Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Getting The Job Done Right: Strengthening The Senate Bill To Fully Protect Competition

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

David Balto (Center for American Progress) has a posting on the Huffington Post on Getting The Job Done Right: Strengthening The Senate Bill To Fully Protect Competition.

December 8, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Antitrust, Economics, and Innovation in the Obama Administration

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Josh Wright (George Mason Law) explains Antitrust, Economics, and Innovation in the Obama Administration.

ABSTARCT: The strength of antitrust doctrine has been its ability to incorporate economic thought and empirical evidence over time. The consumer benefits from that incorporation are well known and uncontroversial. But change in economic thought can be slow. And in the sometimes lengthy period before those changes are incorporated into antitrust doctrine and enforcement decisions, the history of antitrust suggests a tendency toward false positives when innovative business practices are involved.  

December 8, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Middle Way On Applying Antitrust to Information Technology

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

David Evans (University of Chicago Law, University College London Law), suggests The Middle Way On Applying Antitrust to Information Technology.

ABSTRACT: Antitrust analysis ought to account for special features of IT—just like it ought to account for special features of any industry under consideration. But there’s no particular reason to focus additional antitrust resources on this sector. There is also no particular reason to add it to the sorry list of industries that have finagled an antitrust exemption. Antitrust policy towards information technology is interesting mainly because it helps surface broader questions concerning how we do antitrust.

December 8, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, December 7, 2009

Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints, and Firm Entry Size

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

William Kerr (Harvard Business School) and Ramana Nanda examine Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints, and Firm Entry Size.

ABSTRACT: We examine the effect of US branch banking deregulations on the entry size of new firms using micro-data from the US Census Bureau. We find that the average entry size for startups did not change following the deregulations. However, among firms that survived at least four years, a greater proportion of firms entered either at their maximum size or closer to the maximum size in the first year. The magnitude of these effects were small compared to the much larger changes in entry rates of small firms following the reforms. Our results highlight that this large-scale entry at the extensive margin can obscure the more subtle intensive margin effects of changes in financing constraints.

December 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Assessing Competition with the Panzar-Rosse Model: The Role of Scale, Costs, and Equilibrium

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jacob Bikker, Sherrill Shaffer, and Laura Spierdijk are involved in Assessing Competition with the Panzar-Rosse Model: The Role of Scale, Costs, and Equilibrium.

ABSTRACT: The Panzar-Rosse test has been widely applied to assess competitive conduct, often in specifications controlling for firm scale or using a price equation. We show that neither a price equation nor a scaled revenue function yields a valid measure for competitive conduct. Moreover, even an unscaled revenue function generally requires additional information about costs and market equilibrium. Our theoretical findings are confirmed by an empirical analysis of competition in banking, using a sample covering more than 110,000 bank-year observations on almost 18,000 banks in 67 countries during 1986-2004.

December 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Preferences and Equilibrium in Monopoly and Duopoly

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Yongmin Chen (University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics) and Michael H. Riordan (Columbia University - Department of Economics) provide thoughts on Preferences and Equilibrium in Monopoly and Duopoly.

ABSTRACT: This paper takes the new approach of using a copula to characterize consumer preferences in a discrete choice model of product differentiation, and applies it to the economics of monopoly and duopoly. The comparative statics of demand strength and preference diversity, both properties of the marginal distribution of values for each product variety, are strikingly similar across market structures. Preference dependence, a property of the copula and an indicator of product differentiation, is a key determinant of whether prices are higher in multiproduct industries compared to single-product monopoly. Furthermore, the effects of preference on prices and profits influence equilibrium product selection. Remarkably, a horizontally-differentiated duopoly sometimes can foreclose a higher-quality monopoly to the detriment of consumer and social welfare.

December 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Law and Economics of Interchange Fees and Credit Card Markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

This is a reminder that the Truth on the Market symposium on The Law and Economics of Interchange Fees and Credit Card Markets begins tomorrow.

The symposium will take place on Tuesday and Wednesday, December 8 and 9.

  • Omri Ben-Shahar (University of Chicago Law School)
  • Tom Brown (O’Melveney & Myers)
  • Bob Chakravorti (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)
  • Richard Epstein (University of Chicago and NYU Law Schools)
  • Joshua Gans (University of Melbourne Business School)
  • Ron Mann (Columbia University Law School)
  • Geoffrey Manne (International Center for Law & Economics and Lewis & Clark Law School)
  • Tim Muris (George Mason University School of Law and O’Melveney & Myers)
  • Allan Shampine (Compass/Lexecon)
  • Bob Stillman (CRA International)
  • James Van Dyke (Javelin Strategy & Research)
  • Joshua Wright (George Mason University School of Law)
  • Todd Zywicki (George Mason University School of Law)

December 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly with Separable Information, or Nondifferentiable

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ori Haimanko (Hitotsubashi University - Econ) analyzes Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly with Separable Information, or Nondifferentiable.

ABSTRACT: Einy et al (2002) showed that information advantage of a firm is rewarded in any equilibrium of an incomplete information Cournot oligopoly, provided the inverse demand function is differentiable and monotonically decreasing, and costs are affine. We extend this result in two directions. We show first that a firm receives not less than its rival even if that firm's information advantage is only regarding payoff-relevant data, and not necessarily payoff-irrelevant "sunspots". We then show that there is at least one equilibrium which rewards firm's information advantage even with non-differentiable, but concave, inverse demand function. Under certain conditions, these results hold even with always non-negative inverse demand functions.

December 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, December 6, 2009

Chanukah and the Antitrust Professor

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

We spent this afternoon at an early Chanukah party (since Chanukah does not start till the evening of December 12, 2009).

This year we bought some new Chanukah books for the girls.  The first that we read is A Blue's Clues Chanukah.  In the story, Blue and her friends Mr. Salt, Mrs. Pepper, Magenta, Tickety and Joe visit Orange Kitten (funny, she doesn't look Jewish) and celebrate Chanukah together.  I recommend it highly for those that have kids who watch Blues Clues.

The second book that the girls enjoyed is in the Sammy Spider series - Sammy Spider's First Hanukkah.  Our protagonist Sammy Spider learns about Chanukah from his friends the Shapiro family.  The girls also liked this one. 

This Saturday evening we are having a Chanukah party at our house.  What is the right sort of music to play?  Lots of Jewish performers produce Christmas albums (Bob Dylan, Neil Diamond, Kenny G, Michael Bolton, etc.) and the best known Christmas song of all time, White Christmas, was written by Irving Berlin.  How about a Chanukah album?  There is the famous Adam Sandler Chanukah song (in three versions no less).  There is also Hanukkah Blessings by the Barenaked Ladies.  My kids' favorite (at least until Lady Gaga comes out with a Chanukah tune) has got to be the following remake of an 80s classic.  I wish Joey Ramone had made a Chanukah album before he died.  I am still holding out for a Kiss Chanukkah album.  Both Paul Stanley (born Stanley Eisen) and Gene Simmons (born Chaim Witz) I assume celebrate Chanukah.

December 6, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Desarrollos Recientes y Nuevas Tendencias en Libre Competencia

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Desarrollos Recientes y Nuevas Tendencias en Libre Competencia

Fecha: 16 y 17 de diciembre de 2009
Lugar: Aula Magna, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Chile
Dirección: Pío Nono 1, Providencia, Santiago, Chile

El objetivo de esta conferencia es explorar los últimos avances en las diversas áreas que componen la libre competencia, especialmente considerando los nuevos desarrollos y tendencias jurisprudenciales en Chile y el extranjero. La conferencia está dirigida a abogados, economistas, estudiantes y toda otra persona interesada en el área de la libre competencia y el derecho económico en general.

Como invitados especiales al evento expondrán Eleanor Fox, profesora de la New York University (NYU) de Estados Unidos, Ioannis Lianos, profesor de University College London (UCL) del Reino Unido; y Julián Peña, de la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Además, la conferencia cuenta con la participación de varios de los más destacados académicos, autoridades y profesionales chilenos ligados a la libre competencia.

La conferencia ha sido organizada por Paulo Montt, Javier Tapia yeste servidor, y cuenta con el gentil auspicio de las siguientes instituciones:

UCL – Centre for Law and Economics
Universidad de Chile – RegCom, Centro de Regulación y Competencia
Universidad de Chile – Fundación Facultad de Derecho
Telmex
Empresas Eléctricas A.G.
FerradaNehme Abogados
Claro & Cia.
Barros & Errázuriz Abogados

Programa y Participantes

Miércoles 16.12.09
17:30 – 17:35
Bienvenida a nombre de comité organizador. Javier Tapia. UCL
17:35 – 17:50
Inauguración. Profesor Luis Ortiz Quiroga. Decano de la Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Chile
17:50 – 18:30. Presentación Principal 1

Eleanor Fox. Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, NYU
18:30 – 19:00
Panel 1: Libre Competencia en el derecho chileno y comparado
Expositores
Julián Peña, Abogado, Allende & Brea; profesor Universidad de Buenos Aires
Santiago Montt, Abogado, Director RegCom, Universidad de Chile
19:00 – 19:10
Preguntas y cierre primer día


Jueves 17.12.09
9:00 – 10:30
Panel 2 : Abusos de Posición Dominante
Panelistas
Tomás Menchaca, Abogado, Ministro titular Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia
Luis Eduardo Toro, Abogado, Barros & Errázuriz
Álex Van Weezel, Abogado, Claro & Cía.; profesor de Derecho Penal, Universidad de Chile

10:45 – 12:15
Panel 3 : Fusiones
Panelistas
José Tomás Morel, Economista, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Reconstrucción
Francisco Agüero, Abogado, Barros & Errázuriz; profesor de Regulación de Servicios Públicos, Universidad de Chile
Paulo Montt, Abogado, FerradaNehme; profesor de Derecho Civil, Universidad de Chile
14:00 – 15:30
Panel 4 : Carteles y Conductas Colusorias
Panelistas
Enrique Vergara, Abogado, Fiscal Nacional Económico
Javier Tapia, UCL
Aldo González, Economista, profesor del Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Chile
15:45 – 17:15
Panel 5 : Industrias Reguladas
Panelistas
Pablo Bello, Ingeniero Comercial, Subsecretario de Telecomunicaciones
Pablo Serra, Economista, integrante del Panel de Expertos; profesor de Economía, Universidad de Chile
Mike Hantke Domas, Abogado, Oficial para Asuntos Económicos, Cepal. Investigador, Unesco Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science, University of Dundee, Reino Unido
17:30 – 18:10
Presentación Principal 2
Ioannis Lianos, Reader in Competition Law and Economics, UCL
18:10 – 18:20
Agradecimientos y Cierre
Francisco Agüero, Universidad de Chile, Barros & Errázuriz

Valores e información para el pago

Valores:
$40.000.- Público general
$25.000.- Convenios (5 o más participantes)
$15.000.- Estudiantes en general (número limitado de cupos)
$10.000.- Estudiantes Universidad de Chile (número limitado de cupos)

El monto puede ser pagado mediante abono en la cuenta corriente de la Fundación Facultad de Derecho Universidad de Chile:

Banco de Chile
Cuenta N° 18841-07
Rut: 72.209.700-9.

Una vez hecha la transferencia, por favor enviar comprobante y nombre del asistente a Jorge Olave (jolavem@gmail.com) o al fax 7320147.

December 6, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)