February 9, 2010
Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Gea M. Lee (Singapore Management University) explains Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting.
ABSTRACT: In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitelyrepeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agent's information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of privately-informed agents may provide firms with a strategic opportunity to exploit an interaction between internal contracting and market-sharing arrangement- the contracts with agents may be used to induce firms' truthful communication in their collusion, and collusive market-share allocation may act to reduce the agents' information rents.
February 9, 2010 | Permalink
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