Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Friday, October 9, 2009

DOJ Antitrust Wants to Party Like its 1969

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The US Department is investigating IBM in mainframes.  The last time that they started a case against IBM for monopolization was 1969, the year the US put a man on the moon (and five years before I was born).  Of course, IBM is far less dominant than in the early 1980s when Bill Baxter dropped the previous IBM case.

HT: Bill Page

October 9, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Indirect network effects with two Salop circles: the example of the music industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ralf Dewenter (TU Ilmenau), Justus Haucap (University of Erlangen - Nuremberg) and Tobias Wenzel (University of Erlangen - Nuremberg) explain Indirect network effects with two Salop circles: the example of the music industry.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the interdependency between the market for music recordings and concert tickets, assuming that there are positive indirect network effects both from the record market to ticket sales for live performances and vice versa. Using a model with two interrelated Salop circles we show that prices in both markets are corrected down- wards when compared to the standard Salop model. Furthermore, we show that the effects of file sharing on firms' profitability and on variety are ambiguous. File sharing can increase profits through increased concert ticket demand and thereby also lead to additional market entry and additional variety.

October 9, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Optional linear input prices in vertical relations

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Claudia Salim (Free University of Berlin - Econ) writes on Optional linear input prices in vertical relations.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines how the option of a regulated linear input price affects vertical contracting, where a monopolistic upstream supplier sequentially offers supply contracts to two symmetric downstream firms. We find that equilibrium contracts vary with production cost and regulated price level: If the regulated price is not too high, the option allows for price discrimination, but prevents foreclosure in the intermediary market. Indeed, if both cost and optional price are rather low, non-discriminatory input prices below cost may arise. Optional input prices are socially more desirable than a flat ban on price discrimination, as consumers benefit from more intense downstream competition.

October 9, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Hospital Mergers and the Public Interest: Recent Developments in the Netherlands

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

M.F.M. Canoy, European Commission and Wolf Sauter, Tilburg Law and Economics Center have a new paper on Hospital Mergers and the Public Interest: Recent Developments in the Netherlands.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the recent experience concerning hospital mergers in The Netherlands. A topic that is likely to be of broader relevance as health care reform in The Netherlands is relatively advanced. In particular we look at issues concerning market definition, vertical integration and the efficiency defense. The findings are that there appears to be a case for stricter, possibly sector specific, forms of merger control in a liberalisation context. Also there is a need for flanking measures – such as facilitating market entry. Finally public interest standards in health care such as quality, affordability and accessibility should be developed further to enable them to play a more meaningful role in merger control.

October 9, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, October 8, 2009

Buyer Power in International Markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Horst Raff, Christian-Albrechts-Universitaet zu Kiel and Nicolas Schmitt, Simon Fraser University, explain Buyer Power in International Markets.

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the implications for international markets of the existence of retailers/wholesalers with market power. Two main results are shown. First, in the presence of buyer power trade liberalization may lead to retail market concentration. Due to this concentration retail prices may be higher and welfare may be lower in free trade than in autarky, thus reversing the standard effects of trade liberalization. Second, the pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization are weaker under buyer power than under seller power.

October 8, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Efficient Mergers: Preventing Collateral Casualties in Federal Antitrust Enforcement Actions

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jamie Henikoff Moffitt, University of Oregon School of Law addresses Efficient Mergers: Preventing Collateral Casualties in Federal Antitrust Enforcement Actions.

ABSTRACT: This article exposes a gap between how courts state they are analyzing efficiency claims in Section 7 Clayton Act enforcement actions and what they are actually doing. During periods of lax antitrust enforcement, this pattern is not readily visible, since almost all proposed merger and acquisition (“M&A”) deals are approved. With a shift to more aggressive antitrust policy, however, it is critical that merger review include appropriate weighting of transaction-generated efficiencies. Although only a small number of Section 7 cases are litigated each year, corporate negotiators assess thousands of potential M&A deals annually. This article applies analytical frameworks from the negotiation literature to demonstrate how current judicial efficiency analysis discourages corporate negotiators from pursuing efficient deals, thereby hurting the competitiveness of U.S. companies and markets.

October 8, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation - A European View

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ioannis Lianos, University College London - Faculty of Laws discusses ‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation - A European View.

ABSTRACT: The study focuses on the admissibility and assessment of economic expertise in EC competition law litigation. I start by exploring the broader issues raised by the integration of economic expertise in litigation: in particular the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection because of the epistemic asymmetry between judges and experts and the risk of expert bias. The analysis of these problems will bring me to the question of the conception of science and of the relations between science and law that underpins the concept of scientific expertise and, more specifically, economic expertise. I will then identify the extent of the problem of epistemic asymmetry and expert bias by looking to the degree and the locus of the intrusion of economic analysis in competition cases. I will examine the instruments, procedural and substantive, employed by the legal system, in order to mitigate the risks flowing from the epistemic asymmetry and the expert bias claims. First, I will highlight the different institutional and procedural frameworks that were adopted at the European Union level and in some selected member states in order to integrate economic expertise in litigation. My objective will be to understand how these institutional solutions may address each of the identified problems. Second, I will look to 'substantive' law approaches in the adjudication of expertise, such as the development of specific standards for the admissibility and the sufficiency of economic expertise in courts, as an alternative or as an additional option to deal with the challenges raised by economic expertise. The paper will conclude that the possible adverse effects of the epistemic asymmetry and expert bias between judges and experts raise important concerns that the legal systems should tackle. The current procedural/institutional and substantive legal framework governing economic expertise does not however take sufficiently into account important concerns that are specific to economics and other social sciences, such as the preservation of the scientific 'competition' in the supply of economic theory and consequently methodological or assumptions-related pluralism in economic thought. In particular, I will argue against adopting specific standards of admissibility of economic expertise in Europe. This is a US context-specific solution which does not necessarily fit with the specific characteristics of the European legal system. It is also an approach that represents an outdated and partial view of the scientific as well as of the judicial adjudication process.

October 8, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The European Competition Network: Structure, Management and Initial Experiences of Policy Enforcement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Firat Cengiz, Tilburg Law and Economics Cente  explains The European Competition Network: Structure, Management and Initial Experiences of Policy Enforcement.

ABSTRACT: The European Competition Network came into life in 2004 as an atypical network with a relatively hierarchical and highly regulated structure. As a result, predictions regarding the future functioning of this network were largely skeptical at the time of its inception. Now the network is about to complete its fifth year in operation and the European Commission is due to present a report to the European Parliament and the Council regarding experiences of policy enforcement by this network. Therefore, it is particularly timely to have a retrospective look at the European Competition Network and assess its achievements and failures. This paper reviews the structure and management methods of the European Competition Network in the light of the policy network literature and comments on initial experiences with its operation. The paper argues that in general the skeptical predictions regarding the operation of the network have not been realised. The network has been successful particularly in terms of accelerating communication between the competition authorities of Europe and increasing their contribution to the design of European competition policy. However, the paper also reveals certain weaknesses of the operation of this network. Particularly the inefficiencies of investigations by the national competition authorities, the low level of horizontal cooperation between the national competition authorities in individual investigations and the opaque nature of network management appear as matters which need to be addressed to achieve more effective network management.

October 8, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

Antitrust Federalism: Enhancing Federal/State Cooperation

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Christine Varney (DOJ) gave a speech on Antitrust Federalism: Enhancing Federal/State Cooperation for the National Association of Attorneys General Columbia Law School State Attorneys General Program.

October 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

How to Preserve Trust in Anti-trust

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ben Van Rompuy (Institute for European Studies) believes the European Competition Day is a convenient opportunity to reflect on the public confidence in competitive markets, particularly in light of the crisis, and in the benefits derived from them.
Download Comment_Trust in Antitrust_VanRompuyBen

October 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Reverse Payment Settlements and Upcoming Congressional Action

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Geoff Manne (LECG) and Josh Wright (George Mason) have a policy alert on Reverse Payments.

Download ReversePayments

October 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

A Horse of a Different Color: A Study of Color Bias, Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Violations in the Equine Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Mary W. Craig, Faulkner University - Thomas Goode Jones School of Law addresses A Horse of a Different Color: A Study of Color Bias, Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Violations in the Equine Industry.

ABSTRACT: In 2000, Kay Floyd sued the American Quarter Horse Association, and changed not only the way the Association did business, but changed the law as it applied to voluntary associations. The court ruled that an association cannot economically discriminate against some of its members and artificially devalue the property held by those members. Subsequently, the American Quarter Horse Association has changed its own registration rules to reflect the principle behind the Floyd suit, even though the parties settled and dismissed the case. A sister equine association in Texas, however, has refused to amend its rules concerning equine registration, resulting in economic discrimination against some, but not all, of its membership. This article examines the effects of the Floyd suit on the AQHA, and projects the outcome of a similar suit against the American Paint Horse Association, should it continue its registration policies in violation of the Texas Business & Commerce Code.

October 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Will Microsoft Settle with the EU Soon?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

This is the big antitrust story of the day, according to the WSJ.

October 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

New Antitrust Information Resource -

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

A great new tool has come to my attention -  This site aggregates the client alerts of law firms on antitrust issues.  The further subdivide antitrust news by geographic region, US, International, EU, China & the UK.  

October 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Toward an Expansive Reading of FTC Act § 5: Beyond the Sherman Act and an Ex Post Model of Enforcement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Rudolph J.R. Peritz, New York Law School pushes Toward an Expansive Reading of FTC Act § 5: Beyond the Sherman Act and an Ex Post Model of Enforcement.

ABSTRACT: This paper is an edited and lightly footnoted version of Remarks made at a session convened during the American Antitrust Institute’s most recent annual conference. The session was entitled “Can FTC Section 5 and E.U. Article 82 Converge?” The paper distinguishes between the “domestic question” of whether FTC Section 5 should be interpreted to go beyond Sherman Act Section 2, and the “cosmopolitan question” of whether convergence with Article 82 is desirable and achievable. The paper focuses on the domestic question; to the extent an expansive use of Section 5 would foster convergence, that would be a side benefit. The paper asserts three propositions: First, there is a strong and undisputed historical basis for the view that the FTCA is something different in kind from both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Second, in this light, the FTC’s institutional character is properly understood as a competition commission to investigate, report, advise against, and if necessary stop practices deemed unfair methods of competition, ex ante, in their incipiency. The FTC is not an antitrust enforcement agency like the DOJ Antitrust Division. Third, federal court decisions beginning in the 1960s unanimously support the view that the FTC Section 5 and its enforcement by the Commission legitimately serve competition policy understood more broadly than antitrust law, i.e., than the Sherman Act. In sum, the FTC has a long-standing Congressional mandate and judicial invitation to be bold, to push past the antitrust laws, to investigate and stop in their incipiency “unfair methods of competition.” The Commission should be an innovator and investigator rather than an enforcer; it should spend significant resources working at the cutting edge of economic theory and legal doctrine. The FTC mission, properly understood, is to engage in research and development of competition policy at the forefront of changing commercial circumstances.

October 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Pros and Cons of Competition in/by the Public Sector

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The seminar, which is open for competition authority employees, researchers, lawyers and competition consultants, have been appreciated for the open discussion among the participants and we hope that this year’s seminar will be no exception.

Seminar in Stockholm on November 13

This year, the theme for the seminar is "The Pros and Cons of Competition in/by the Public Sector". As in previous years we will arrange a seminar in Stockholm on November 13 where the contributors will present their papers and leading officials from competition authorities around the world will be the discussants.

Preliminary Programme, Friday 13 November

9.00 Registration and coffee

9.30 Introduction by Dan Sjöblom, Director General of the Swedish Competition Authority

The moderator for the conference is Mattias Ganslandt, Director of Centre for European Law and Economics (CELEC).

9.50 Gianni de Fraja: Mixed Oligopoly: Old and New.
Discussant: Knut Eggum Johansen. 10.50 Coffee

11.20 D. Daniel Sokol: What Role for Government Ownership in Business and What is the Best Form of Oversight.
Discussant: Preben Pettersson.

12.20 Lunch

13.40 Hans W. Friederiszick: On the difficult relationship between competition policy and public enterprises: What can be learned from recent developments in the field of European state aid control.
Discussant: Kate Collyer.

14.40 Coffee 

15.10 Michael Steinicke: Public contracts through procurement - can there still be state aid?
Discussant:  Joseph Wilson. 

16.10 Closing of seminar

Each speaker has 35 minutes for their presentations; the discussants have 15 minutes each, leaving 10 minutes for general discussion.


The seminar venue is World Trade Center Stockholm, directly adjacent to Arlanda Express, the express rail link with Stockholm Arlanda Airport. The conference venue is marked by red dot.


Gianni de Fraja, University of Leicester
Hans W. Friederiszick, ESMT European School of Management and Technology
D. Daniel Sokol, University of Florida Levin College of Law
Michael Steinicke, University of Southern Denmark

We have the pleasure of announcing that the following senior officials will comment on the presentations:

Kate Collyer, Cooperation and Competition Panel, United Kingdom
Preben Pettersson, Danish Competition Authority
Knut Eggum Johansen, Norwegian Competition Authority
Joseph Wilson, Competition Commission of Pakistan

Moderator of the seminar will be Mattias Ganslandt, Centre for European Law and Economics (CELEC).


We need your registration at the latest on the 12th of October 2009.
Register here

All matters regarding registration and accommodation are handled by Bokningsbolaget, .


If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact our head of the organizing committee Arvid Fredenberg at .

October 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Favoring Dynamic Competition Over Static Competition: A Neo-Schumpeterian Approach to Advancing Innovation Through Antitrust and Merger Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

J. Gregory Sidak, Criterion Economics and Tilburg University and David J. Teece, Berkeley - Econ have a new working paper on Favoring Dynamic Competition Over Static Competition: A Neo-Schumpeterian Approach to Advancing Innovation Through Antitrust and Merger Law.

How would competition policy be shaped if it were explicitly to favor Schumpeterian (dynamic) competition over neoclassical (static) competition? Schumpeterian competition is the kind of competition that is engendered by product and process innovation. Such competition does not merely bring price competition. It tends to overturn the existing order. A “neo-Schumpeterian” framework for antitrust analysis that favors dynamic competition over static competition would put less weight on market share and concentration in the assessment of market power and more weight on assessing potential competition and enterprise-level capabilities. By embedding recent developments in evolutionary economics and the behavioral theory of the firm into antitrust analysis, one can develop a more robust framework for antitrust economics. Such a framework is likely to ease remaining tensions between antitrust and intellectual property. It is also likely to reduce confidence in the standard tools of antitrust economics when the business environment manifests rapid technological change.

It appears that the Antitrust Division has attempted to incorporate more dynamic analysis, but the result has been inconsistent across different mergers and different doctrinal areas of antitrust law. Moreover, a complicating factor in the transformation of the law is the fact that the federal courts have, by embracing the reasoning in the Merger Guidelines promulgated several decades ago by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission, caused antitrust case law to ossify around a decidedly static view of antitrust. Put differently, in the years since 1980, the Division and the FTC have successfully persuaded the courts to adopt a more explicitly economic approach to merger analysis, yet one that has a static view of competition. The result is not a mere policy preference. It is law.

To change that law to have a more dynamic view of competition will therefore require a sustained intellectual effort by the enforcement agencies (as well as by scholars and practitioners) that, once more, engages the courts to reexamine antitrust law, as they did in the late 1970s during the ascendancy of the Chicago School, when antitrust law became infused with its current, static understanding of competition. A necessary but not sufficient condition for that effort is a public process by which the Division and the FTC revisit and restate the Merger Guidelines in a manner that clarifies and defends the role of dynamic competition in antitrust analysis. We therefore applaud the announcement of the antitrust agencies in September 2009 to solicit public comment on the possibility of updating the Merger Guidelines. Assuming that the Division and the FTC decide to revise the existing Merger Guidelines, those revised guidelines (and useful complementary undertakings, such as generalized guidelines on market power and remedies) then will require leadership by the enforcement agencies to persuade the courts that antitrust doctrine should evolve accordingly. That neo-Schumpeterian process may take a decade or longer to accomplish, but it is a path that we believe the Roberts Court is willing to travel.

October 7, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

China’s Antimonopoly Law—One Year Down

Posted by Wentong Zheng

Part 1: General Overview

First, I would like to thank Dan and Shubha for inviting me to guest blog here on the Chinese antitrust law.  It has been a year (or a little more than a year, to be accurate) since China’s new Antimonopoly Law (“AML”) went into effect on August 1, 2008.  Adopted in August 2007 after a nearly thirteen-year drafting process, the AML is China’s first comprehensive antitrust legislation and has been hailed as a milestone in China’s march towards a market economy.

So what does the first year of the AML tell us about the future of the Chinese antitrust law?  That will be the subject of my guest-blogging here.  In today’s post, I will provide an overview of the AML and a summary of the developments in the past year.  In the next five or six posts, which will be uploaded at approximately one to two week intervals, I will take up issues such as the direction of China’s merger and dominance law, the allegedly protectionist bent the AML has taken on, the “dual-track” antitrust regime that begins to emerge in China, the interaction between the AML and China’s industrial policies and economic development goals, the special problem of “administrative monopolies” (meaning anticompetitive conducts by government agencies), and the problems with the enforcement of the AML.

What’s in the AML?

Much has been written about the content of the AML elsewhere and I won’t be reinventing the wheel here.  To just give a quick summary, the AML has all major elements of the antitrust laws of the Western countries: prohibition of horizontal agreements, prohibition of abuse of market power, and a merger review regime.  In the meantime, the AML also has elements that are not typically found in the antitrust laws of the Western countries.  Those unusual elements include, inter alia, provisions on the special status of State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”) and provisions on the so-called “administrative monopolies” (anticompetitive conducts by government agencies). 

What Has Changed?

It is not an exaggeration to say that The AML has brought sweeping changes to China’s antitrust regime.  Prior to the AML, China had some laws and regulations that served certain antitrust functions.  Those laws and regulations were ad hoc in nature, and the antitrust functions they served were quite limited.  For instance, the 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law prohibits tying arrangements, predatory pricing, and bid rigging.  The 1997 Price Law prohibits price fixing, predatory pricing, and price discrimination.  But prior to the AML, there was not one law that banned all forms of horizontal agreements and all forms of abuse of market power.  The AML changed all that.  In addition, prior to the AML, China had a merger review regime that applied only to foreign companies acquiring Chinese companies.  Now under the AML, China’s merger review regime applies to both foreign and domestic companies.

What Has Not Changed?

Despite the accomplishments of the AML, there are certain things that the AML has not changed.  First, the AML remains ambivalent towards China’s SOEs.  Second, the AML does not provide an effective remedy for administrative monopolies, the most prevalent form of monopolies in China.  Finally, the AML has preserved China’s tripartite antitrust enforcement structure that predated the AML.  I will have more to say about each of these issues later.

What Has Happened Since Last Year?

The first year of the AML’s existence has seen a slew of regulations aimed at implementing the AML. On August 3, 2008, two days after the AML went into effect, the State Council (China’s cabinet) issued a decree on the thresholds that would trigger merger notification requirements under the AML. The three government agencies charged with enforcing the AML—the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”), the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”), and the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”)—all issued regulations or proposed regulations in their respective enforcement areas.  In May 2009, the State Council’s Antimonopoly Commission, an inter-agency coordinative body on antitrust policies established under the AML, issued a guideline on how to define “relevant market” in cases brought under the AML.

With the exception of MOFCOM, which is tasked with merger review, the antimonopoly enforcement agencies seem to be taking a leisurely pace when it comes to carrying out specific enforcement actions.  Since the AML went into effect, there has not been one single enforcement action against any individual or entity for engaging in horizontal agreements or abuses of market power.  MOFCOM is the only enforcement agency that seems to maintain a busy schedule.  In August 2009, MOFCOM released official statistics showing that as of the end of June 2009, MOFCOM received more than one hundred merger notifications under the AML and accepted fifty-eight of them for official review.  Of the cases for which review had been concluded, forty-three were approved without any conditions, two were approved with conditions, and one was blocked.  The only one case blocked by MOFCOM, the proposed acquisition of Huiyuan Juice Group by Coca-Cola, caused a great amount of stir  both in China and in the international community.  I will have more to say about the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case later.

Since the AML went into effect, private citizens of China have been more aggressive than the antimonopoly enforcement agencies in seeking remedies against what they perceive as monopolies banned by the AML.  On the very first day of the AML becoming effective, three lawsuits were filed against the telecommunication giant China Netcom, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, and the municipal government of Yuyao City, Zhejiang Province respectively.  Many more lawsuits were subsequently brought against state-owned companies such as China Mobile and China Construction Bank.  The courts, however, have been a bit reluctant to take up antimonopoly cases.  Many antimonopoly cases were dismissed by the courts, and of those that were accepted, none has reached a conclusion so far.  I will have more to say about the enforcement of the AML later.

In my next post, I will discuss China’s new merger review regime under the AML.  Stay tuned.

October 6, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Introducing Guest Blogger Wentog Zheng

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Joining us for a serious of guest blogs will be Wentong Zheng.  Wentong is a newly minted Associate Professor of Law at University at Buffalo Law School, The State University of New York.  He holds a a JD and PhD (econ) from Stanford.

October 6, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Puzzling Persistence of the Single Entity Argument for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court's Opportunity to Reject a Flawed Defense

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Gfeldman1 Gabe Feldman (Tulane Law) has just posted The Puzzling Persistence of the Single Entity Argument for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court's Opportunity to Reject a Flawed Defense.

ABSTRACT: This Article argues that a single entity classification for sports leagues divorces antitrust immunity from the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws and is theoretically unsupportable. Antitrust law is designed to act as a gatekeeper, filtering out net anticompetitive conduct. The Seventh Circuit’s single entity approach ignores the competitive effects of league conduct and distorts the basic rationale for distinguishing between single and multiple entity conduct. In doing so, it vests sports leagues with virtually free rein to engage in anticompetitive behavior. This Article also brings to light evidence of actual economic competition between NFL teams that proves that the Seventh Circuit’s single entity analysis in American Needle is factually unsupportable. This Article thus concludes that the Supreme Court should definitively put an end to the single entity defense for professional sports leagues. The Article also proposes a model for streamlining the rule of reason analysis and reducing the litigation burden on sports leagues.

October 6, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)