Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, August 10, 2009

"Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Marc Edelman, Rutgers School of Law-Camden has posted Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade.

ABSTRACT:  This Article explains why some courts would likely find the NFL Personal Conduct Policy to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, and explores ways in which the NFL clubs could promote off-the-field decorum without risking antitrust liability. Part I of this Article discusses the underlying business structure of the NFL. Part II provides a brief overview of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Part III analyzes the legality of the NFL Personal Conduct Policy under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Part IV proposes four ways in which NFL clubs could promote positive off-the-field decorum without incurring antitrust risk.

August 10, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Oliver Budzinski (Environmental and Business Economics - University of Southern Denmark) identifies Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits.

ABSTRACT: Naturally, competition policy is based on competition economics made applicable in terms of law and its enforcement. Within the different branches of competition economics, modern industrial economics, or more precisely game-theoretic oligopoly theory, has become the dominating paradigm both in the U.S. (since the 1990s Post-Chicago movement) and in the EU (so-called more economic approach in the 2000s). This contribution reviews the state of the art in antitrust-oriented modern industrial economics and, in particular, critically discusses open questions and possible limits of basing antitrust on modern industrial economics. In doing so, it provides some hints how to escape current enforcement problems in industrial economics-based competition policy on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, the paper advocates a change of the way modern industrial economics is used in competition policy: instead of more and more cas! e-by-cases analyses, the insights from modern industrial economics should be used to design better competition rules.

August 10, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, August 9, 2009

European Commission Slammed for Intel Case Lapse

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

This is not good news regarding the rule of law.  According to the Wall Street Journal, "The European Union's ombudsman issued a rare rebuke of the bloc's antitrust regulator, saying it failed to record 'potentially exculpatory' evidence from a witness in its investigation of chip giant IntelCorp."  The article is an interesting read.  No response yet from DG Comp.

August 9, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)