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June 6, 2009
4th Annual ForoCompetencia Colloquium
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
En nombre del Comité Organizador quería anticiparles que el viernes 16 de octubre de 2009 se realizará el 4° Coloquio ForoCompetencia en el Sheraton Pilar, en las afueras de Buenos Aires.
Este año el temario será el siguiente:
- Panel 1: Defensa de la competencia e intervención del Estado.
- Panel 2: Medidas preventivas.
- Panel 3: Acuerdos de clemencia.
- Panel 4: Control de fusiones en la nueva economía: Convergencia e innovación.
En los próximos días estaremos enviando el programa completo.
Al igual que en la vez pasada, el precio de la inscripción será de U$S 150 (sector privado) y U$S 75 (sector público). Se recuerda asimismo que los cupos son limitados.
Para inscribirse hay que contactarse con Marina Bidart (marinabidart@
4to. COLOQUIO FOROCOMPETENCIA
Pilar, Buenos Aires - 16 de octubre de
2009
Programa
8:30 - 9:00 - Acreditación y desayuno.
9:00 - 9:10 -
Palabras de bienvenida:Miguel del Pino, Miembro del Comité Organizador del 4°
Coloquio.
9:10 – 9:30 – Palabras de apertura: Dr. Ricardo Napolitani,
Presidente de la CNDC (a confirmar).
9:30 - 11:00 - Panel 1: Defensa de
la competencia e intervención del Estado en tiempos de crisis.
Panelista:
Ignacio de León (Econlex, Venezuela).
Comentaristas:
José Tavara
(Universidad Católica, Perú).
Moderador: Julián Peña
11:00 - 11:30 -
Café.
11:30 - 13:00 - Panel 2: Medidas preventivas.
Panelista: Antonio
Creus (Bird & Bird, España) (A confirmar).
Comentaristas: Alfredo Gusmán
(Cámara Apel. Civil y Comercial Federal, Argentina).
Ismael Malis (ex
Presidente CNDC, Argentina).
René Medrado (Pinheiro Neto,
Brasil).
Moderador: Marcelo D’Amore
13:00 - 14:30 - Almuerzo buffet
14:30 - 16:00 - Panel 3: Acuerdos de clemencia.
Integrantes: Mariana
Tavares (Secretaria de Derecho Económico, Brasil).
Diego Póvolo (vocal de la
CNDC, Argentina).
Karine Faden (Freshfields, EE.UU.).
Javier
González-Magaz (Steptoe & Johnson, EE.UU.).
Moderador: Viviana
Guadagni
16:00 - 16:30 - Café.
16:30 - 18:00 - Panel 4: Control de
fusiones en la nueva economía: Convergencia e innovación
Panelista: Santiago
Urbiztondo (FIEL, Argentina).
Comentaristas: Antonio Guerra Fernández (Uría
& Menéndez, España).
Felipe Irarrázabal (Philippi, Yrarrázabal, Pulido
& Brunner, Chile).
Humberto Guardia Mendonça (Vocal de la CNDC,
Argentina).
Moderador: Walter Cont
18:00 - Palabras de cierre, Marcelo
den Toom, Miembro del Comité Organizador del 4° Coloquio.
June 6, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 5, 2009
More Common Ground for International Competition Law?
The 4th ASCOLA Conference
More Common Ground for International Competition Law?
June 16-17, 2009
George Washington University Law School
Washington, D.C.
Registration is free
Day 1: Tuesday, June 16
8.45 a.m. Welcome and Opening
Edward Swaine, Competition Law Center at George Washington University
Law School
9.00 a.m. PART I: Economic Foundations of Competition Law
Chair: Warren Grimes
How Consumer Choice is the Best Way to Model Competition Law
Robert Lande, University of Baltimore Law School
A Unified Theory of Competition and Consumer Protection Law: Consumer Choice
Neal Averitt, Federal Trade Commission
Goals of Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics
Maurice Stucke, University of Tennessee College of Law
10:30 – 11:30 a.m.: Coffee Break
Comments
Jonathan Baker, American University Law School
Wolfgang Kerber, University of Marburg
Paul Nihoul, University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Discussion
12:30 p.m. Lunch
2:00 p.m. PART II: Institutional Hot Topics
Chair: Eleanor Fox
The Role of NGOs in the Development of Competition Law
Albert Foer, American Antitrust Institute
Developments in U.S. Enforcement
Stephen Calkins, Wayne State University Law School
Discussion
3:15 – 3:45 p.m.: Coffee Break
3:45 p.m. PART III: International Antitrust
Chair: Eleanor Fox
Rethinking of Extraterritorial Application of Competition Law in Japan
Yoshizumi Tojo, Rikkyo University (Japan)
Regional Agreements as the Next Step in International Antitrust
Michal Gal, Haifa University
Comments
Clifford Jones, University of Florida Law School
Discussion
5:00 p.m. General Assembly (ASCOLA Members Only)
Day 1: Wednesday, June 17
9:00 a.m. PART IV: International Perspectives of Hot Topics
Chair: Rudolph J.R. Peritz
The Anti-competitive Effect of Resale Price Maintenance
Marina Lao, Seton Hall University Law School
Australia’s criminalization of cartels: Should it be contagious?
Caron Beaton-Wells, University of Melbourne
Comments
Josef Bejček, Brno University (Czech Republic)
Discussion
10:30 – 11:30 a.m.: Coffee Break
A Comparative Look at the Control of State Enterprises in China
Deborah Healey, University of New South Wales
Discussion
1:00 p.m. Lunch
Lunch Speech
Diane P. Wood, Federal Judge at the Court of Appeals for the
7th Circuit; University of Chicago Law School
2:30 p.m. PART V: Abuse of Dominance and Monopolization
Chair: Clifford Jones
Prospects for Narrowing the US-EC Gap on Dominant Firm Conduct
Andrew Gavil, Howard University School of Law
Abuse of Market Power in Related Markets
Thomas Eilmansberger, Salzburg University
Comments
Discussion
3:45 – 4:15 p.m.: Coffee Break
4:15 p.m. PART VI: Intellectual Property in Competition
Chair: Clifford Jones
Patent Ambush Strategies and Article 82 EC Treaty
Andreas Fuchs, Osnabrück University
Reverse Payment in Patent Litigation Settlements
Rudolph J.R. Peritz, New York Law School
Comments
Josef Drexl, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law (Munich)
Steven Anderman, University of Essex (UK)
Gustavo Ghidini, LUISS Guido Carli (Rome), Milan University
Discussion
5:45 p.m. Farewell
Josef Drexl, Chair of ASCOLA
Registrants should send inquiries to lduche@law.gwu.edu.
June 5, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Intellectual Oligopoly: A Cautious Defense of Intellectual Oligopoly with Fringe Competition
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Mark Lemley (Stanford Law) challenges Michele Boldrin and David Levine in Intellectual Oligopoly: A Cautious Defense of Intellectual Oligopoly with Fringe Competition.
ABSTRACT: Michele
Boldrin and David Levine offer a strong attack on intellectual property
(IP), which they call “intellectual monopoly.” In their view, IP is not
necessary to encourage invention or creation. Quite the contrary, they
argue that we get innovation from competition, not monopoly. Further,
because monopoly imposes well-recognized social costs, we are better
off without it if it doesn’t in fact spur new innovation.
Boldrin
and Levine make a plausible case on their own terms. Nonetheless, I
think their terms are misleading. IP rights are rarely if ever
“intellectual monopolies.” Most patents, to say nothing of most
copyrights, create no economic rents. What this means is that we can’t
assume that IP rights generally impose deadweight losses on society.
They cause deviation from atomistic, perfect competition, but they
don’t cause monopoly pricing. With a small number of exceptions,
therefore, they don’t cause the social harms Boldrin and Levine
correctly associate with monopoly pricing.
June 5, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Antitrust and 'Free Movement' Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Marc Edelman, Rutgers School of Law-Camden and Brian Doyle, Seton Hall Law explain Antitrust and 'Free Movement' Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe.
ABSTRACT: This article discusses the legal risks that would emerge if the National Basketball Association ("NBA") and National Football League ("NFL") decide to expand into Europe. Part I of this article explains the differences in operating structure between U.S. and European professional sports leagues. Part II discusses the differences in competition law between the United States and European Community. Part III explains why the legal status of age and education requirements (age/education requirements) is more favorable to professional sports leagues under U.S. law than under EC law. Part IV explains why the legal status of league drafts and reserve systems also might be more favorable to professional sports leagues under U.S. law.
June 5, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 4, 2009
Economic Effects of State Bans on Direct Manufacturer Sales to Car Buyers
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Gerald R. Bodisch (DOJ) examines the Economic Effects of State Bans on Direct Manufacturer Sales to Car Buyers. I think that this is an important paper. The reason that the franchise rules work the way they do is because of public choice concerns. There are lots of local dealers (although the number will be shrinking soon thanks to GM and Chrysler bankruptcies) with lots of political power at the state level that make sure to protect themselves from competition. Hopefully this paper will move the debate forward by shedding light on how laws can be changed to reflect pro-competitive concerns and to protect consumers from special interests that missuse government regulation for anti-competitive ends. This is a must read for state legislators and consumer groups.
ABSTRACT: State franchise laws prohibit auto manufacturers from making sales directly
to consumers. This paper advocates eliminating state bans on direct manufacturer
sales in order to provide automakers with an opportunity to reduce inventories
and distribution costs by better matching production with consumer preferences.
June 4, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Antitrust, Patents and Developing Nations
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
John Barton (Stanford Law) writes on Antitrust, Patents and Developing Nations.
ABSTRACT: In the developed world, antitrust policy has traditionally been a foil to intellectual property (IP). There are now serious concerns that the world's IP system, including both rules created by national legislation and those created by international agreements, is stronger than is the economic interests of developing nations. A stronger antitrust law might be a valuable response.
This article, therefore, examines the actions that developing nations might take in the antitrust area, looking both at national legislation and at international analysis and explores how to pursue such approaches consistently with current law in the area. The article concentrates on patents but considers copyright law where that law affects technological innovation, as in the case of software. The article does not explore other areas of antitrust laws such as the general treatment of Intellectual Property rights, which noted the possible role of antitrust law but did not explore it in depth because antitrust law proved less relevant to the poorest nations than did the basic access issues explored in that analysis. Nor, except in passing, does the article consider compulsory licensing based on broad principles, such as those included in TRIPS Article 3I3 of the Doha Declaration.
The Article avoids emphasizing specific technical doctrines, emphasizing instead the various economic standards that permeate antitrust practices. It considers three important contexts: the response to a (generally foreign) monopolist, the response to a (generally primarily foreign) global oligopoly or cartel, and the management of relations between a major (generally foreign) firm and a local licensee.
June 4, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Sports Leagues and the Rule of Reason: How to Assess Internal Venture Restraints
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
James Keyte & Paul Eckles (both Skadden) address Sports Leagues and the Rule of Reason: How to Assess Internal Venture Restraints.
ABSTRACT: ...The question, then, is whether there is an alternative analytical framework the Court could adopt that could cut short or streamline these wasteful litigations but without a finding that sports leagues are a single entity? For many years, in addition to pressing its "single entity" defense, sports leagues have argued for a particular variant of the "ancillary restraints doctrine" that would find a League's internal decisions, rules, and practices are "ancillary" to the joint venture itself and, hence, reasonable as a matter of law.
As discussed below, the sports leagues have not had much success in the lower courts with this argument; moreover, the jurisprudence regarding the ancillary restraints doctrine in general has a muddled history and has largely been subsumed within the broader rule of reason. Professor Gary R. Roberts, who has been writing on this subject for decades, once framed the question this way: "The ultimate issue here is not whether leagues are single entities or a collection of independent firms; rather, it is whether or not the internal rules and decisions of leagues ought to be immune from case-by-case rule of reason review under section 1."
American Needle could provide the Supreme Court the opportunity to cut through that confusion over the rule of reason's application to sports leagues and adopt an analytical framework recognizing that legitimate joint ventures should have the discretion to run their businesses based on their own business judgment without being second-guessed by federal courts. For far too long, there has been a schism in the rule of reason framework as applied to sports leagues and other legitimate ventures. Thus, while certain types of restraints can be challenged without any economic analysis at all under the per se rule, there has been no analytic device at the other end of the spectrum to immunize from antitrust challenge under Section 1 the types of fundamental decisions that legitimate business collaborations must be allowed to make without continual second-guessing under the guise of Section 1.
June 4, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 3, 2009
Entry in the ADHD Drugs Market: Welfare Impact of Generics and Me-toos
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Farasat A.S. Bokhari (FSU - Econ) and Gary M. Fournier (FSU - Econ) explain Entry in the ADHD Drugs Market: Welfare Impact of Generics and Me-toos.
ABSTRACT: In this paper, we exploit a novel approach for instrumenting a di fferentiated products demand system for therapeutically equivalent drugs. Using unusually detailed sales data on psychostimulant drugs, used to treat Attention De cit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), we are able to identify and measure substitution patterns across a range of drugs. We find that the demand for ADHD drugs is quite elastic and there are significant substitution possibilities among these drugs, both within the molecule and form, as well as across the segments. In addition, the first-time introduction of a generic drug shows large welfare gains due to expansion of the market to price sensitive consumers. Further, the welfare gains due to the introduction of me-too drugs vary by the novelty of the drug, and for significantly new varieties can be as large as those of the introduction of a generic. Our results bear policy implications for both, the speed with which new drugs are approved for marketing, as well as for actions among pharmaceutical firms that may delay the
entry of a generic drug.
June 3, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Horizontal Mergers, Involuntary Unemployment, and Welfare
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Oliver Budzinski (Environmental and Business Economics - University of Southern Denmark) and Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer (Economic Policy Unit - Philipps-University of Marburg) analyze Horizontal Mergers, Involuntary Unemployment, and Welfare.
Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production (synergies). However, demand-side effects of synergies are usually neglected. We introduce them into a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by assuming an (empirically supported) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific synergies and derive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers are substantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in full employment economies, demand-side effects remain negligible. Eventually, policy conclusions for merger control are discussed
June 3, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
The world turn’d upside down
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Peter Freeman (Chairman, Competition Commission) delivered a speech The world turn’d upside down.
ABSTRACT: The line from which the title phrase is taken is from a ballad sung in protest against the abolition by Oliver Cromwell of Christmas festivities at the time of the English Civil War. We are not facing civil strife today, but we are facing economic strife on a scale not seen since the 1930s. In that sense, our world has indeed turned upside down.
This is a critical time for both competition policy and competition enforcement. These of course are different things, and we should be clear what we mean by them. Policy is the overall framework which provides the objectives and justification for what we do. Enforce-ment means the actions taken by authorities in pursuit of those objectives. I have always thought that the idea of ‘enforcing’ competition is rather heroic. Enforcing the law that prohibits infringements as in the case of Articles 81 and 82, yes; but in the CC’s case, with our job of investigating mergers and markets, as well as our regulatory role, we are better described as acting to maintain, restore or promote competition, depending on the circum-stances.
June 3, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
The Overcharge as a Measure for Antitrust Damages
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Martijn A. Han, University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics, and Jan Tuinstra, University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics discuss The Overcharge as a Measure for Antitrust Damages.
ABSTRACT: Victims of antitrust violations can recover damages in court. Yet, the quantification of antitrust damages and to whom they accrue is often complex. An illegal price increase somewhere in the chain of production percolates through to the other layers in a sequence of partial pass-ons. The resulting reductions in sales and input demands lead to additional harm to downstream (in)direct purchasers and upstream suppliers to the cartel, respectively. Nevertheless, U.S. civil antitrust litigation is almost exclusively concerned with direct purchaser claims for (treble) damages calculated on the basis of the overcharge. Similar best practice rules are emerging in Europe. In this paper, we show that the direct purchaser overcharge bears no structural relation to the true harm inflicted by a cartel on all of its direct and indirect purchasers and sellers in the chain of production.
June 3, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Alitalia—Government Interventionism, The Road to Recovery?
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Philippe Noguès (O'Melveny & Myers) & Giovanni Cifelli (O'Melveny & Myers) asks Alitalia—Government Interventionism, The Road to Recovery?
ABSTRACT: On December 3, 2008, the Italian competition authority (the “ICA”) authorized the merger between Compagnia Aerea Italiana (“CAI”), a new Italian company incorporated in order to acquire most of the passenger-related assets of Alitalia, and AirOne, the second largest Italian carrier. According to the decision, the transaction led to overlaps on 22 domestic and seven international routes where the combined entity would have a market share ranging from 50 to 100 percent. More importantly, the decision also outlined that the merged entity would be the only carrier to offer passenger air transport on numerous routes, including some of the most relevant routes in terms of traffic and revenue, whereas elsewhere the presence of competing operators, with a few exceptions, would be strongly reduced.
Confronted with that analysis—which concluded that a transaction would impede effective competition by creating dominant positions on several markets—many, if not all, competition regulators in the world would have either prohibited the transaction or approved it further to significant structural remedies in order to ensure that the consumer would not be harmed. In fact, quite the contrary happened in this case!
June 3, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 2, 2009
Avoidance and Denial of Liability for Cartel Offences: Proactive Lawful Escape Routes Left Open by the Cartel Legislation
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Brent Fisse (Melbourne Law) discusses Avoidance and Denial of Liability for Cartel Offences: Proactive Lawful Escape Routes Left Open by the Cartel Legislation. Download Fisse_Avoidance_&_Denial_of_Liability_for_Cartel_Offences
ABSTRACT: Cartel litigation and cartel investigation are likely to be shaped to a significant extent by what corporations and managers do proactively in response to the threat of criminal sanctions, civil penalties and liability for damages. It would be a mistake to assume that the prime targets of the new cartel legislation1 – those competitors who cause multi-million dollar losses to consumer welfare by co-ordinating their conduct instead of competing against each other – will be sitting ducks waiting to be shot.
The new cartel offences and civil penalty prohibitions are intended to electrify the deterrence of cartel conduct. However, discussion of the implications for corporate and individual behaviour has been superficial and not always realistic. It is entirely possible that a direct effect will be to induce the more widespread use of anti-competitive methods of doing business that do not involve breaking the law. Corporations and their advisers are adept at managing the law in ways they believe will achieve their perceived interests as distinct from the interests of legislators and enforcement agencies.2 This paper outlines some of the avenues open to corporations and their managers to avoid or deny liability by revising their liability control strategies and doing some re-engineering or personal training to implement those strategies.
Many lawful escape routes are open to those in the corporate sector who do not share the noble aspirations of those responsible for Australian anti-cartel laws. The escape routes are not riskfree
but some conceivably can be made to work.
June 2, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Asia-Pacific Antitrust Review 2009
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
The Global Competition Review has published the The Asia-Pacific Antitrust Review.
- Introduction
- Overviews
- Overview: Cartels
Paul Schoff, Andrew Matthews - Minter Ellison - Overview: International Competition
Peter Camesasca, Dimitri Nionakis, Marc Reysen, David Stewart - Howrey LLP - Overview: Merger Control
David A Higbee - Hunton & Williams LLP
- Overview: Cartels
- Country Chapters
- Australia: Overview
Peter Armitage, Wolfgang Hellmann - Blake Dawson - Canada: Cartels
Jim Dinning, Mark Katz - Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP - Canada: Merger Control
Susan M Hutton - Stikeman Elliott LLP - China: Antimonopoly Law
Nathan Bush - O'Melveny & Myers LLP - China: Merger Control
Peter J Wang, Yizhe Zhang - Jones Day - Hong Kong: Overview
Christy Baker, Connie Carnabuci, Margaret Wang - Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer - India: Overview
Suchitra Chitale - Chitale & Chitale Partners - Indonesia: Overview
James Donoghue, Toby Grainger - Soebagjo, Jatim, Djarot in association with Blake Dawson - Japan: Merger Control
Shigeyoshi Ezaki, Etsuko Hara, Vassili Moussis - Anderson Mori & Tomotsune - Korea: Overview
Kyung-Taek Jung, Donghoon Yi - Kim & Chang - Korea: Abuse of Dominance
Karen Yookyung Choi, Min-Ho Lee - Shin & Kim - Korea: Merger Control
Yong Seok Ahn, Yu Jin Kim - Lee & Ko - Papua New Guinea: Overview
Peter Armitage, Wolfgang Hellmann - Blake Dawson
- Australia: Overview
June 2, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
A Plea for Greater Antitrust Transparency
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Comments over breakfast one morning last week at a great antitrust conference in Santorini organized by Ioannis Lianos and UCL got me thinking about the lack of transparency among antitrust practitioners and academics -- at least in the United States though I suspect elsewhere as well. Oftentimes, academics and private practitioners (many with former agency experience) are asked to present at various hearings and workshops because of their expertise on a topic. Oftentimes they include written submissions along with their oral testimony. It is very rare that such practitioners and academics include who has paid for their testimony.
Going forward, I hope that DOJ and FTC begin the introduction to every speaker with the following question. "Have you or will you be billing a client for work in connection with this testimony and if so, who is it?"
Similarly for law reviews and peer review journals, I hope that going forward they mandate disclosure the way that the Antitrust Law Journal does for these purposes.
June 2, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
The unfulfilled promise of New Zealand’s monopolisation law: Sources, symptoms and solutions
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Rex Ahdar (Law, University of Otago) has an interesting piece on The unfulfilled promise of New Zealand’s monopolisation law: Sources, symptoms and solutions. Download Monopolization.CCLJ
ABSTRACT: New Zealand’s monopolisation prohibition — s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 — is not an effective weapon in the antitrust armoury. Proving a violation of s 36 is most difficult as the paucity of successful cases illustrates. Based on a laudable concern that efficient, innovative conduct might be curtailed, the New Zealand courts have overcompensated by promulgating a strict counterfactual test for ‘taking advantage of’ that thwarts effective prosecution of monopolising conduct. This article traces the reasons for this unduly lenient approach and puts forward several suggested solutions — including a multi-stage, burden-shifting, composite test — aimed at reviving s 36 as an effective enforcement tool against single-firm conduct that curtails effective competition.
June 2, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
ICN 8th Annual Conference
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
The annual conference is this week. Movers and shakers from around the world will gather in Zurich.
AGENDA
Pre-ICN Competition and Development Forum
Co-sponsored by IDRC and the Swiss Competition Commission
Side Entrance, Kongresshaus Zurich
Main Entrance, Kongresshaus Zurich
Hosted by the Chairman of the Swiss Competition Commission and
co-sponsored by the International Chamber of Commerce
At Festsaal, Kaufleuten, Zurich
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
Main Entrance, Kongresshaus Zurich
Walter A. Stoffel, Chairman, Swiss Competition Commision
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich Doris Leuthard, Head, Federal Department of Economic Affairs / Federal Councilor
Regine Aeppli, President, Government of the Canton of Zurich
David Lewis, Interim Chair, Steering Group, International Competition Network
Walter A. Stoffel, Chairman, Swiss Competition Commision
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | John Fingleton, CEO, U.K. Office of Fair Trading |
Market Studies Showcase
| Moderators: | René Jansen, Board Member, Netherlands Competition Authority |
| David Miller, Executive Director, Jamaica Fair Trading Commission | |
| Kim Sparlund, Deputy Director General, Danish Competition Authority |
| Panelists: | Melanie L. Aitken, Interim Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau Canada |
| Thula Kaira, Executive Director, Zambia Competition Commission | |
| Dhanendra Kumar, Chairman, Competition Commission of India | |
| Anne Perrot, Vice-Chair, Autorité de la Concurrence, France |
| Panelists: | Eduardo Pérez Motta, President, Federal Competition Commission, Mexico |
| HackHyun Kim, Director General, Korea Fair Trade Commission | |
| David Anderson, Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels | |
| Vladimir Kachalin, Advisor to the Chairman, Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia |
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
Session 1: Institutional directions of competition advocacy
Working Group Room 1, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Małgorzata Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, President, Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, Poland |
| Resource Persons: | Nancy Olson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice |
| Mirna Pavletic Zupic, Member, Croatian Competition Council |
Session 2: Sectoral dimension of competition advocacy
Working Group Room 2, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Markus Lange, Head, Bundeskartellamt, Germany |
| Resource Persons: | Shuichi Sugahisa, Director, Japan Fair Trade Commission |
| Nigel Caesar, Competition Law Officer, Competition Bureau Canada | |
| Clara Guzman, Director, National Competition Commission, Spain |
Session 3: Competition advocacy: ICN Members experience and recommendations for further ICN work
Working Group Room 3, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Andrea Appella, Director, U.K. Office of Fair Trading |
| Resource Persons: | Maria Coppola Tineo, Counsel, U.S. Federal Trade Commission |
| Duane Schippers, Deputy Commissioner, Competition Bureau Canada |
Session 4: Market Studies: Definition, Purpose and Powers
Working Group Room 4, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | René Jansen, Board Member, Netherlands Competition Authority |
| Resource Person: | Hannah Priest, Attorney, U.K. Office of Fair Trading |
Session 5: Market Studies: Process
Working Group Room 5, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Philip Lowe, Director General, European Commission, DG Competition |
| Resource Person: | Graham Winton, Director, U.K. Office of Fair Trading |
Session 6: Market Studies: Evaluation
Working Group Room 6, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Declan Purcell, Member and Director, Irish Competition Authority |
| Resource Person: | Gianluca Sepe, Senior Lawyer, Italian Competition Authority |
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
J. Robert Kramer II, Director, U.S. Department of Justice
| Moderator: | Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice |
| Panelists: | Ali İhsan Çağlayan, Acting Director, Turkish Competition Authority |
| Nadia Calviño, Deputy Director General, European Commission, DG Competition | |
| Yuji Kimura, Chief Investigator, Japan Fair Trade Commission | |
| Alastair Mordaunt, Director, U.K. Office of Fair Trading | |
| Stanley Wong, Member and Director, Irish Competition Authority |
Session 1: Merger Analysis in Troubled Times and new Merger Analysis RPs
Working Group Room 1, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Michele Pacillo, Economist, Irish Competition Authority |
| Adam Fanaki, Acting Senior Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau Canada | |
| Mateusz Blachucki, Chief Expert, Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, Poland | |
| Resource Person: | Ted Henneberry, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, USA |
Session 2: Merger Analysis in Troubled Times and new Merger Analysis RPs
Working Group Room 2, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Kai Hooghoff, Lawyer, Bundeskartellamt, Germany |
| Nadine Mouy, Deputy General, Autorité de la Concurrence, France | |
| Resource Persons: | Randall Hofley, Stikeman Elliott LLP, Canada |
| John Taladay, Howrey LLP, USA |
Session 3: Merger Analysis in Troubled Times and new Merger Analysis RPs
Working Group Room 3, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Peter Freeman, Chairman, U.K. Competition Commission |
| Eric Tu, International Affairs Officer, Taiwan Fair Trade Commission | |
| Nancy Olson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice | |
| Resource Person: | Jérôme Philippe, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, France |
Session 4: Merger Analysis in Troubled Times and new Merger Analysis RPs
Working Group Room 4, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | J. Robert Kramer II, Director, U.S. Department of Justice |
| Olavo Chinaglia, Commissioner, Administrative Council for Economic Defence, Brazil | |
| Resource Person: | Paul Gorecki, Economic & Social Research Council, Ireland |
Session 5: Notification & Procedures
Working Group Room 5, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Cynthia Lewis Lagdameo, Counsel, U.S. Federal Trade Commission |
| Paul O'Brien, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice | |
| Resource Persons: | Juergen Schindler, Allen & Overy |
| Dave Poddar, Mallesons Stephen Jaques | |
| Omar Wakil, Torys LLP |
Session 6: Notification & Procedures
Working Group Room 6, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Tim Grimwade, Executive General Manager, Mergers Group, Australian Competition & Consumer Commission |
| Daniela Trampert-Paparella, Case Handler, Austrian Competition Authority | |
| Resource Persons: | Robert Schlossberg, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer |
| Hendrik Bourgeois, General Electric |
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Walter A. Stoffel, Chairman, Swiss Competition Commission |
| Panelists: | Ronit Kan, Director General, Israel Antitrust Agency |
| Charles Webb, Executive Director, Jersey Competition Regulatory Authority | |
| Philip Marsden, Director, British Institute of International and Comparative Law | |
| Michal Gal, University of Haifa, NYU Center for Law and Business | |
| Alberto Heimler, Advisor, Italian Competition Authority |
Hosted by the Swiss Competition Commission and the City of Zurich &
the Canton of Zurich, co-sponsored by the Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht
At Lake Side, Zurich
Thursday, June 4, 2009
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice |
| Panelists: | Ana Paula Martinez, Director, Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of Justice, Brazil |
| Graeme Samuel, Chairman, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission |
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | John Pecman, Acting Senior Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau Canada |
| Panelists: | Kirtikumar Mehta, Principal Advisor, European Commission, DG Competition |
| Monique van Oers, Director, Netherlands Competition Authority | |
| Simon Williams, Senior Director, U.K. Office of Fair Trading |
Subgroup 1, Session 1: Transitioning to Criminal Sanctions
Working Group Room 1, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice |
| Ana Paula Martinez, Director, Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of Justice, Brazil | |
| Andrew Christopher, Baker & McKenzie |
Subgroup 1, Session 2: Transitioning to Criminal Sanctions
Working Group Room 2, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Bruno Lasserre, President, Autorité de la Concurrence, France |
| Simon Williams, Senior Director, U.K. Office of Fair Trading | |
| Elizabeth Farina, Law and Economics Consulting Group |
Subgroup 1, Session 3: Transitioning to Criminal Sanctions
Working Group Room 3, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Graeme Samuel, Chairman, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission |
| Eduardo Pérez Motta, President, Federal Competiton Commission, Mexico | |
| Mario Siragusa, Partner, Cleary Gottlieb |
Subgroup 2, Session 1: Leniency: Maximising Incentives for Reporting and Cooperation
Working Group Room 4, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Randal T. Hughes, Partner, McCarthy Tétrault |
| Toshiyuki Nambu, Director, Japan Fair Trade Commission | |
| Mark Pearson, Executive General Manager, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission | |
| Gianluca Sepe, Senior Lawyser, Italian Competition Authority |
Subgroup 2, Session 2: International Cooperation and the Cooperation of Searches
Working Group Room 5, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Sabrina Carron-Roth, Senior Legal Advisor, Swiss Competition Commission |
| John Pecman, Acting Senior Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau Canada | |
| Gary Spratling, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher | |
| Peter Szolnoky, Section Head, Hungarian Competition Authority |
Subgroup 2, Session 3: Investigative Tool Boxes in Criminal and Civil Regimes: Ways to Optimise Detection
Working Group Room 6, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderators: | Olivier Guersent, Director, European Commission, DC Competition |
| Pieter Kalbfleisch, Chairman, Netherlands Competition Authority | |
| Monique van Oers, Director, Netherlands Competition Authority |
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
Distinguishing Pro From Anticompetitive Conduct: The Fine Line Between Aggressive Competition and Anticompetitive Foreclosure in Tying and Discounting Cases
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, U.S. Federal Trade Commission
| Moderator: | Markus Lange, Section Head, Bundeskartellamt, Germany |
| Panelists: | Damien Neven, Chief Economist, European Commission, DG Competition |
| Shlomi Parizat, Chief Economist, Israel Antitrust Authority | |
| Simon Roberts, Chief Economist, South Africa Competition Commission | |
| Renata Hesse, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati | |
| Jorge Padilla, Law and Economics Consulting Group |
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
Session 1:
Working Group Room 1, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Richie Hutton, New Zealand Commerce Commission |
| Resource Person: | Kai Hooghoff, Legal Adviser, Bundeskartellamt, Germany |
Session 2:
Working Group Room 2, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Deborah Platt Majoras, General Counsel, The Procter & Gamble Company |
| Resource Persons: | Ernst Ferdinandusse, Principal Administrator, European Commission |
| Stephanie Yon, International Adviser, Autorité de la Concurrence, France |
Session 3:
Working Group Room 3, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Gianluca Sepe, Senior Lawyser, Italian Competition Authority |
| Resource Persons: | Charles Webb, Executive Director, Jersey Competition Regulatory Authority |
| Michael Blechman, Kaye Scholer, LLP |
Session 4:
Working Group Room 4, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Anne Purcell White, Assistant Chief, U.S. Department of Justice |
| Resource Persons: | Frank Montag, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer |
| Paolo Palmigiano, BT Group plc |
Session 5:
Working Group Room 5, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Shuichi Sugahisa, Director, Japan Fair Trade Commission |
| Resource Persons: | Alden Abbott, Associate Director, U.S. Federal Trade Commission |
| Marcel Meinhardt, Lenz & Staehelin |
Session 6:
Working Group Room 6, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Justus Haucap, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg |
| Resource Persons: | Martine Dagenais, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Competition Bureau Canada |
| Eleanor M. Fox, New York University School of Law |
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Olavo Chinaglia, Commissioner, Administrative Council for Economic Defence, Brazil |
| Panelists | Philip Lowe, Director General, European Commission, DG Competition |
| Maria Coppola Tineo, Counsel, U.S. Federal Trade Commission | |
| Barış Ekdi, Competition Expert, Turkish Competition Authority |
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Speaker: | Russell Damtoft, Associate Director, U.S. Federal Trade Commission |
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
CPI Subgroup 1, Session 1: Institutional Setting
Working Group Room 1, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Jungwon Song, Section Head, Korean Fair Trade Commission |
| Resource Persons: | Fabien Zivy, Head of Staff of the President, Autorité de la Concurrence, France |
| Shan Ramburuth, Commissioner, South African Competition Commission |
CPI Subgroup 1, Session 2: Compliance with remedies and sanctions – design, monitoring compliance and enforcement of decisions
Working Group Room 2, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | William Kovacic, Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission |
| Resource Persons: | Carlos Esteva Mosso, Acting Director, European Commission, DC Competition |
| Tsutomu Nakato, Hibiya Sogo Law Office, Japan |
CPI Subgroup 1, Session 3: Ex-post evaluation – macro evaluation – broad evaluation; impact in consumers; what are the benefits the agencies’ decision give to society (assessment)
Working Group Room 3, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Barış Ekdi, Competition Expert, Turkish Competition Authority |
| Resource Persons: | Celina Escolan, President, El Salvador Superintendency of Competition |
| John Fingleton, CEO, U.K. Office of Fair Trading | |
| Kazuhiko Takeshima, Chairman, Japan Fair Trade Commission |
CPI Subgroup 2, Session 1: The assessment of technical assistance needs of developing agencies
Working Group Room 5, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Joszef Sarai, Section Head, Hungarian Competition Authority |
| Resource Persons: | Vladimir Kachelin, Assistant to the Head, Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation |
| Hilary Jennings, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development | |
| George Lipmile, United Nations Commission on Trade and Development |
CPI Subgroup 2, Session 2: ICN experience-sharing in cyberspace: the on-line discussion forum
Working Group Room 6, Kongresshaus Zurich
| Moderator: | Mariana Tavares, Section Head, Portuguese Competition Authority |
| Resource Persons: | Kenneth Smith Ramos, Director General, Federal Competition Commission, Mexico |
| Russel Damtoft, Associate Director, U.S. Federal Trade Commission | |
| Eleanor M. Fox, New York University School of Law |
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
Hosted by the Swiss Competition Commission
At Uto Kulm, Zurich
Friday, June 5, 2009
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
Panel and Plenary Sessions on Vice-Chairs’ present and future work and ideas for assisting and supporting member agencies
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
Panel Discussion
| Moderator: | Philip Collins, Chairman, U.K. Office of Fair Trading |
| Panelists: | William E. Kovacic, ICN Vice-Chair for Outreach; Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission |
| Eduardo Pérez Motta, ICN Vice-Chair of International Coordination; President, Commission on Competition, Mexico | |
| Kazuhiko Takeshima, ICN Vice-Chair of Advocacy and Implementation; Chairman, Japan Fair Trade Commission | |
| Eleanor M. Fox, New York University School of Law | |
| Tommy Deza Sandoval, Legal Adviser, Sala de Defensa de la Competencia, Peru | |
| Chuan Leong Lam, Chairman, Competition Commission of Singapore | |
| David Miller, Executive Director, Jamaica Fair Trading Commission |
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
Plenary Session & Discussion, Continued
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
Plenary, Kongresshaus Zurich
Walter A. Stoffel, Chairman, Swiss Competition Commission
David Lewis, Interim Chair, Steering Group, International Competition
Fevzi Özkan, Vice President, Turkish Competition Authority
Networking, Coffee Break & Lunch, Kongresshaus Zurich
Main Entrance, Kongresshaus Zurich
June 2, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
June 1, 2009
Assessing the Antitrust Case Against the Bowl Championship Series
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Andrew Zimbalist (Smith College - Econ) writes on Assessing the Antitrust Case Against the Bowl Championship Series.
ABSTRACT: In an uncertain world, one predictable event is that the Bowl Championship Series (“BCS”) perennially engenders widespread skepticism and strident criticism. In 2008-09, Florida (13-1) beat Oklahoma (12-2) to win the putative college football national championship. No one disputes that Florida and Oklahoma were among the nation’s best teams, but Utah (13-0), USC (12-1), and Texas (12-1) all feel they deserved a shot at the title. Indeed, Texas even beat Oklahoma in a regular season game.
This year, the president of the United States is also weighing in. President Obama stated: “If I’m Utah, or if I’m USC or if I’m Texas, I might still have some quibbles. That’s why we need a playoff.”
In place since 1998, the BCS purports to determine the national champion in college football, while preserving the century-old system of postseason bowl games. To make its determination of which teams go to the championship game, the BCS employs the USA Today Coaches Poll, the Harris Interactive College Football Poll, and an average of six computer rankings...
Does the BCS violate U.S. antitrust laws and is it vulnerable to an antitrust challenge?
June 1, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Economic Theory And Competition Law
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Recently out is Economic Theory And Competition Law, edited by Josef Drexl (Max Planck Institute).
BOOK ABSTRACT: It is a fact that economics matters when it comes to competition law. Yet, the context for this book is the increasingly complex relationship of economic theory and competition law which gives rise to lively political and academic debate about the direction competition law should take in a more global and innovation-oriented market place. Adopting a comparative background, taking into account different situations in the US, Europe, Japan, transition and developing countries, the contributors to the book investigate the impact of economics on the objectives of competition law both in various fields of competition law enforcement – restrictive agreements, unilateral restraints, merger control – and on the effectiveness of enforcement in a given legal and judicial system.
Contents: Preface Part I: The Goals of Competition Law – A Comparative Perspective Part II: The Status of Efficiency Analysis in Competition Law Part III: Economic Analysis and Competition Law in Practice Part IV: Guest Speech Index Contributors: M. Chagny, T. Eilmansberger, H.W. Friederiszick, M.-A. Frison-Roche, M.S. Gal, D.J. Gerber, T.L. Greaney, S. Hayashi, W. Kerber, B. Lasserre, A. Louvaris, G. Parr, A. Perrot, H. Schweitzer, L. Tichý, R. Zäch, D. Zimmer
June 1, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Two-Sided Market Definition
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
David S. Evans, University College, London, University of Chicago Law School, LECG explains Two-Sided Market Definition.
ABSTRACT: This paper addresses the analysis of market definition when the parties involved in an antitrust or merger analysis include one or more two-sided platforms. We discuss how standard market definition measures such as SSNIP tests, diversion ratios, and conditional logit demand analyses have to be modified to account for the unique characteristics of two-sided platforms. We also review how market definition of two- sided platforms was treated in recent US and EC case law.
June 1, 2009 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
