« October 11, 2009 - October 17, 2009 | Main | October 25, 2009 - October 31, 2009 »
October 24, 2009
Most Downloaded Antitrust Law Papers - August 25, 2009 to October 24, 2009
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
October 24, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
GCR's 2009 Competition Law Review – Recent developments in competition law and policy
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
GCR's 2009 Competition Law Review
–
Recent developments in competition law and policy
Monday 16 and
Tuesday 17 November 2009,
The Conrad Hotel, Brussels
|
A
unique opportunity to hear some of the most influential speakers debate and
analyse the key developments in competition law. The programme will focus on
developments in four major areas: cartel enforcement, merger control,
enforcement of Article 82 and damages actions for the breach of EC antitrust
rules. Download
the conference brochure here Chairmen and speakers
include:
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
October 24, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
October 23, 2009
Competition and Cooperation between Professional Sports Franchises: The Impact on Ticket Prices
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Greg Pelnar (Compass Lexecon) explains Competition and Cooperation between Professional Sports Franchises: The Impact on Ticket Prices.
ABSTRACT: An important issue in many antitrust lawsuits involving professional sports leagues and their member teams is the extent to which franchises within the same, and across different, professional sports leagues compete with one another for fans and advertisers. Complicating the issue is the fact that some sports franchises also cooperate with other franchises in the same or different leagues by, for example, participating in a joint venture to build and operate the stadium in which they will play their games or a regional sports network joint venture to televise their games. An extreme form of cooperation is common ownership: some franchises in different sports leagues have common ownership. This study investigates the impact of competition and cooperation among the franchises of the four major professional sports leagues (i.e., the National Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major! League Baseball) on ticket prices for the 2008 season. The regression results suggest that the existence of one or more rival sports franchises in the same metropolitan area does not have a statistically significant impact on ticket prices. On the other hand, there is at best weak evidence that cooperation between sports franchises impacts ticket prices. These findings are consistent with a number of alternative hypotheses.
October 23, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Collective Dominance to Coordinated Effects in EU Competition Policy
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Juan Briones (e-Konomica) discusses Collective Dominance to Coordinated Effects in EU Competition Policy.
ABSTRACT: Since the Commission first tackled the oligopoly issue under the Merger Regulation, there has been considerable development of the Commission's policy in this area and, also, very significant clarifications from the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. To begin with, the Commission published guidelines for its assessment of coordinated effects under the merger regulation.
Quite naturally, the oligopoly issue has arisen often, not to say systematically, since nowadays most markets do present an oligopolistic structure of supply. This is even more valid if we consider the relatively narrow relevant antitrust markets, which are typically defined by reference to substitution in demand. More often than not, leading groups of less than four suppliers account for a large combined share of output in almost any antitrust market. However, is an oligopoly in a collective dominant position? The decision in the Airtours/ First Choice case vastly extended the boundaries of the situations under which the Commission found this may be the case.
October 23, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
GCR 2010 European Antitrust Review
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
The Global Competition Review has published the comprehensive 2010 European Antitrust Review.
- Introduction
- EU Substantive Areas
- Cartels
Julian Joshua, Elvira Aliende Rodríguez - Howrey LLP - Commercial Agreements
Jochen P Beck, Tom S Pick - Hammonds LLP - Compliance
Kiran Desai - Mayer Brown - Mergers
Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Craig Pouncey - Herbert Smith LLP - Merger Efficiencies and Remedies
Alexandros Papanikolaou, Michael Rosenthal - Hunton & Williams LLP - Monopolies and Market Dominance
Alexander Böhlke - Kemmler Rapp Böhlke - Plaintiff Recovery Actions
Michael Hausfeld, Vincent Smith - Hausfeld & Co LLP - Private Antitrust Litigation
Jesús Alfaro, Tim Reher - CMS Albiñana & Suárez de Lezo and CMS Hasche Sigle - Public Affairs
Louise Harvey, Gwendoline Motte - FD Blueprint - State Aid
Paris Anestis, Sarah Jordan - Howrey LLP - Trade
Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, Riccardo Croce, Yves Melin - Hammonds LLP - Vertical Agreements
Astrid Ablasser-Neuhuber, René Plank - bpv Hügel Rechtsanwälte
- Cartels
- EU Industry Sectors
- Air Transport
Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, Riccardo Croce, Guillaume Taillandier - Hammonds LLP - Chemicals
Flavia Distefano - McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP - Energy
Riccardo Celli, Philippe Noguès, Christian Riis-Madsen - O'Melveny & Myers LLP - Pharmaceuticals
Bill Batchelor, Fiona Carlin - Baker & McKenzie - Private Equity
Pierre-André Dubois, Arabella Hinton - Kirkland & Ellis International LLP - Sport
Riccardo Croce, Stephen Sampson, Will Sparks - Hammonds LLP - Technology
Pierre-André Dubois, Arabella Hinton - Kirkland & Ellis International LLP
- Air Transport
- Country Chapters
- Austria
Astrid Ablasser-Neuhuber, Florian Neumayr - bpv Hügel Rechtsanwälte - Czech Republic
Dagmar Bicková, Arthur Braun - bpv Braun Haškovcová - Denmark
Jesper Fabricius, Asser Rung-Hansen - ACCURA - France: Abuse of Dominance
Louis Vogel, Joseph Vogel - Vogel & Vogel - France: Cartels
Natasha G Assadi-Tardif, Marc Lévy - SJ Berwin LLP - France: Merger Control
Antoine Choffel, Yann Utzschneider - Gide Loyrette Nouel AARPI - Germany: Abuse of Dominance
Michael Dietrich, Marco Hartmann-Rüppel - Taylor Wessing - Germany: Cartels
Alexander Rinne, Tilman Siebert - SJ Berwin LLP - Germany: Merger Control
Martina Maier, Philipp Werner - Howrey LLP - Germany: Private Antitrust Litigation
Tatjana Mühlbach, Alexander Rinne - SJ Berwin LLP - Greece
Despina D Samara - Calavros & Partners - Hungary
Geoff Bennett, László Kelemen, Gergely Prinz - Szabó Kelemen & Partners Attorneys - Ireland
Helen Kelly - Matheson Ormsby Prentice - Israel
Tamar Dolev-Green, Eytan Epstein, Michelle Morrison - Epstein, Chomsky, Osnat & Co - Italy: Overview
Silvia D'Alberti, Lucio D'Amario - Allen & Overy - Studio Legale Associato - Italy: Cartels
Davide Balboni, Laura Matilde Cerri - SJ Berwin LLP - Italy: Merger Control
Giorgio Alù, Giovanni M Pallone - Tonucci & Partners in alliance with Mayer Brown LLP - Italy: Telecoms
Eutimio Monaco, Domenico Siciliano - Bird & Bird - Latvia
Martins Gailis, Liga Hartmane - Kļaviņś & Slaidiņś LAWIN - Netherlands: Cartels
Esther Glerum-van Aalst, Marleen de Putter, Andre Reznitchenko - Kneppelhout & Korthals - Netherlands: Merger Control
Michel Chatelin, Simone Schippers - Eversheds Faasen - Portugal
Mário Marques Mendes, Pedro Vilarinho Pires - Marques Mendes & Associados - Romania
Mihaela Ion, Silviu Stoica - Popovici Nitu & Asociatii - Russia
Natalia Ivolgina, Tapani Manninen - Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd - Spain: Overview
Juan Jiménez Laiglesia, Jorge Masía, Arantzazu Ruiz-Villanueva, Luis Sotelo - DLA Piper Spain - Spain: Cartels
Ramón García-Gallardo - SJ Berwin LLP - Spain: Merger Control
Marcos Araujo, Konstantin J Jörgens, Crisanto Pérez-Abad - Garrigues - Spain: Telecoms and Media
Blanca Escribano, Sofía Fontanals, Mar Quirós - Bird & Bird - Switzerland
Andreas Burger, Marcel Dietrich, Franz Hoffet - Homburger - Turkey
Metin Somay - Somay Hukuk Burosu in collaboration with Hammonds LLP - Ukraine
Irina Drofenko, Irina Nazarova - Engarde Attorneys-at-law in collaboration with Hammonds LLP - United Kingdom: Overview
Julia Joseph, Becket McGrath - Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP - United Kingdom: Cartels
Amanda Butler, Philipp Girardet, Simon Holmes - SJ Berwin LLP - United Kingdom: Private Enforcement
Neil Davis, Lesley Farrell - SJ Berwin LLP
- Austria
October 23, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
October 22, 2009
Repealing Insurers’ Antitrust Exemption Under McCarran-Ferguson: Less There Than Meets the Eye?
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Tim Greaney (St. Louis Law) has a posted a discussion on Repealing Insurers’ Antitrust Exemption Under McCarran-Ferguson: Less There Than Meets the Eye?
October 22, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Doh-Shin Jeony (Toulouse School of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra) and Domenico Menicucci (Università degli Studi di Firenze) explain Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling.
ABSTRACT: We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affects competition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio e¤ects of bundling and analyze the consequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.
October 22, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
The Doctrine of Collective Dominance: All Together Forever?
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Frederic Depoortere (Skadden) & Giorgio Motta (Skadden) ask The Doctrine of Collective Dominance: All Together Forever?
ABSTRACT: What are the policy objectives underlying the collective dominance (“CD”) doctrine under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and what is the legal test governing its application? Even today these questions remain partially unanswered. EC competition law still appears to lack a robust and consistent legal standard for identifying when companies should be held “collectively dominant” and when their conduct constitutes an abuse. In addition, the lack of clear policy objectives has not assisted the debate on these issues. They may even have lead to a significant decrease in the European Commission’s interest in CD situations: the recent Guidance on Enforcement Priorities (“Enforcement Guidance”), which presumably sets out the Commission’s enforcement priorities under Article 82, does not cover collective dominance at all.
Possible policy objectives for CD are outside the scope of this article, which concentrates on providing some observations on the test currently endorsed by the Community Courts (“Courts”) to identify abuses of CD. In its Compagnie Maritime Belge judgment (“CMB”), as confirmed by subsequent case law, the ECJ proposes a three-prong test: (i) the existence of a collective position/entity, (ii) such collective position being dominant, and (iii) the abuse by the collectively dominant entity. The first and third prongs are the main focus of this article.
October 22, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Competition and Antitrust Policy in the Enlarged European Union - A Level Playing Field?
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Jens Hölscher, University of Brighton and Johannes Florian Stephan, Technical University Freiberg address Competition and Antitrust Policy in the Enlarged European Union - A Level Playing Field?
ABSTRACT: With the central and east European countries (CEECs) increasingly included into the international division of labour in the European economic space, we are prompted to ask whether this integration operates on a level playing field with respect to competition policy. In fact, our analysis reveals that effectiveness of implementation of competition law and policy and intensity of competition are lower in the CEECs. We find no reason to believe that the new eastern EU members struggle with the recent reforms of competition policy in the EU, nor do we see the necessity for policy action to spur effective implementation.
October 22, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
From Formalism to Effects? – The Commission’s Communication on Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Nicolas Petit (University of Liege - Law) addresses From Formalism to Effects? – The Commission’s Communication on Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC.
ABSTRACT: The purpose of the present article is to offer thoughts on the “Guidance Communication on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty” and, in particular, to review the requirements which the Commission must meet in Article 82 EC cases when it purports to apply the Communication’s economics-oriented, effects-based. In addition, this article seeks to assess whether the Communication’s effects-based approach really entails a paradigmatic shift towards increased competition economics, comparable to the (r)evolution that has taken place in other areas of EC antitrust enforcement since the early 2000. It comes to the conclusion that whilst the Communication marks a welcome economic sophistication of the Commission’s Article 82 EC enforcement policy, it nonetheless often fails to go beneath the surface of modern antitrust economics, and thus provide only limited guidance to firms and their counsels.
October 22, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
October 21, 2009
It's the Market Power, Stupid! Stock Return Patterns in International Bank M&A
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Yassin Hankir, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management - FIPEMA, Christian Rauch, E-Finance Lab, and Marc P. Umber, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance explain It's the Market Power, Stupid! Stock Return Patterns in International Bank M&A.
ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes capital market reactions to international bank M&A. We investigate combined stock return patterns of targets, bidders, and their peers upon takeover announcement, and closing or withdrawal. We distinguish five common M&A hypotheses and relate characteristic and mutually exclusive abnormal stock return patterns to each hypothesis. We find that investors believe in gains through the exploitation of market power by the post-merger entity. In a multinomial logistic model we show that patterns related to market power significantly concur with large relative target size, intra-industry mergers, and increasing market concentration, suggesting a substantial lessening of competition through M&A.
October 21, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Competition Among the Big and the Small
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Ken-Ichi Shimomura, Kobe University and Jacques-François Thisse, Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics explain Competition Among the Big and the Small.
ABSTRACT: Armchair evidence shows that many industries are made of a few big commercial or manufacturing firms, which are able to affect the market outcome, and of a myriad of small family-run businesses with very few employees, each of which has a negligible impact on the market. Examples can be found in apparel, catering, publishers and bookstores, retailing, finance and insurances, and IT industries. We provide a new general equilibrium framework that encapsulates both market structures. Due to the higher toughness of the market, the entry of big firms leads them to sell more through a market expansion effect, which is generated by the exit of small firms. Furthermore, the level of social welfare increases with the number of oligopolistic firms because the procompetitive effect associated with the entry of a big firm dominates the resulting decrease in product variety.
October 21, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Antitrust/Competition Professors - Separated at Birth
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Back by popular demand. Fell free to suggest additional names.
Arianna Andreangeli (Liverpool Law) and
Eva Mendes
Darren Bush (Houston Law) and
Philip Seymour Hoffman
Michael Carrier (Rutgers - Newark Law) and
McLovin
Dan Crane (Michigan Law) and
David Hyde Pierce
German Coloma (Universidad del CEMA - Econ) and
Jason Statham
Harry First (NYU Law) and
Richard Schiff
Eleanor Fox (NYU Law) and
Valerie Harper
Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt - Management) and
Tim Daley
Andy Gavil (Howard Law) and
Richard Dreyfuss
Damien Geradin (Tilburg - Law) and
Keifer Sutherland
Herb Hovenkamp (Iowa Law) and
Obi Won Kenobi
Valentine Korah (UCL Law) and
Judy Dench
Bill Kovacic (GW Law and FTC) and
Kris Kristofferson
Thom Lambert (Missouri Law) and
Lady Gaga
John Lopatka (Penn State Law) and
Frank Langella
Bill Page (Florida Law) and Bill Gates
Randy Picker (Chicago Law) and
Kelsey Grammer
Daniel Sokol (Florida Law) and
Steve from Blues Clues
Chris Sprigman (Virginia - Law) and
John Cryer
Paul Stancil (Illinois Law) and
Rutger Hauer
Florian Wagner-von Papp (UCL Law) and
Elijah Wood
Spencer Waller (Chicago Loyola Law) and
Roberto Benigni
Phil Weiser (Colorado Law) and
Jonathan Silverman
Josh Wright (George Mason Law) and
Michael Rapaport
October 21, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (9) | TrackBack
‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation - A European View
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Ioannis Lianos (UCL - Law) explains ‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation - A European View.
ABSTRACT: The study focuses on the admissibility and assessment of economic expertise in EC competition law litigation. I start by exploring the broader issues raised by the integration of economic expertise in litigation: in particular the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection because of the epistemic asymmetry between judges and experts and the risk of expert bias. The analysis of these problems will bring me to the question of the conception of science and of the relations between science and law that underpins the concept of scientific expertise and, more specifically, economic expertise. I will then identify the extent of the problem of epistemic asymmetry and expert bias by looking to the degree and the locus of the intrusion of economic analysis in competition cases. I will examine the instruments, procedural and substantive, employed by the legal system, in order to mitigate the risks flowing from the epistemic asymmetry and the expert bias claims. First, I will highlight the different institutional and procedural frameworks that were adopted at the European Union level and in some selected member states in order to integrate economic expertise in litigation. My objective will be to understand how these institutional solutions may address each of the identified problems. Second, I will look to 'substantive' law approaches in the adjudication of expertise, such as the development of specific standards for the admissibility and the sufficiency of economic expertise in courts, as an alternative or as an additional option to deal with the challenges raised by economic expertise. The paper will conclude that the possible adverse effects of the epistemic asymmetry and expert bias between judges and experts raise important concerns that the legal systems should tackle. The current procedural/institutional and substantive legal framework governing economic expertise does not however take sufficiently into account important concerns that are specific to economics and other social sciences, such as the preservation of the scientific 'competition' in the supply of economic theory and consequently methodological or assumptions-related pluralism in economic thought. In particular, I will argue against adopting specific standards of admissibility of economic expertise in Europe. This is a US context-specific solution which does not necessarily fit with the specific characteristics of the European legal system. It is also an approach that represents an outdated and partial view of the scientific as well as of the judicial adjudication process.
October 21, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
The Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2009 in the Intel Case: Where is the Foreclosure and Consumer Harm
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Damien Geradin (Tilburg Law and Economics Center, Howrey) has an interesting new paper that asks, The Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2009 in the Intel Case: Where is the Foreclosure and Consumer Harm.
ABSTRACT: On 21 September 2009, the European Commission published a provisional non-confidential version of its 13 May 2009 Decision in which it condemned Intel to a record fine of € 1.06 billion on the ground that it had granted conditional rebates and payments to a number of OEMs and a large retailer of consumer electronics purchasing its x86 CPUs, and that it had paid OEMs to delay, cancel or in some other way restrict the commercialization of specific AMD-based products.
This paper shows that the Commission Decision contains a number of flaws. They include the facts that the Decision: (i) relies in substance on a per se prohibition of conditional rebates recognized by the formalistic case-law of the Community courts, notwithstanding that the Commission had clearly indicated in various important policy documents, including its Guidance Paper on Article 82 EC, its intention to move away from this approach for an effects-based analysis; (ii) states, contrary to sound policy, that it need not conduct an “as efficient competitor” test, but conducts a misguided one anyway; (iii) insufficiently supports its speculative theory that the OEMs’ purchasing policy was influenced by their understanding of Intel’s alleged intention to reduce or eliminate their rebates should they buy x86 CPUs from AMD; (iv) fails to demonstrate its contention that Intel’s rebates harm competition and consumers; and (v) conducts an excessively restrictive analysis of the efficiencies created by Intel’s rebates.
The Intel decision thus stands for the dangerous proposition that any dominant firm is at risk under Article 82 EC if there exists evidence that employees of a customer believe that reducing present purchases from it could have repercussions with regard to the availability and terms of future purchases, even if the belief is ambiguous, equivocal or contrary to written assurances of the firm or its executives, and without any showing of foreclosure. While the foregoing may be considered as an overstatement and that an “agreement” on conditions (not a mere unilateral belief on the part of the customer) is necessary to find a violation, the Commission accords itself so much latitude on how it collects, interprets and weighs evidence that the distinction is illusory.
The compatibility of the Commission Decision with EC competition law will now be examined by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities to which Intel lodged an appeal. Because of the wide-ranging implications of this Decision, not only for Intel but for all large corporations having to negotiate price incentives with their customers, it is to be hoped that the Court of First Instance of the EC will review this decision carefully and hold the Commission to the same rigorous standards it has applied in the merger control area.
An important question (that will not be addressed by the Court of First Instance, but which is nevertheless relevant from a policy standpoint) is whether antitrust intervention was at all needed in a market characterized by increasing output, decreasing prices and sustained innovation. These characteristics alone should raise serious doubt about claims of anti-competitive foreclosure and consumer harm, especially when they are made by competitors. These characteristics also question the Commission’s wisdom of investing large enforcement resources in what turned to be a long and protracted investigation. As this paper will demonstrate, the market for x86 CPUs was competitive and there is no convincing evidence that Intel’s conduct was anti-competitive and foreclosed AMD and harmed consumers.
October 21, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
October 20, 2009
How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Pedro P. Barros, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Joseph A. Clougherty, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), and Jo Seldeslachts, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) ask How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?
ABSTRACT: We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.
October 20, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Daniel A. Crane, University of Michigan Law School discusses Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement.
ABSTRACT: Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and legal judgment day is usually so long that the corporate managers responsible for the planning have left their corporate employer before the employer internalizes the cost of the violation. Private litigation needs to be entirely reconceptualized and redirected toward a forward-looking, problem-solving approach to market power issues.
October 20, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration with Downstream Oligopsony and Oligopoly
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
October 20, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Antitrust Hotch Potch is Back
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Damien Geradin (Tilburg Law and Economics Center, College of Europe, Howrey) has resumed the Antitrust Hotch Potch blog.
October 20, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
October 20, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
