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December 22, 2009
The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Herb Hovenkamp (Iowa Law) explains The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond.
ABSTRACT: In
Twombly the Supreme Court held that an antitrust complaint failed
because its allegations did not include enough “factual matter” to
justify proceeding to discovery. Two years later the Court extended
this new pleading standard to federal complaints generally. Twombly’s
unnecessarily broad language had led to a broad rewriting of federal
pleading doctrine.
Naked market division conspiracies such as
the one pled in Twombly must be kept secret because antitrust enforcers
will prosecute them when they are detected. This inherent secrecy,
which the Supreme Court did not discuss, has dire consequences for
pleading if too much factual specificity is required. Indeed, it can
close the door in cases where the conspiracy is reasonably suspected
but supporting evidence has not already been uncovered.
In the
paradigm cartel case the defendants meet secretly in a hotel room and
plot prices or output. But antitrust agreements can be proven by other
evidence, including evidence of interdependence, parallel behavior, and
actions contrary to independent self-interest. By indicating that the
complaint failed because it did not state “which of their employees”
may have conspired and that there was some “when” or “where” that the
agreement took place, the Court was apparently requiring the plaintiff
to plead something in its complaint that existing law would not require
it to show in order to avoid summary judgment or a JML at trial. Or to
say it differently, the Court was changing conspiracy doctrine at the
same time that it was changing pleading doctrine.
The most
salient fact about Twombly is that, although it was a
proof-of-agreement case, the claim was of geographic market division
rather than parallel pricing. For all of its lengthy discussion about
the facts essential to a good complaint, the Supreme Court paid little
attention to the difference between price fixing and market division.
While parallel pricing typically is interdependent conduct, parallel
failures to enter one another’s markets typically are not. As a result,
methods of indirect proof that might work in a case alleging unlawful
price fixing are unlikely to work in one alleging unlawful market
division. Twombly clearly reached the correct conclusion, but it could
have done less damage to the values of notice pleading stated in the
Federal Rules had it focused more narrowly on the mechanisms by which
anticompetitive agreements are proven. Pleading reform requires, not an
increase in “factual matter,” but rather a closer correlation between
the legal elements that must be proven and the allegations in a
complaint.
December 22, 2009 | Permalink
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