust statutes, with potential enforcement by the Antitrust Division and the FTC and through lawsuits brought by state attorneys general or private parties. This paper considers the economic issues raised by legislation and the likely impacts on competition and welfare.
February 12, 2010 | Permalink
TrackBack URL for this entry:
Listed below are links to weblogs that reference The Economics of Railroad “Captive Shipper” Legislation: